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 “Beyond the Banlieue: French Postcolonial Migration & the Politics of a Sub-Saharan 
Identity” details and historicizes the interstitial area between French state acculturation policies 
and the lived experience of Afro-French residents from 1945-2018. The project uses oral 
histories from Black communities in Paris to reveal a rich legacy of sociopolitical, economic and 
cultural efforts to navigate and negotiate this divide. These narratives offer an alternative 
perspective to prevailing scholarly and popular discourses emphasizing decline, resentment, 
intractability and rebellion as the defining features of French race relations in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century. This dissertation examines the attempts and attitudes of activists, 
entrepreneurs, artists, authors, teachers, youth and politicians to reclaim a largely untold history 
of the way that three generations of African migrants have contested the “invisibility” of race 
and the shortcomings of state policy to forge communities and multilayered identities in the 
postcolonial era. Interweaving the processes of migration and acculturation, this project mines 
the experiences of black diasporic populations in Paris over the past seventy years to reimagine 
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Africa on the Seine: Immigration, Community and the Post-Colonial Diaspora 
 
 The long avenue of the Champs-Élysées was crowded with thousands of soldiers and 
civilians on August 26, 1944.  Even before the formal parade began, joyous spectators celebrated 
in the street. As the 2nd Armored Division of the French army marched toward the Arc de 
Triomphe, bystanders hugged each other as they watched their heroes pass by. The tri-colored 
French flag flapped triumphantly in the summer breeze. After almost two weeks of armed 
volleys between Nazi and Allied Forces, the crowd gathered to rejoice in Paris’ liberation.1  
The final advance toward freedom from Nazi rule began in the Parisian suburb of Pantin 
on August 15th. Allied forces recruited local residents to join the final “struggle against the 
invader.”2  In an effort to counter this mass mobilization, Adolf Hitler instructed his army to 
destroy Paris.  For the next ten days, explosions shook the streets. As Allied troops advanced, 
they fired rounds into the air. When German General Dietrick von Cholitz surrendered, Parisians 
descended from their flats and flooded the streets singing “La Marseilliase.”3 In celebration of 
                                                          
1 The parade on August 26, 1944 is detailed in the following monographs, newspaper articles, and documentary 
film: Michael S. Neiberg, The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944 (New York: Basic Books, 2012); Ray 
Argyle and Maurice Vaïsse, The Paris Game: Charles De Gaulle, the Liberation of Paris, and the Gamble That Won 
France (Toronto, Ont.: Dundurn, 2014); Matthew Cobb, Eleven Days in August: The Liberation of Paris in 1944 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 2014); The Spirit of Liberation. Directed by Konstantin Von Zur Mühlen. Germany: 
Kronos Media, 2017. DVD; General De Gaulle's Triumphant Entry into Paris after Its Liberation. Illustrated London 
News (London, England), Saturday, September 02, 1944; pg. 264; Issue 5498; Meyer Berger, “Grimness Tinges Joy 
of French." New York Times (1923-Current File), Aug 24, 1944; "AP PHOTO ON NEW STAMP." New York Times 
(1923-Current File), Aug 31, 1945.  
2 Marvin Perry, World War II in Europe: A Concise History (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2013), 220.  
3 “La Marseilliase” is the French national anthem.  
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their deliverance from German occupation, General Charles De Gaulle delivered an emotional 
speech. He declared that Paris had been “liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help 
of the French armies.”4 For the next several days, the city reveled in its new found carte blanche.   
The masses of troops that risked their lives to save the city were honored. In the public 
celebrations that swept Paris, soldiers were at the center of the pomp and circumstance. Yet in 
the photographs and films that immortalize the armed forces, the swarms of faces are 
homogenously white.5 Glaringly absent are the almost 200,000 Sub-Saharan African soldiers 
that comprised the French forces throughout World War II.6  
 
 
                                                          
4 Charles Kaiser, The Cost of Courage (New York: Other Press, 2017), 173. 
5 Cécile Bishop, "Photography, Race And Invisibility," Photographies 11, no. 2-3 (2018): 193-213; “Liberation of 
Paris in Images." Visual Communication Quarterly 17, no. 3 (2010); Luc Briand and Aude Deraedt, "Libération De 
Paris: Pourquoi Il N'y a (presque) Pas De Noirs Sur Les Photos." Libération, published on August 25, 2014, 
https://www.liberation.fr/photographie/2014/08/20/paris-libere-uniquement-par-des-soldats-blancs_1083150; 
Éric Lafon, "Photographie De Dukson, « Un Oublié De L'histoire » De La Libération." La Fondation De La Résistance, 
La Fondation Pour La Mémoire De La Déportation, Le Ministère De La Culture (direction Des Archives De France) Et 
Le Ministère De La Défense (direction Des Patrimoines, De La Mémoire, Et Des Archives), accessed on February 21, 
2019, http://www.fondationresistance.org/pages/rech_doc/dukson-oublie-histoire-liberation_photo10.html.  
6Historian Gregory Mann details the 100,000 West African soldiers mobilized during the Fall of France during 1939-
1940. See Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 18. Historian Ruth Ginio describes French efforts in 1942 to recruit an additional 100,000 
soldiers. See Ruth Ginio, The French Army and Its African Soldiers: The Years of Decolonization (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2017), 15. Their work built upon the landmark study by Myron Echenberg, Colonial 
Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991). For 
more monographs examining the role of Black soldiers in World War II see, David Killingray and Martin 
Plaut. Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2012); Timothy L. 
Schroer, Recasting Race after World War II: Germans and African Americans in American-occupied Germany 
(Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2007) and Raffael Scheck, Hitlers African Victims: The German Army 









In the months leading up to the liberation of Paris, De Gaulle withdrew the remaining 
20,000 tiralleurs stationed in France and replaced them with white troops.7 This erasure from the 
public narrative of victory was contested by Black armed forces. In the months following the 
triumph of France, a series of violent incidents ensued between African and white French 
soldiers.8 The most tragic of these events occurred on November 30, 1944.  At an army base 
outside of Dakar, 1,000 Senegalese soldiers protested the French government’s failure to pay 
their military pensions. In retaliation, several white French soldiers shot over thirty five of the 
protesters.9  
                                                          
7 Tiralleurs (is an abbreviation of the term Tirailleurs Sénégalais) which refers to colonial troops recruited from 
West, Central and East Africa known collectively as Sub-Saharan or Black Africa.   See, Eric Deroo and Antoine 
Champeaux, La Force Noire: Gloire Et Infortunes D'une Légende Coloniale (Paris: Editions Tallandier, 2006). This 
process of demobilizing African troops is known as blanchissement (whitening) included West African soldiers 
being removed from the front lines of the battle, forced removal of “American issued” uniforms and weaponry and 
being sent to repatriation centers. See Mann, Native Sons, 116-119.  
8 These incidents occurred at transit camps throughout provincial cities both in France and West Africa.  
9 For more on clashes at Camp Thiaroye, see Sabrina Parent, Cultural Representations of Massacre: 
Reinterpretations of the Mutiny of Senegal (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and Nancy 
Ellen Lawler, Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992). 




In the wake of World War II, France lay in ruins. More than 567,000 civilians and 
soldiers died. Its farm lands were destroyed and public morale was low. Later that year, General 
turned President Charles De Gaulle announced his plan to rebuild the nation. The era that 
followed is what historians call “Les Trente Glorieuses” of prosperity and consumption.10 The 
French economy saw unprecedented growth. To sustain this rapid expansion, French companies 
and officials recruited immigrant laborers. Comprised of mostly colonial populations, these 
migrants posed a particular challenge to France’s commitment to a uniform national language, 
culture and raceless identity. Immigrating from Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, they were 
employed in French steel factories, along car plant assembly lines and as street-sweepers. In the 
same way that African soldiers were crucial to France’s victory over German Nazis, Black 
workforces were critical to sustaining the French postwar economic boom.  During these years of 
frenzied development, waves of Sub-Saharan migrants arrived in France uninhibited by 
legislation. They constructed much of the nation’s current infrastructure.  When an economic 
decline in 1973 brought an end to France’s extraordinary expansion, the government hastily 
curtailed immigration in 1975. In the years that followed, France increasingly targeted Black 
migrants as the scapegoats for unemployment, urban decay and political turmoil.  
In a society that touts its “racelessness,” the lives of Black French men and women reveal 
the chasm between attitudes and actuality. It is within the gaps between policy and personal 
experience that this dissertation situates itself. “Beyond the Banlieue” details and historicizes the 
interstitial area between French state acculturation policies and the lived experience of Black 
French residents. The narratives that emerge from Black communities in Paris reveal a rich 
                                                          
10 “Les Trente Glorieuses” or Thirty Glorious Years. 
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legacy of sociopolitical, economic and cultural efforts to navigate and negotiate this divide.11 
They offer an alternative perspective to prevailing scholarly and popular discourses emphasizing 
decline, resentment, intractability and rebellion as the defining features of French race relations 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.12 This dissertation reclaims a largely untold 
history of the way that three generations of African migrants have contested the “invisibility” of 
race and the shortcomings of state policy to forge communities and multilayered identities in the 
postcolonial era.13 The lives of activists, entrepreneurs, artists, authors, teachers, youth and 
politicians are interwoven with the processes of migration and acculturation. Taken together, 
these experiences reveal how Black diasporic populations in Paris over the past seventy years 
have reimagined the place and power of race in contemporary French history.    
                                                          
11 Various grassroots initiatives haven taken place in France to encourage African immigrant sociopolitical, cultural 
and economic growth. These efforts encourage maintaining a connection to Africa based upon ancestral origin but 
also a space to experiment with political and social agendas. For more information see, Diobaye Ndeye, “True 
Loves: African entrepreneurs are welcomed to Paris for this Hackathon, True Africa, published on February 18, 
2016, http://trueafrica.co/article/true-loves-african-entrepreneurs-are-welcomed-to-paris-for-this-hackathon/; 
Suzanne Gauch, "Sampling Globalization in Calixthe Beyala's Le Petit Prince De Belleville." Research in African 
Literatures 41, no. 2 (2010): 203-21; Elisa Joy White, "Paris: The Liberating Quality of Race," in Modernity, Freedom, 
and the African Diaspora: Dublin, New Orleans, Paris (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 227-37; Medhi 
Kabara and Régis Chaoupa, Diaspora. La communauté noire en France (Diaspora Communication, 2006).  
12 For more information about the conditions of the Black migrants living in Paris today, see Angelique Chrisafis, 
“’Nothing’s changed’: 10 years after French riots, banlieues remain in crisis,” The Guardian, published on October 
22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after-french-riots-
banlieues-remain-in-crisis; Donna Rachel Edmunds, “Paris Banlieues aren’t producing rioters, ‘They are producing 
terrorists’,” Breitbart, published on October 27,  2015, http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/10/27/paris-
banlieues-arent-producing-rioters-producing-terrorists/; “Ten years after Paris suburb riots has anything really 
changed?,” France 24, published on October 27,  2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20151026-france-10-years-
after-riots-life-paris-suburb-clichy-sous-bois-integration-police;Hugh Schofield, “Fears the banlieues could burn 
again,” BBC News, published on October 27, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34636104; Sylvia 
Zappi, “Dix ans après les émeutes, le sentiment d’abandon des banlieues,” Le Monde, published on October 26, 
2015; “2005-2015. Emeutes dans les banlieues, notre site special,” Le Parisien, published on October 24, 2015, 
http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/2005-2015-emeutes-dans-les-banlieues-notre-site-special-24-10-2015-
5215915.php.           
13 Within the dissertation, the terms immigrant and migrant are used interchangeably recognizing Sub-Saharan 




Contemporary France: The History of Immigration and Post-Colonial Movement 
The story of French migration in the post-World War II era has largely been framed 
around two thematic generations of historiography: modern immigration to France and the 
emergence of multicultural France. Pioneered by French historian Gérard Noiriel, the study of 
modern immigration to France emerged as a “sociohistory of the political.”14 Historians situated 
within this body of scholarship responded directly to the centrality of immigration as a pressing 
social and political issue in France during the 1980’s. Their works aimed to deconstruct “two 
contradictory positions on immigration [posited by intellectuals and French public officials]: on 
the one hand, denying that France had any particular problem with immigrants; on the other, 
decrying the latest streams of immigrants as threats to the country’s unity and viability.”15 
Noiriel in particular positioned his analysis of French immigration within three fields of 
scholarship: legal history of immigration and assimilation, social history of immigrant 
experiences and the political role of immigration within modern French history. In order to 
upend these contradictions, he used comparative studies to examine immigration in France and 
the United States.  
In response to his work, scholars charted the sustained waves of immigration after World 
War II and their impact on French conceptions of national identity. This revisionist effort pointed 
                                                          
14Originally published in French under the title Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration XIXe-XXe siècles (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1988). This dissertation relies on the translated version of the monograph. See Gérard Noiriel, 
The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity (Contradictions of Modernity) Translated by 
Geoffroy De Laforcad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), xi.  
15 Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, vii. 
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to “Les Trente Glorieuses” (1945-1975) as the fundamental catalyst to the largest period of mass 
immigration in the country’s history. Scholarship on modern French immigration emphasized the 
material conditions of French immigrant communities, native attitudes toward immigration and 
the impact of legislative reform.16 The most recent literature uses a sociopolitical lens to 
approach national acculturation policy as a fluid and evolving field.17 These monographs 
acknowledge the ways in which the French state has reimagined the history of immigration due 
to new pressures and geopolitical urgencies. Even within this burgeoning body of scholarship, 
Black populations remained largely at the margins.  
A second generation of scholars in the mid-1990’s and into the new millennium 
attempted to redress the silences of race and ethnicity within French history. Their works 
examined the emergence of multi-ethnic France, created as a result of post-colonial immigration 
to France. Focusing in particular on the period after 1974, scholars shifted their attention towards 
                                                          
16 For works exploring the social conditions of immigrants in France see, Alec G. Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France: 
Immigration, Politics, Culture, and Society (New York: Routledge, 2007); Patricia M. E. Lorcin, and David G. 
Troyansky, Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World. Edited by Hafid Gafaïti (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2009). For works exploring French native perspectives on immigrants, see Maxim 
Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France (London: Routledge, 
1992); Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and after (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1998). For a monograph exploring immigration legislation after 1975 see, Clifford D Rosenberg, 
Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
17 Vittorio Longhi and Janet Eastwood, The Immigrant War: A Global Movement against Discrimination and 
Exploitation (Bristol: Policy Press University of Bristol, 2014); Martin Schain, The Politics of Immigration in France, 
Britain, and the United States: A Comparative Study (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Giovanna Zincone, 
Rinus Penninx, and Maren Borkert, Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in past 
and Present (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011); Catherine Raissiguier, Reinventing the Republic: 
Gender, Migration, and Citizenship in France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010; This most recent wave 
is still indebted to works that tried to address these issues earlier including most notably Patrick Ireland’s work, 
The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994).  
8 
 
“ethnic relations in France… [and] on immigrants from Africa and Asia.”18 However, much of 
this historiographical literature concentrated on the Maghreb as the target of analysis to examine 
the rupture in French national identity after the Algerian War.19 Scholars explained this 
demographic focus on North Africa by arguing that “Maghrebis [were] by far the largest single 
group among the population of immigrant origin [living in France].”20 Indeed, when scholars 
considered Sub-Saharan migrants their participation was framed as ancillary to North African 
migration activity.  
A critical turning point within these scholarly conversations occurred in 2005. The urban 
uprisings that enveloped France during November 2005 propelled scholars to reexamine the 
historical roots of frustration that consumed the mainly North and Sub-Saharan African 
participants.  French historians shifted their focus toward the increasingly xenophobic and 
nationalist terminology deployed by the government that separated “immigrants” from “French” 
nationals.  These monographs brought together post-colonial studies, the histories of colonialism 
and decolonization as well as modern African Diaspora studies to “explore the complex 
                                                          
18 Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France (New York: Routledge, 1995), xiv 
and xvii. 
19 This recent trend is best explained in the following monographs: Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration and Identity in 
Beur Fiction: Voices from the North African Community in France (Oxford: Berg, 1997); Paul A. Silverstein, Algeria in 
France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Todd Shepard, Invention of 
Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Elaine R. 
Thomas, Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France: A Comparative Framework (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Amelia H. Lyons, The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families 
and the French Welfare State during Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Kate Marsh, 
France's Lost Empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia, and La Fracture Coloniale (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); 
Nadia Kiwan, Identities, Discourses and Experiences: Young People of North African Origin in France (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013); Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 2010) and Susan Ireland and Patrice J. Proulx, Immigrant Narratives in Contemporary France (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 2001). 
20 Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity, xiv and xvii. 
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intersection of citizenship, race and class in contemporary France.”21 As a result of the urban 
uprisings, race and ethnicity became a central feature in scholarly investigations of immigration. 
Moreover, a demographic focus on Sub-Saharan Africa increased.22 Scholars from various 
disciplines, offered explanations for the explosion of fury that detonated in 2005. Noted French 
scholar Tyler Stovall used transnationalism as a theoretical framework to interrogate “debates in 
contemporary France about multiculturalism, race and national identity.”23 His scholarship 
represents the newest turn within the historiography, emphasizing the synergetic relationship 
between transnational movement and global economic frameworks in relation to race and French 
immigration. 
 Even within the growing body of scholarship on modern immigration to France, the 
experiences of Sub-Saharan Africans and their descendants remains relatively under-explored. In 
the emerging field of “Black French Studies,” monographs examined Black migration to France 
from the Caribbean and the United States. Others began to explore the lives of Sub-Saharan 
African immigrants. However, these scholarly works largely focus on the period before 2005.24 
                                                          
21 Charles Tshimanga, Didier Gondola, and Peter J. Bloom, Frenchness and the African Diaspora: Identity and 
Uprising in Contemporary France (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 9.  
22 Indeed there are studies and monographs that pre-date the 2005 uprisings, and these bodies of work are used 
throughout the dissertation. For several examples see, Michel Wieviorka and Philippe Bataille, La France Raciste. 
(Paris: Seuil, 1993); Sue Peabody and Tyler Edward Stovall, The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France 
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2003); Tyler Edward Stovall and Georges Van Den Abbeele, French 
Civilization and Its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003).  
23 Tyler Edward Stovall, Transnational France: The Modern History of a Universal Nation (Boulder: Westview, 2015), 
3. Spanning the French Revolution to present times, he wrote a transnational history of a “universal nation” in 
order to bolster his argument that globalization is not a recent phenomenon. Stovall’s benevolent treatment of 
universalism is a direct response to Tzvetan Todorov’s disapproval of universalism as a useful category of analysis. 
See, Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 157.   
24 A growing number of historiographical works considered various waves of Black migration to Paris. Focusing on 
the creation of racial communities these works are foundational to my study. For examples see, Margaret Byron 
and Stéphanie Condon, Migration in Comparative Perspective: Caribbean Communities in Britain and France (New 
10 
 
This dissertation responds to a growing number of monographs that examine the experiences of 
Afro-French populations.25 These works have begun to give voice to Sub-Saharan African 
migrants and examined socio-political, economic and cultural conditions. Among the leading 
texts in this vein is Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness, a 
multidisciplinary collection of essays that explores Black French identity and confronts the 
controversial nature of discussing race in France. Contributors to the collection acknowledge that 
their work is “no more than a start” to contending with issues of racial discrimination, inequality 
and belonging in France.26 Despite these crucial and much needed additions to the field, critical 
gaps remain. Women and Gender Studies scholar Alexander C. Weheliye notes that “ideas about 
how gender and sexuality inflect blackness in France are virtually absent.”27 Historian Rachel 
Anne Gillett underscores that “music and sport…are underserved.”28 Moreover, a consideration 
                                                          
York: Routledge, 2008); Mann, Native Sons; Tyler Edward Stovall, Paris Noir: African Americans in the City of Light 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). This project’s later end point has the advantage of considering how youth were 
impacted by earlier generational efforts to create a community united by race but individualized based on various 
lived experiences. 
25 See Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small, Black Europe and the African Diaspora 
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 2009); Yasser A. Munif, “French Postcolonial Nationalism and Afro-French 
Subjectivities” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 2011); Trica Danielle Keaton, T. Denean 
Sharpley-Whiting, and Tyler Edward Stovall, Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2012); Bennetta Jules-Rosette, Black Paris: The African Writers' Landscape 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Loretta Bass, African immigrant families in another France (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014); Thomas, Dominic Richard David, Black France: Colonialism, Immigration, and 
Transnationalism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007) and Pap Ndiaye, La Condition Noire: Essai Sur Une 
Minorité Français (Paris: Folio Actuel, 2009).  
26 Keaton, Sharpley-Whiting, and Stovall, Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012), 11. This monograph also contends with that comparative studies remains particularly 
salient post-2005. 
27 Alexander G. Weheliye, "Book Review: "Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness," The 
Black Scholar 43, no. 3 (2013): 92-94.  
28 Rachel Anne Gillett, "A Review of “Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness,” History: 
Reviews of New Books 41, no. 3 (2013): 102-03.  
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of Black French migrant intergenerational negotiations of policy and protest remains woefully 
under-examined. In order to fill in these gaps, this dissertation adopts a unique analytical 
framework to address the contours of French policy, national society and racial identity.  
 Beyond the Banlieue: Immigration, Space and Race 
 “Beyond the Banlieue” offers a new perspective on Black French communities. Four 
distinctive elements of this project combine to intervene in discussions of French contemporary 
history, race and migration. First, it focuses on the often overlooked experiences of Sub-Saharan 
African migrants. Secondly, it foregrounds intergenerational exchanges as key sites of formation 
and friction over identity and protest. Third, it adopts a historical perspective that incorporates 
and critically engages various forms of cultural production. Finally, it examines the processes of 
migration and community organization within the context of a “postcolonial diaspora” that 
shaped the sociopolitical and economic dimensions of immigrant acculturation in France 
particularly after 1975 and 2005.  
One of the most significant interventions to be made is a more comprehensive 
consideration of Sub-Saharan African migrants. The bulk of recent scholarly attention and 
literature has focused on North African immigration and the contrast between Muslim religious 
identity and French polices of laïcité.29 The substantial but often ignored flows of migration 
from Sub-Saharan Africa offer a distinct set of narratives that complicate but also work in 
                                                          
29 Much of the historical emphasis on postcolonial immigration to France has remained focused on Algeria and the 
Maghreb as France’s focal sphere of influence and the initial source of tension over differences of religion, 
ethnicity and national belonging. For examples see, John Richard Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: 
Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Trica Danielle Keaton, Muslim 




dialogue with North African migrant experiences.30  By shifting the focus to Sub-Saharan Africa 
without devaluing the experiences of North African populations, this dissertation offers a 
compelling new perspective on the agency of Black migrants apart from the standard tropes of 
declension and rebellion. Chronicling individual immigration histories from Mali, Senegal, 
Gabon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and other francophone Sub-Saharan African nation-states, 
this dissertation deploys their experiences to offer a more nuanced description of modern French 
immigration. Furthermore, this project seeks to redefine what it means to be French. In its 
analysis, chapters consider not only how Black French populations define themselves but also 
how white French citizens self-identify often in opposition to North and Sub-Saharan Africans.  
This project also interrogates the generational transfer of knowledge and tensions over 
identity within these Sub-Saharan African migrant waves. Scholars of non-white migration to 
France have typically analyzed either first generation or second-generation migrants and their 
experiences of acculturation. Few, if any studies have probed the ways in which these groups 
have shaped each other.31 By framing the experiences of three generations of migrants as central 
to negotiations of racial identity in France, this work contextualizes how race remains a 
fundamental part of their lived experiences. Moreover, tracking the evolution of these 
intergenerational relationships and the different battles that emerge, subsequent chapters identify 
                                                          
30 The historical separation of Africa between “North” Africa (including Egypt) and Sub-Saharan “Black Africa” 
carries colonial connotations and silences the socioeconomic, political and cultural connections between these 
African nation-states.  
31 For studies examining Sub-Saharan immigration by generation see Bass, African immigrant families in another 
France; Caroline H. Bledsoe and Papa Sow, "Back to Africa: Second Chances for the Children of West African 
Immigrants." Journal of Marriage and Family 73, no. 4 (July 15, 2011): 747-62; Roxane Silberman, Richard Alba, and 
Irène Fournier, "Segmented Assimilation in France? Discrimination in the Labour Market against the Second 
Generation." Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 1-27; Richard D. Alba and Mary C. Waters, The next 
Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective (New York: New York University Press, 2011).  
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points of continuity and rupture at the individual, familial and community level. These narratives 
frame how Black French populations have navigated the pressures and priorities of the French 
state with respect to acculturation and racelessness as well as detail the nature of life at the 
“everyday” level that escapes even as it shapes current national debate.32 A more concrete 
understanding of Black intergenerational relationships links the urban uprisings of 2005 to a 
much longer history of activism around banlieue conditions.  
Beyond the demographic composition of these migration flows and the generational 
exchanges within them, the third feature of my analytical framework examines the cultural 
expressions that emerge from these communities. The arena of culture represents a fertile but 
underexplored area of historical investigation. Most historians of race in France tended to 
emphasize social structures.33 Scholars that have evaluated Black French culture have largely 
                                                          
32 Situated within the Cultural Turn of the 1970’s, historians of race and ethnicity demonstrate that race is not a 
static nor fixed construction. The most recent wave of African American and Diaspora Studies scholars has 
experimented with various models to explain evolutions in racial identity formulation. Thomas Holt’s concept of 
the “Cultural Paradigm” argued that racism is embedded in a social formation that is both material and specific to 
locale. Thus, a critical study of “everydayness” links the social and individual levels of behavior and helps explain 
how racialized paradigms can remain the same despite historical change. This concept also recognized that 
behavioral patterns must continually change as a result of dynamic shifts in local economic and social conditions. 
For examples see Leora Auslander and Thomas C. Holt, “Sambo in Paris: Race and Racism in the Iconography of the 
Everyday” in The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France, edited by Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003), 147-184; Thomas C. Holt, “Marking: Race, Race-Making, and the Writing of History,” 
The American Historical Review 100, no. 1 (February 1995),1-20; Daniel Wickberg, “Heterosexual White Male: 
Some Recent Inversions in American Cultural History,” Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (June 2005), 136-157. 
33 A second generation of literature focusing on social conditions in the metropole, particularly in the banlieue, 
consider how discriminatory practices employed by the state birthed a community of angry immigrant youth and a 
pervasive sentiment of hopelessness that came to the fore with the 2005 uprisings. For examples see, Chakri 
Belaïd. Banlieue, Lendemains De Révolte (Paris: La Dispute, 2006); Robert Castel, La Discrimination Négative: 
Citoyens Ou Indigènes (Paris: La République des Idées, 2007); Denis Fougère, Francis Kramarz, Roland Rathelot, and 
Mirna Safi, “Social Housing and Location Choices of Immigrants in France." International Journal of Manpower 34, 
no. 1 (2013): 56-69; Véronique Le Goaziou and Laurent Mucchielli, Quand Les Banlieues Brûlent ...: Retour Sur Les 
Émeutes De Novembre 2005 (Paris: La Découverte, 2006); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, “The 
October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?" International Migration 44, no. 2 
(2006): 23-34; Leland Ware, "Color-blind Racism in France: Bias Against Ethnic Minority Immigrants." Washington 




come from outside the field of history.34 This project fills a historiographical gap by considering 
the ways that cultural expression have been used to shape Black French identity and popular 
narratives about the role of race in French society. From the French World Cup victories in 1998 
and 2018 to the growth of Hip Hop in France and the campaigns for greater diversity in French 
media, subsequent chapters address the ways that cultural arenas have witnessed their own 
contestations over the inclusiveness of the French state and challenges to racelessness. The 
cultural works examined in this dissertation respond to African historian Florence Bernault’s 
two-part call for a “new cultural turn,” where culture and identity emerge as central 
battlegrounds for social critique and political action as well as works that contend with “new 
forces and alternative fronts in France’s social and political fabric, particularly among citizens of 
color and immigrant origin.”35   
Situated within this new “cultural turn,” in its analysis of African francophone cultural 
productions, this dissertation pays particular attention to the pressure African migrants place on 
France’s often inflexible “social and political” fabric. Furthermore, this work moves beyond 
                                                          
34 For works considering the role of hip hop in the banlieue, transnational parallels between France and America, 
the failure of state policy directed toward racial and economic minorities as well as, focusing on the counter-
cultural or oppositional identity of Hip Hop, see, Hisham Aidi, Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim 
Youth Culture (New York: Random House, 2014); Sophie Body-Gendrot, "Models of Immigrant Integration in France 
and the United States: Signs of Convergence?" in The Bubbling Cauldron: Race, Ethnicity, and the Urban Crisis, 
edited by Michael P. Smith and Joe R. Feagin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 244-62; Alain-
Philippe Durand, Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-hop Culture in the Francophone World (Lanham: Scarecrow 
Press, 2002); James Perkinson, "Imperial Whiteness Meets Hip Hop Blackness: A Spiritual Phenomenology of the 
Hegemonic Body in the Twenty-first Century USA" in Religion in Hip Hop: Mapping the New Terrain in the US, 
edited by Monica R. Miller, Anthony B. Pinn, and Bernard Freeman (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 115-
16; Tandem, “Hardcore 93,” in C’est toujours pour ceux qui savent, Kilomatre, 2005, CD; "Paname City Rapping. B-
boys in the Banlieues & beyond" in Post-Colonial Cultures in France, edited by Alec Hargreaves (London: Routledge, 
1997), 150-66.  
35 Florence Bernault, “Colonial Syndrome: French Modern and the Deceptions of History,” in Frenchness and the 
African Diaspora: Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France, 121.  
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scholarly focus on African francophone literature as the focus of cultural investigation.36 This 
dissertation incorporates a broader array of cultural texts including film, fictional narratives, and 
Hip Hop/Rap in order to capture popular attitudes and individual efforts at the portrayal of 
migrant experiences and challenges. These works offer a unique window into the overlapping 
and multivalent identities that characterize Black French immigrant populations.37 To examine 
these identities and their progression over time, subsequent chapters analyze the evolution of 
student and worker archetypes and the shifts that occur as a result of this change. Within this 
dissertation, cultural productions by African migrants are used to challenge one of the overriding 
conventional assumptions about French immigration policy, which is that prior to 1975 this was 
largely a “laissez-faire” approach. This project argues that this notion of a “laissez-faire” 
approach significantly discounts the amount of surveillance, engagement and contact with the 
French state that Black migrant populations experienced and endured. These embedded 
                                                          
36 For works analyzing African Francophone literature in relation to sociopolitical action and immigration see, 
Dominic Thomas, Black France, Jules-Rosette Bennetta’s Black Paris; F. Abiola Irele, The African Imagination: 
Literature in Africa and the Black Diaspora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Alec G. Hargreaves, Voices from 
the North African Immigrant Community in France: Immigration and Identity in Beur Fiction (Providence: Berg, 
1992; Christopher Miller, Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory 
and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures (London: Routledge, 2002).  
37 The use of Hip Hop as a social and cultural analytic focuses on youth from the 1980-2000’s. Consequently, 
scholars described a predominantly male narrative and concentrated on the banlieue as a space of festering anger. 
This dissertation invites a new perspective on other geographic spaces that Black people occupy and complicates 
the narrative of angry youth rap to consider the message of “hope” within protest rap, for example see, Kery 
James, “Banlieusards,” in À l'ombre du show business, Up Music, 2008, CD. Drawing inspiration from Tupac 
Shakur’s “Keep Your Head Up” James introduces “hope” within the reactionary ghettoized narrative of the 
banlieue. Scholarship on Black French women rappers analyzed through the lens of protest and feminism is still 
relatively limited. Their oversight offers a particularly fertile field for historical inquiry. This dissertation builds on 
the work of Lakeyta M. Bonnette to fill this gap. See, Pulse of the People: Political Rap Music and Black Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 2015). In addition to music, this project uses film to portray the 
difficulties of grappling with an African identify influenced by a sense of French nationalism. This project builds 
upon the most recent attempts to write a Francophone film historiography, see Melissa Thackway, Africa Shoots 
Back: Alternative Perspectives in Sub-Saharan Francophone African Film (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2003); Mahriana Rofheart, Shifting Perceptions of Migration in Senegalese Literature, Film, and Social Media 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014).    
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communal structures inform African migrant identity at the tail end of colonialism and lay the 
foundation for an Afropean identity in the postcolonial era in addition to linking postcolonial 
migration to a new evolution with the African Diaspora.  
Finally, “Beyond the Banlieue” seeks to understand each of these components of Black 
French identity within the context of a “postcolonial diaspora.”38 Scholars exploring African 
migration recognized decolonization as a distinct moment within the diasporic process. Rather 
than using the “postcolonial diaspora” as its theoretical framework, this dissertation considers the 
postcolonial diaspora as its subject. While the project does not deploy Marxist analysis, it does 
take seriously the contours of the diaspora in the postcolonial moment. Subsequent chapters 
explore African diasporic migration in the postcolonial/neo-colonial era and focuses on 
individual as well as communal agency.  Thus, it critically investigates postcolonial and African 
diasporic actors at the local level.  
My work expands upon this emerging field of study to understand how the empowering 
effects of decolonization and the stultifying effects of neocolonialism have combined to shape 
the political, economic and social priorities of African immigrants to France. Intervening in 
scholarly interpretations of postcolonial migration, this project deviates from understanding this 
process as rooted solely in feelings of anger or resentment over decolonization struggles. Instead, 
it draws new contours from the varied motivations of voluntary migration, self-determination 
                                                          
38 These interrelated processes of migration, self-determination, the formation of a racial and national identity are 
explored more concretely in David Chariandy’s "Postcolonial Diasporas." Postcolonial Text, Vol 2, No 1., 2006, 
http://postcolonial.org/index.php/pct/article/viewArticle/440/839/. For more on the theoretical approaches  of 
the postcolonial diaspora, see J. Dillon Brown and Leah Rosenberg, Beyond Windrush: Rethinking Postwar 
Anglophone Caribbean Literature (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2015); Paul Bandia, Writing and 
Translating Francophone Discourse: Africa, the Caribbean, Diaspora (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014); Yaw B. Agawu-
Kakraba, and F. Komla Aggor, Diasporic Identities within Afro-Hispanic and African Contexts (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).    
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and the countervailing pressures of neocolonial influence and French internal colonization. This 
dissertation forges conceptual links between a continuous history of modern African diasporic 
migration and a profound rupture point in 1975 that necessitated negotiations of transnational, 
racial and national identity.   
Within its chapters, this project unearths how the systemic shift from policing of 
immigration policy to policing of Black French populations are intertwined and how they 
affected the personal security, economic status and political identities of Afro-French people. In 
addition, this work contributes to the burgeoning catalog of monographs that examine the urban 
uprisings of 2005. The combination of these distinct analytic perspectives offers an important 
avenue to challenge the prevailing interpretations of the historical roots and political legacies of 
the uprisings. 39 My work contextualizes the 2005 rupture but seeks to also understand its 
aftermath and Black French responses to this moment. It aims to situate the post-2005 era as a 
distinct shift in terms of defining Black French identity as well as connecting millennial Afro-
French activism to a larger wave of transnational activism occurring throughout the African 
Diaspora.  This combination of perspectives reveals a far more complex process of contestation, 
community building, and self-empowerment. Ultimately, this dissertation recognizes a much 
greater degree of Black French agency and efforts to engage with the French state through other 
mechanisms than violence.  
 
                                                          
39 Tshimanga, Gondola, and Bloom challenge the recent body of historiography that use “colonial paradigms” to 
explain the 2005 uprisings because these works do not include a space for diasporic identity and they emphasize a 
culturally unassimilable African “other” as a racial and social identity that carries political utility in Frenchness and 




Beyond the Banlieue uses a variety of terms to discuss Sub-Saharan African migrants and 
subsequent generations of Black French populations. This dissertation builds on scholarship that 
recognizes “immigrants of Sub-Saharan descent are heterogeneous because they arrive in France 
with varying customs, languages, social capital, and even economic resources, [though] it should 
be acknowledged that they are typically perceived and treated as a homogenous “other” category 
by French society.”40 Throughout the dissertation, French language terms are italicized and 
translated either in a footnote or parenthetical notations. These terms are also found in the 
Appendix under “Glossary.” As discussed in Black France/France Noire: The History and 
Politics of Blackness, terms used to discuss Black populations remain highly controversial and 
contested in France.41 The enduring legacies of “racelessness” and French republican ideologies 
of universalism undermine the use of terms or phrases that denote racial identities.  Yet 
throughout history, terms such as “Nègre” (meaning Negro also pejoratively as nigger), “Black” 
(an English term used to describe African diasporic populations in France as well as distance 
French language speakers from a maternal language reference to race) and “Noire” (meaning 
Black) populate French film, music, literature and popular media.42 These various terms are used 
                                                          
40 Bass, African immigrant families in another France, 14. 
41 Keaton, Sharpley-Whiting, and Stovall, Black France/France Noire, 1-14. 
42 In France, a recent movement called “Je suis Noire” has publicized the shift from using the English term “Black” 
to describe African diasporic populations to utilizing “Noire.” This dissertation recognizes the linguistic legacy of 
French use of the world “Black” to describe this population and only uses this term given its Anglophone audience. 
The second chapter analyzes a critical use of the word “Black” within French contexts specifically during the 1998 
World Cup under the slogan, “Black, Blanc, Beur” used to describe France’s multi-ethnic national soccer team. 
Within this slogan the only French language term is “Blanc” meaning “white.” Beur finds its origins in the verlan 
inversion of “arabe” inverted first as “rebeu” and secondly as “beur” used to describe people of North African 
descent.  For more on the movement “Je suis Noire” see, "Je suis noire, mais belle!" Le Monde, published on April 
29, 1980, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1980/04/30/i-je-suis-noire-mais-
belle_2802347_1819218.html; "Noir, Pas Black." ARTE Radio, published on January 11, 2016, 
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in different social contexts and carry different meanings when used in conversation. Part of the 
complexity of French racelessness is that these terms are not formal designations of racial 
identity substantiated by French law, but rather monikers of description used by non-Black 
populations to denote racial inferiority or terms of self-description used by Black peoples within 
France.  Often these terms of self-description are malleable and tend to accentuate an 
individual’s connection to Africa, Black Diasporic populations more broadly or connections to 
the French state and national identity.  In subsequent chapters, several terms are used 
interchangeably to describe Black populations in France.  They include: “Black French” or 
“Afro-French,” which are concretely associated with a connection to national, linguistic and 
racial identity. A third term, “Afropean,” offers a more diasporic sense of being Black in Europe.   
Methodology & Sources 
In order to capture the varied perspectives that shape this study, the project mines an 
array of archival sources, oral histories, digital and print media, interviews, film, fiction and 
music. This multivalent perspective enriches current understandings of the interrelated 
constitution of race, gender and class identity.  An ethnographic study facilitates these goals by 
stitching together several interdisciplinary frameworks to provide a portrait that depicts the Sub-
Saharan African experiences of migration, acculturation and isolation in contemporary France.43  
                                                          
https://www.arteradio.com/son/61657765/noir_pas_black; Jadine Labbé Pacheco, "Je Suis Noire, Pas 'black'." 
L'Obs, published on August 29, 2017, https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/nos-vies-intimes/20170828.OBS3873/je-
suis-noire-pas-black.html and Éric Mukendi, "Le Black Est-il L'avenir Du Noir ?” Jeune Afrique, published on 
December 16, 2015,  https://www.jeuneafrique.com/287317/societe/le-black-est-il-lavenir-du-noir/.  
43 This comprehensive portrait of the Sub-Saharan experience in France will be derived from an analysis of social 
media, personal interviews, artistic production and cultural expression, as well as, more traditional archival sources 
such as national immigration legislation, education policies, integration programs, local newspapers, colonial 
reports and worker contracts.   
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This project uses materials from two archives within its chapters. The Archives 
Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence (ANOM-AEF) house French colonial 
administration records from 1800-1975. This archival material encompasses labor recruitment 
and immigration management efforts from Sub-Saharan Africa in the period before 1975. These 
materials contextualize why 1975 was a transformative moment for migrants and is particularly 
important for the early portion of the dissertation.  The Archives Nationales in Pierrefitte-sur-
Seine (AN) contain documents outlining the legislative approach to immigration management 
between 1945-present. These documents chart state acculturation efforts, housing conditions of 
immigrant populations and the Ministry of Interior as well as police records that carefully 
tracked Sub-Saharan African populations.44 
A local study emphasizing the experiences of Black communities in Paris represents the 
most fruitful method to address these perspectives. Sociologist Loretta Bass examined the varied 
lives of Sub-Saharan immigrants in France, but her focus was primarily in provincial cities that 
had “proportionally high immigrant populations.”45 This dissertation builds upon Bass’ work by 
redirecting attention from the provincial cities back to Paris. 46  It departs from her 
                                                          
44 In addition to these two archives spaces, I also used materials from the National Library of France particularly 
national legislation, Parliament proceedings and Official French National Journal reports.   
45 Bass gathers her ethnographic data from a “city of one million inhabitants in the southwest region of France.” 
African immigrant families in another France, 13 and 20. 
46 In 2008, 3.1 million descendants of immigrants ages 18 to 50 were living in France—comprising 12 percent of the 
French population. Fifty percent has a parent born in Europe, and 40 percent a parent born in Africa (mainly the 
Maghreb). The younger the person, however, the more likely he or she was to have a parent born in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Sixty percent of second-generation immigrants who had at least one parent from Sub-Saharan Africa were 
under 26. Descendants of immigrants were concentrated in the same areas as recent immigrant, namely Paris (30 
percent) and the southeast of France (16 percent). This may be due in part to a lack of resources and a low level of 
social mobility. The geographical concentration of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa was even higher than the 
average: 65 percent lived in Paris. For more information, see Angeline Escafre-Dublet, “Mainstreaming Immigrant 
Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment and Social Cohesion Initiatives.” Migration Policy Institute 
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methodological approach by integrating analysis of Sub-Saharan immigrant oral sources along 
with that of French legal policy and Black cultural productions.  
To best capture the lived experiences of these Black Parisian communities, this study 
relies heavily on oral history. Over a period of four years, I collected thirty oral histories tracing 
individual migration paths from Mali, Senegal, Gabon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and other 
francophone Sub-Saharan African nation-states. I gathered participants from first generation 
immigrants and subsequent generations. These interviews occurred multiple times (5-8 meetings) 
and trace familial roots, descriptions of migration, the process of acculturation, important events 
and a larger discussion of everyday life. Interviews took place primarily in and around Paris. 
Designed to be a “tool of critical reflection and for human liberation,” the interviews invite 
participants to reflect on their political identities and goals for the future.47 This methodological 
approach encompasses the perspectives of “ordinary people” that are not often considered in 
national debates over citizenship, immigration legislation and naturalization.48 In addition to oral 
histories gathered from “ordinary people,” I examined published interviews as well as public 
statements from prominent Black French cultural and political figures including Christiane 
                                                          
Europe (August 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/mainstreaming-immigrant-integration-policy-
france-education-employment-and-social-cohesion.   
47 Nancy Scheper-Hughes. "The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology," Current 
Anthropology 36, no. 3 (1995), 418. 
48 Patricia Lim, James Morrison and Chong Kwa describe the process of collecting oral histories to access the 
perspectives of “ordinary people” in the following quote, “The intimacy provided by intensive and prolonged 
fieldwork helps us to perceive subtle and remote relations which are frequently missed out in broad surveys, and 
offers rich and deep cultural and historical insights which are otherwise not obtainable. In doing do, it enables the 
detailed documentation of “culture-building” by ordinary people, often capturing their innermost feelings on many 
complex and difficult subjects.” See Patricia Lim, James Morrison and Chong Kwa, Oral History in Southeast Asia: 




Taubira, Harry Roselmack, Kery James, Calixthe Beyala, and Kylian Mbappé. Including their 
perspectives along with those of “everyday people” are critical to developing a more nuanced 
narrative. This project answers the recent call of postcolonial literary scholar Robert Marzec to 
incorporate a greater array of voices and to map the struggle for social and political agency 
amongst Black French immigrant communities.49 Acknowledging their collective agency 
requires reading “with and against the grain” of official sources along with oral histories to 
understand how Sub-Saharan immigrants destabilize prevailing discourses of non-agency and 
unassimilability.50  
Focusing primarily on the impact of both immigration and integration on individual and 
community identities, this dissertation gathers perspectives that are missing from official 
narratives and press.51 African migrants have been consistently confined to the margins of 
national legislative, political, economic and social conversations. Therefore, introducing these 
ethnographic sources fills an acute void within traditional archival spaces and historical 
scholarship on immigration to France. Oral history interviews also often provide an entrée into 
obtaining documents that are not a part of official archives, but that are nonetheless relevant to 
understanding the lived experiences of interviewees.  These have included family photos, diaries, 
                                                          
49Robert P. Marzec, Postcolonial Literary Studies: The First Thirty Years (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2011), 142.  
50 Andrew Smith, "Reading against the Postcolonial Grain: Migrancy and Exile in the Short Stories of Kanchana 
Ugbabe," Research in African Literatures 35, no. 3 (2004): 62-75.   
51 This dissertation relies heavily on periodicals and other print media to establish a chronology of events and 
identifying popular and public commentary regarding immigration, race, and national debates about citizenship. 
The bulk of these sources are major distribution newspapers in Paris with some provincial coverage (20 Minutes, Le 
Monde and Le Monde Diplomatique, Le Figaro, Le Parisien). The absence of an archive for Paris-based Afro-French 
newspapers represents a challenge but Afro-French magazines (including Présence Africaine, Africulture, Jeune 




and other forms of media. As a result, oral histories are corrective instruments of scholarly 
inquiry preserving the experiences of subaltern people from marginalization in day-to-day 
existence and historical memory. As a scholarly tool wielding transformative power, these 
ethnographic interviews were collected and interpreted using a methodology that is deliberate 
and specific to the unconventional nature of these sources.52 Deploying this approach thus 
maximizes the efficacy of the source base. This project also utilizes oral histories and other 
published interviews to analyze how migrants navigate multi-layered identities. Pairing these 
oral sources with official documents, “Beyond the Banlieue” employs Sub-Saharan migrant 
narratives to highlight the ways in which their locally lived experiences are affected by national 
policy.  
This project foregrounds the use of a “Millennial Oral History” to permit a closer-
examination of the “everyday” experiences impacting Sub-Saharan migrants. With the use of 
technology and social media, scholars can gain a unique glimpse into the instantaneous thought-
processes of individuals. By developing social media profiles for interviewees based on their 
posts from Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Snapchat, my dissertation interrogates 
opinions and perspectives composed for public consumption. Traditionally, oral histories have 
been troubled by a romanticization of the past, memory, and self-censorship.53 This process is 
                                                          
52 The oral history methodology of this project is rooted in the work of Daniel James, Sidney Mintz, Alessandro 
Portelli, Donald A. Ritchie, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, and Steve Stern. Daniel James, Doña María's story: Life History, 
Memory, and Political Identity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Sidney W. Mintz, Worker in the Cane; a 
Puerto Rican Life History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli 
and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History (Buffalo: State University of New York Press, 1990); Donald A. 
Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 
"The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology," Current Anthropology 36, no. 3 (1995): 409-
40; Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004).  
53 Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 182.  
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applied particularly in its third chapter to circumvent much of the self-censorship imposed by a 
direct line of open-ended questions routinely used in oral history interviews. Additionally, 
permitting participants to discuss their personal thoughts placed within public forums offers an 
original entry point into their opinions on social issues, trending topics and milestone life events. 
This project applies the data collected from these social media profiles both during the interviews 
and in the post-interview analysis. During the interview process, social media postings are used 
to reference specific issues, dates and events in order to “jog the memory” of participants.54 In 
the post-interview analysis, social media posts are used to cross-examine retrospective comments 
offered during the interview and compare them with what participants wrote in real time. A 
“Millennial Oral History” endeavors to utilize interviews and social media in conjunction with 
each other to offer a more extensive account of life events.  
This project combines the methodological use of oral history with the theoretical 
framework of intersectionality. Latin American historian Daniel James argued that life narratives 
must be examined within a kaleidoscope of difference: class culture, workplace, family, 
geographical community, religious and ethnic identity, political activism…all emerge within 
gendered terms.55 This project recognizes that James’ rendering of a complex, layered mosaic of 
life experiences allocates a space for a seemingly contradictory, uneasy and disjointed narrative.  
Accepting a “messy” story replicates a closer glimpse of reality and particularly facilitates the 
realization that women and men have distinct lived experiences.   
                                                          
54 This allows the researcher to move beyond the rehearsed script interviewees often rely on when discussing 
particular milestone events. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History, 98-99. 
55 James, Doña María's story, 220. 
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By embracing an intersectional methodology to highlight the compound identities of 
individuals, my work draws upon Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought. Collins defines 
intersectionality as “an analysis claiming that systems of race, social class, gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity, nation and age form mutually constructing features of social organization.”56 
Accordingly, these features converge and influence the individual experiences of women. 
Although intersectionality is chiefly concerned with qualifying subjective lived experiences; this 
analytic framework is upheld by a matrix of domination. Collins frames this matrix of 
domination as interconnected systems of structural, disciplinary, hegemonic and interpersonal 
oppression. Consequently, this framework prioritizes the relationship between the individual and 
oppressive systems of power. This intersectional approach is indispensable to revealing how 
gender is at the heart of various experiences of empowerment and disempowerment in recent 
French history.   
Finally, these oral history methodologies and theoretical frameworks are supplemented 
by a close-reading critique of literature, film, and music.57 Building on the recent 
                                                          
56 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 299.  
57 Francophone literature, film and music comprise additional source bases that are not represented within the 
national archives or print media but are essential to understanding the varied experiences of Sub-Saharan 
immigrants in France. These include colonial-era fictional narratives written by Camara Laye, Ferdinand Oyono and 
Ousmane Sembène. Taken together, these foundational works describe the “push-pull factors” for the earliest 
waves of Sub-Saharan African immigration before 1975 and help to contextualize the earlier generation of 
migrants. In addition, these works detail the personal process of acculturation in France as well as familial 
reactions from those left behind in Africa. This project also includes an examination of two films by Sub-Saharan 
African directors. Paulin Soumanou Vieyra and Mamadou Sarr’s Afrique sur Seine (Africa on the Seine) released in 
1955 and Ndèye Marame Guèye’s film Une Africane sur Seine (An African Woman on the Seine) completed in 2016. 
These films explore the processes of immigration, familial tensions, and African migrant observations of the French 
state to offer an overlooked but critically important perspective. Finally, I analyze the lyrics and themes presented 
by several Hip Hop/Rap artists (MC Solaar, Casey, Kery James, Bams and Youssoupha). These artists produce music 
that span from the “Golden Age of French Hip Hop” to the present expressing the struggles and triumphs of 
African migrants living in France. Analyzing their lyrical work alongside popular criticism of their performances 
offers an additional way to explore the links between cultural expression and sociopolitical action. 
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interdisciplinary work produced by Brent Hayes Edwards, Michelle Stephens, and Dominic 
Thomas, this project engages in a similar style of close readings to draw out issues of translation, 
stratification and décalage in Black cultural production.58  Their work not only critically 
examined the substance of African diasporic audio-visual and written expression but also linked 
the cultural to the political.59  This project leverages that body of scholarship to analyze the use 
of language and the visual representation of racial identity. Close-reading analysis exposes the 
multiple uses of art within African diasporic communities.60 Embracing this array of 
methodological approaches is invaluable to extracting the significance of race at the 
international, state, community and individual level.   
Chapter Overview 
Through these sources and layered methodologies, “Beyond the Banlieue” constructs a 
largely thematic narrative of the period between 1945 and 2018. Highlighting the roots of official 
immigration policy, the sociopolitical negotiation of successive waves of immigration, the 
spatialization of race in a “raceless society,” efforts for socioeconomic uplift and improvement, 
                                                          
58 Brent Hayes Edwards defines décalage as a “gap” in space and time. He uses this word to represent the un-
evenness of the African Diaspora and as a model for individual experiences that resist and or escape linguistic 
translation. See The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black Nationalism, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 15. This project is informed by the work of Brent Hayes Edwards, Michelle 
Stephens and Dominic Thomas. Their scholarship uses a close-reading approach to examine the role of race, travel 
and articulation within transnational literary dialogue. See Michelle Ann Stephens, Skin Acts: Race, Psychoanalysis, 
and the Black Male Performer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Dominic Richard Thomas, Black France: 
Colonialism, Immigration, and Transnationalism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007) and Africa and 
France: Postcolonial Cultures, Migration, and Racism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).  
59 Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora, 13. 
60 Broadening their perspective beyond local regions Naana Jane Opoku-Agyemang, Paul E. Lovejoy, and David 
Vincent Trotman explore the relationship between literary works and history within the African Diaspora using 
close-reading analysis in Africa and Trans-Atlantic Memories: Literary and Aesthetic Manifestations of Diaspora 
and History (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008).  
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and popular cultural expression of identity, this dissertation tracks some of the myriad ways that 
Black French populations have defined themselves both within and in opposition to institutions 
of the French state.  
Each of the following chapters interrogates three overarching themes. The first is the 
evolution of agency, resistance and socioeconomic empowerment within Black communities. 
They explore the tactics, ideas and organizations that Afro-French communities have used to 
offer various methods of uplift. The second theme focuses on the tensions between individual 
and community identity and the sociopolitical emphasis on racelessness from the French state. It 
examines the varied roles and definitions of racial identity and ‘Frenchness’ for Sub-Saharan 
African migrants. The final theme contests a narrative of sociopolitical declension that resulted 
from the events of 2005. Instead, it seeks to contextualize and understand the ways in which both 
black and white populations have mobilized differing notions of violence in postcolonial France.  
Chapter 1 maps the interrelated processes of Sub-Saharan African migration with 
particular attention to government legislation that abetted and then later restricted this 
immigration to France. Tracing the transformation of perceptions on immigration, it explores the 
sentiments of African migrants and the goals of the French state in revising immigration policy. 
The discussion encompasses three waves of immigration. The first two waves took place during 
Les Trente Glorieuses (1945-1975). The third wave took place after the restrictive immigration 
legislation of 1975 and proved to be the largest and most controversial.61  African peoples were 
                                                          
61 The first wave of migrations (1945-1960) from Sub-Saharan Africa were often temporary and dominated by 
males. Migrating to France for travel and or education, African males arrived in relatively small numbers in 
comparison to European and Maghreb male immigrants. The second wave of migrations (1960-1975) responded to 
the economic changes occurring within the succession of newly independent African nations and France’s 
increasing demand for an industrial labor force in mining, steel, railroad construction and public service. France’s 
need for a labor population that would accept lower wages, longer hours, and unskilled labor came to a stuttering 
halt with the oil crisis of 1973. The third and largest wave of migrations (1975-1995) responded to worsening 
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agents of change within both the periphery and the metropole. Their cultural and sociopolitical 
activity maintained and fostered links between Africa and France. Using film and oral histories, 
the chapter uncovers the responses of the French state, policymakers and Sub-Saharan migrants 
to these concerns of identity, citizenship and acculturation.  
The second chapter explores the unique challenges facing Black migrants in Paris. 
Focusing on immigration policy, activism and cultural expression, this chapter argues that 
African immigration forced France to redefine the contours of its national identity. In the years 
after 1975, Sub-Saharan migrants responded to reactionary immigration legislation deploying a 
variety of tactics. Using this tension between the government and Black populations as the 
vehicle to examine first and second generation negotiation and rejection of French policy, the 
analysis explores two forms of cultural expression: music and sport.  Uncovering the voices of 
protest in the banlieue that challenge racial, spatial and class discrimination, this chapter 
analyzes Black French responses to social and political exclusion. Chronicling critical turning 
points in 1998, 2002 and 2005, this chapter introduces sport as a cultural flashpoint that contends 
with the inclusivity of French national identity.  It also argues that 2002 was an important but 
overlooked year by the current historiography in terms of white French national identity 
retrenchment.  These concluding segments scrutinize the long roots of the millennial urban 
uprisings as well as cultural reactions to these events.  
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induced the feminization wave of immigration relocating their wives and children to France preempting the closing 
of the borders. Coinciding with family reunification was the increase of Sub-Saharan immigration under “extended 




The third chapter surveys a new wave of Black entrepreneurship and economic self-
empowerment that subsequently shaped a segment of the French economy. Offering a counter-
narrative to the socioeconomic marginalization of African migrants, the discussion begins with 
the shift from a first generation “worker” identity to attempts at increasing the middle class as 
Black French populations became more established and economically mobile. Exploring the 
lives of men and women who graduated from French universities, these stories are central to 
expanding the narrative of opportunity and change for African migrants beyond the banlieue 
uprisings of 2005. Next, the chapter examines how migrants established businesses that bridge 
the gap between their lives in France and a commitment to improving conditions in individual 
African nation-states. Using oral histories with various Afropean entrepreneurs in Paris, these 
interviews investigate their attempts to circumvent French employment discrimination by 
creating their own businesses and employing other people of African descent. As entrepreneurs 
endeavor to create a space of their own to service Black communities, their increasing visibility 
challenges the contours of marginalization, promotes individual access to increased economic 
resources and intra-community competition.  
The final chapter centers on Black French activism in the new millennium. It addresses 
the shift from protests around the nature of immigration to a strong focus on the experiences of 
second and third generation Black French youths. Notions of police violence rather than the 
policing of borders have come to propel activists’ agendas. This twenty-first century evolution in 
Black French activism builds upon discourses examined in the previous three chapters. The 
analysis contends with how Afropean individuals, artistic communities and media personalities 
are making concerted efforts to challenge the national government’s pace of change.  Using 
activist campaigns around media representation and the Black Lives Matter France movement, 
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these two case studies represent a key shift in the platforms used to gain political traction in 
France. This chapter offers insight on the inclusion of African immigrants within existing power 
structures. Focusing on protest efforts against inequality and the government’s use of 
“racelessness” to circumvent addressing racial discrimination, it argues that race remains the 



















Chapter One: From the Seuil de Tolerance to Zero Tolerance: Charting the shifting attitudes 
toward immigration from 1945 to 1974 in France 
 
“Each one follows his own destiny, my son…This opportunity is within your reach. You 
must seize it…Yes, I want you to go to France. I want that now, just as much as you do. 
Soon we’ll be needing men like you here [in Guinea]…May you not be gone too long!”62 
 
Laye Camara was nineteen years old when he was faced with the decision to leave 
Guinea to continue his studies in France.63 Camara won first place in his final examinations for 
the Certificat D’Aptitude Professionnelle de Mecanicien in 1946. This distinction was rewarded 
with a government scholarship to study abroad.  His excitement hit an impasse when the school 
director informed him that he needed his parent’s permission to accept the offer. Upon returning 
to his hometown in Kouroussa, Guinea, Camara set out to receive his parents’ blessing. His 
father had long resigned himself to his son’s departure, “I knew quite well that eventually you 
would leave us. I knew it the very first time you set foot in school. I watched you studying with 
such eagerness, such passionate eagerness!...Yes, since that day I have known how it would 
be.”64 His mother also knew the day would come for her son’s departure, but she could not 
resign herself in the same way as her husband, “Yesterday it was the school in Conakry 
[Guinea]; today it’s the school in France; tomorrow…what will it be tomorrow? Every day 
                                                          
62 Camara Laye, The Dark Child. Translated by James Kirkup (London: Collins, 1989), 182.  
63 For the purposes of this dissertation, Laye Camara is referred to by the original composition of his first and last 
name. The formulation Camara Laye was used by the colonial school administration in Guinea, he would later 
publish his written work using this format. See Adele King, The Writings of Camara Laye (London: Heinemann, 
1983), 1.  
64 Laye, The Dark Child, 182.  
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there’s some mad scheme to take my son away from me!”65 Despite her aversion to the extensive 
travel that propelled his studies, she ultimately helped Camara prepare for the voyage to France 
in 1947. 
Camara joined a small group of Guinean students studying in France on the eve of 
decolonization.66 After landing at Orly airport, he was overwhelmed by the sights and sounds of 
Paris. Unlike many of the African students who studied and lived in the city center, Camara’s 
first home was in the Parisian suburb of Argenteuil. There he studied at the Central School of 
Automobile Engineering where he earned an Automobile Mechanics’ Certificate.67  When his 
government scholarship was not renewed, Camara decided to stay in France to continue his 
studies but now had to support himself through a variety of jobs. During the day, he worked as a 
porter for a local market, for the city public transit system and as a skilled laborer at the Simca 
car assembly plant. At night, Camara studied at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métier. 
On the road to earning another diploma in engineering, he suspended his studies several times 
due to lack of funds.68 During this period of time, Camara struggled to balance his role as both 
student and worker. These moments of abject poverty and feelings of loneliness drove him to 
reflect on happier times in Guinea. Growing increasingly frustrated with his experiences in 
France and the limitations of his technical education, Camara believed, “it was not…worth the 
                                                          
65 Laye, The Dark Child, 182.  
66 Estimates reveal that by 1952 less than 100 Guinean students residing in France. See Jean Suret-Canale, La 
République De Guinée (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1970), 147.  
67 While working on this certificate, Camara also pursued his baccalauréat (the American equivalent to a high 
school diploma).  
68 King, The Writings of Camara Laye, 2.  
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trouble to leave Africa only to become a mechanic. It was too simple a job.”69 This frustration 
fueled idyllic recollections of his motherland, his family, and identity which he wrote about over 
the course of several years. His autobiographical memoir was originally entitled L’Enfant de 
Guinée (The Child of Guinea). In 1953, Plon publishing changed the title of the manuscript to 
L’Enfant Noir (The Black Child) to gain broader appeal. Camara published this first book at the 
age of twenty five. Simultaneously demonized by a number of African anti-colonial activists and 
acclaimed by a host of white French literary critics, Laye was awarded the Prix Charles Veillon 
in February 1954.70 This mainstream success resulted in interviews on several French radio 
stations, adaptions of the novel published in West Africa and in colonies within the Pacific as 
well as the financial freedom to purchase a car, rent his own apartment and travel extensively.  
Laye Camara was among a growing subset of African students writing about their 
experiences in France during the 1950’s.71 This community of writers published in France but 
was acutely connected to the mounting wave of anti-colonial protest in Africa. His work along 
with that of Ousmane Socé, Ake Loba, Ferdinand Oyono, Cheikh H. Kane, Bernard Dadié and 
Ousmane Sembène formed a new generation of African authors that contended with their 
transnational movement.72 Building on the intellectual ingenuity of the Négritude movement, 
                                                          
69 Recorded Interview with J. Sorel. From King, The Writings of Camara Laye, 3.  
70 The Prix Charles Veillon was a Swiss literary awarded first created in 1947. When Camara won the award in 1954, 
he was the first non-European to receive the honor. L’Enfant Noir was most notoriously criticized by Cameroonian 
author Mongo Beti. In an article published by Présence Africaine, he wrote a searing reproach of the novel for not 
engaging with the sociopolitical truth of colonialism. See Alexandre Biyidi, “L’Enfant noir,” Présence Africaine 16 
(1954) 419-420.  Among the more laudatory critics was Jean Blanzat, who wrote a review for Le Figaro litteraire.  
See Jean Blanzat, Le Figaro Litteraire, March 6, 1956.  
71 Abdoulaye Gueye estimates that by 1952-1953 there were about four thousand African students residing in 
France. See Abdoulaye Gueye, Les intellectuals africains en France. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002), 72. 
72 For more on the “generation of 1928” see Sonia Lee, Camara Laye (Boston: Twayne Publishers), 4. One of the 
first Senegalese novelists, Ousmane Socé published Mirages de Paris in 1937.  Building on this tradition of 
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these authors moved beyond contending with assimilation to the possibility of integrating within 
the French society. Both proudly African and officially French, these literary works examine 
blending two worlds to which they felt linked.73  Their novels explore a range of topics 
including: life in Africa, motivations for traveling to France, reception by white Frenchmen, 
notions of an African community in France and a longing to return to Africa. Read together, late 
colonial-era African francophone literature acts as a representation of the success of French state 
actors’ interpretation of “civilizing mission,” but it also serves as a departure point. These 
authors used the French language to advocate for a dual identity of unapologetic Blackness and 
Frenchness which remains oppositional to the republican vision of a singular, all-encompassing, 
‘raceless’ national identity.74  
These male  writers differed from the waves of African labor migrants that arrived after 
the period of decolonization, both in the purpose of their stay within France and their reception 
                                                          
exploring life in France, the following books were published by Camara’s contemporaries. Ousmane Sembène was 
a Senegal writer who published Le Docker noir in 1956. Ferdinand Oyono was a Cameroonian author who 
published Une Vie de boy also in 1956. Bernard Dadié is an Ivorian writer who published Un nègre à Paris in 1959. 
Aké Loba was an Ivorian writer who published Kocumbo, l'étudiant noir in 1960, Cheikh H. Kane is a Senegalese 
writer that published L'Aventure ambiguë in 1961. 
73 Major theoreticians of the Négritude movement include Léopold Senghor, Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas. For 
more on the Négritude movement, see Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora; King, The Writings of Camara Laye, 23 
and 63; Thomas, Black France, 42-43.  
74 Thomas, Black France, 6 and 28. This assessment by Thomas weighs heavily on interpretations from white 
French audiences. A deeper examination of Black authors who published in Présence Africaine underscores the 
centrality of Black reading audiences. Présence Africaine founder Alioune Diop made this position clear in the first 
publication of the journal. He stated, “The language in which [the voice of Africa] will be expressed, in our journal, 
will not fail to unveil new themes ... and original forms of sensibility ...” From Alioune Diop, "Niam Ngoura Ou Les 
Raisons D’être De Présence Africaine." Translated by Janis Mayes. Présence Africaine, no. 1 (1947): 12. African 
authors that submitted their work to white French publishing companies were aware that their authentic voice 
would be manipulated to reach a broader audience, which meant yielding to a considerable amount of editing and 
titles changes (this is made exceedingly clear in the process of L’Enfant Noir’s publication through Plon. At the 1st 
International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists hosted by the Sorbonne in Paris from September 19th-22nd 




by white French populations. These African authors represented the last gasp of the colonial era. 
During the period between 1945 and 1955, African Francophone literary figures moved freely 
between Africa and France. Protected by legislation that supported their French “citizenship,” 
these former student-authors served as key strategists of the movement toward decolonization 
even if that was not always their ultimate goal. Profoundly impacted by their time in France, 
Camara, Senghor, and Socé attempted to preserve the link between Africa and France.75 Many of 
their experiences within the metropole were a result of their small community size and individual 
status as intellectuals. Reflected in their writing, these colonial-era texts can be seen as “the 
precursors to contemporary immigrant narratives.”76  Laye Camara, both student and worker, 
represents a bridge between two dominating archetypes seen in African francophone literature 
and film that would increasingly become the focus of French immigration policy in the period 
between 1965 and 1975. During this time, national lawmaking was reactive and often uneasy 
about the growing presence of Black bodies within the metropole. This fomented the embrace of 
student and worker archetypes to rationalize their presence as well as the constant renegotiation 
of policy.  
This chapter contextualizes the proliferation of immigration legislation crafted by a 
variety of nation-state actors in the French government across thirty years. By using archival 
interviews and African francophone film, this analysis foregrounds and calls attention to African 
responses to these laws. The chapter argues that Black migrants were subject to a level of 
                                                          
75 Ousmane Socé served in the French Senate from 1946-1953 and in the Sénat de la Communauté française from 
1959-1961. Léopold Senghor served as member of the Fifth Republic’s Constitutional Commission in 1958. Camara 
Laye returned to Guinea to participate in the post-colonial transition and later served as the first ambassador to 
Ghana. He helped secure aid for Guinea after the French stopped providing funding.   
76 Thomas, Dominic Richard David. Black France: Colonialism, Immigration, and Transnationalism. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2007, 4.  
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surveillance that counters the “laissez-faire” immigration model often adopted by French 
historians and public officials.77 Acutely aware of this level of scrutiny by the French state, 
African migrants formed communities both within Paris and in the banlieue to protect each other 
and their vested interests. Their cultural and sociopolitical activity maintained and fostered links 
between Africa and France in the period before decolonization and after. Exploring these 
activities offers a more nuanced sense of the cultural and sociopolitical discourse that emerged 
between Sub-Saharan African immigrant communities and the French state.  
In the wake of World War II, France grappled with a new set of challenges in its effort to 
keep the colonial empire unified. Colonial soldiers from Sub-Saharan Africa were critical in the 
ultimate victory of France over the Axis forces. Both in size and military prowess, les tiralleurs 
distinguished themselves in battle within Tunisia, Corsica and Italy and ultimately in France 
from 1940-1944. During the autumn of 1944, when victory seemed imminent, General Charles 
De Gaulle withdrew the remaining African soldiers stationed in France. This led to a series of 
violent altercations between them and white Frenchmen.78 In an effort to regain control over the 
downward spiral of events, De Gaulle gathered colonial leaders later that year in Brazzaville to 
                                                          
77 In one of the newest edition of her book, French immigration policy scholar Julie R. Watts describes the period of 
“laissez-faire immigration” ending abruptly as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. See Julie R. Watts, Immigration Policy 
and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2018), 43. This description is also found in several other landmark monographs about the period. See, 
Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity, 177; Messina, West European Immigration, 14; Andreas Fahrmeir, 
Olivier Faron, and Patrick Weil. Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in 
Europe and the U.S. from the French Revolution to the Inter-war Period (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 85. 
78 Ousmane Sembène was a Senegalese tirailleur during World War II and was among the soldiers, who fought in a 
number of battles leading up to the liberation of France.  Although there were a number of violent interactions 
between African soldiers and white Frenchmen, the most notable of these was the Thiaroye massacre. On 
November 30, 1944, 1,000 Senegalese soldiers participated in an uprising at Camp Thiaroye in protest of the 
French government’s failure to pay them military pensions. In retaliation, on December 1, 1944, white French 
soldiers shot over thirty five soldiers. This violent repression was reimagined in a 1988 film by Sembène entitled 
Camp de Thiaroye.  
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discuss how to quell the roars of resentment as seeds for independence took root. Attuned to 
these political and social changes, many of the literary figures from the Négritude movement 
were summoned to calm the sea of discontent. Not writing in a vacuum, Camara’s generation of 
authors were cognizant of the treatment toward Black soldiers and in their writing grappled with 
the limitations of France’s raceless rhetoric.  
As migration patterns to France began to shift, legislative priorities transformed from 
1945-1975. During this period, France established its modern immigration infrastructure. 
Historians of contemporary France acknowledge these years as the largest period of mass 
immigration in the country’s history.79 Most scholars consider the time before 1974 as the 
golden age of “laissez-faire” immigration policy.80 After 1974, French policy restricted 
immigration. The government, which had always privileged ostensibly the most assimilable 
population flows from Europe, while categorizing African immigrants as largely unassimilable 
and undesirable, increasingly restricted Black migration to France and adopted progressively 
more punitive policies toward migrants already in the country.81  
Organized in two sections, the first section of this chapter charts the shift of Sub-Saharan 
Africans as imperial subjects to members of the French community through policy and 
                                                          
79 Noiriel, The French Melting Pot, 87-90. 
80 Julie R. Watts, Immigration policy and the challenge of globalization: unions and employers in unlikely alliance. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, 43.  
81 For works discussing the categorization of immigrants after 1975, see Pierre Bideberry, Director de l’Office 
National d’Immigration, “Bilan de Vingt Années d’ Immigration-1946-1966,”Reveue Française des Affaires Sociales, 
No.2, April-June 1967; Ireland, The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity; Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, 
The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe (New York: Routledge, 1994); Thomas, Black France; Paul A. 
Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) and 
Rayna Bailey, Immigration and Migration (New York: Facts On File, 2008). 
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administrative debate. This examination of policy is paired with a close reading of one of the 
earliest Black French films in order to explore the prevailing archetypes in the French cultural 
and political imagination. Throughout the period, Sub-Saharan African migrants were 
understood to be almost exclusively students or workers. These categories conveyed certain 
expectations with respect to class and gender that shaped not only French policy, but migrant 
self-perceptions. Subsequent examination introduces film textual analysis as a method that ties 
together the written and audiovisual art forms. The film Afrique Sur Seine (1955) directed by 
Paulin Soumanou Vieyra and Mamadou Sarr focuses on a student protagonist but also introduces 
a series of worker characters. This new archetype coincides with the changing volume of African 
immigration from study-based to labor-based migrations. The section concludes with an analysis 
of the film on the eve of decolonization. The film foreshadows the shift from Africans as 
“members of the French community” to the use of “immigrant” nomenclature to describe post-
colonial movement during the years that defined France’s loss of its empire and the acquisition 
of African independence. 
The second section, “Post-colonial Africa and Migration to France: 1960-1975,” 
examines the impact of decolonization on both Africa and France.  After the “fall of its empire,” 
France turned renewed energy toward the metropole in its efforts to spur industrial growth and 
production which relied heavily on immigrant labor. Due to its dependency on migrant labor, 
government officials focused on monitoring migrants’ presence through local agencies and 
police records. This consistent surveillance of African migrants disrupts what scholars have 
deemed a French “laissez-faire” approach to immigration between 1945 and 1975. Conventional 
framing by immigration scholars contends that prior to 1974, France had effectively adopted 
noninterventionist methods for addressing immigration.  However, the sheer amount of 
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legislation, revisions to this policy and contact between the French state and Black migrants 
suggests that these interactions were not necessarily as “hands-off” as previously considered. 
Instead, immigration acculturation process was a policed and regulated issue by the government  
In the period from 1952 to 1962, the objects of administrative concern were Maghreb 
migrants politicized by the Algerian revolution. Indeed compared to the 350,000 Algerian 
laborers working in France, the earliest waves of Sub-Saharan laborers paled in number.82 In 
stark contrast to North Africans, the presence of Black laborers was ostensibly depoliticized by 
the French government. In an effort to preserve their relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa as 
Algeria cut its ties, French officials signed bilateral accords with several West and Central 
African countries to facilitate Black migration without the hassle of the official immigration 
apparatus which later promoted clandestine movement. However by the mid-1960’s, Black 
students and workers were increasingly subject to monitoring by the Ministry of Interior and the 
local police as the African population swelled within Paris. The reality for Sub-Saharan Africans 
immigrants was that they faced significant levels of contact and scrutiny by the state once they 
were in France. Counter to the myth of noninterventionist policy, a variety of state agents were 
heavily involved in monitoring, evaluating and policing of African migrants during the “laissez-
faire” period. These methods help to contextualize some of the speed with which the late 1960s 
and 1970s turn towards a more hardline immigration policy could happen. The seemingly 
overnight “Africanization” of Paris and its neighboring suburbs from a small community of 
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students to highly concentrated 6.3% of the total national population by 1975 made them targets 
for political reaction.83  
The section concludes with an analysis of the politicization of Black workers in France. 
Using a rich trove of archival interviews from a report conducted by the Direction de la 
Population et des Migrations, these sources reveal the ways in which spatial representations of 
race were mapped into French cities in response to the growing presence of African migrants. 
Housing options for Black male workers were commonly overcrowded, decrepit and segregated.  
This frustration with poor housing conditions fomented the growth of groups lobbying for 
change. The year 1968 serves as a critical turning point to this “apolitical” folklore, as a large 
number of Sub-Saharan African students and laborers engaged in vocal protests. Increased 
political engagement coincided with an economic crisis in 1973 that brought France’s years of 
growth to a grinding halt. Despite this fiscal collapse, Sub-Saharan migrants arrived in greater 
numbers than ever before. When the government took steps to close the country’s borders in 
1974, it marked key demographic and legal shifts in the status of Black migrants. As a result of 
this drastic shift in policy and economic realities, Sub-Saharan migrants arrived en masse to a 
nation on edge financially and socio-politically. They became scapegoats for high unemployment 
numbers, suburban decay and social deviance.  
A deeper understanding of the relationship between African migration and the history of 
French immigration legislation frames Sub-Saharan migrants as objects of policy concern but 
also cultural construction. This framework offers a lens through which to examine the 
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convergence of voluntary migration, policy and generational sociopolitical negotiations that 
shaped subsequent evolutions in Black French identity. Juxtaposing French policy with Black 
cultural production is a frame of analysis that draws new contours from the varied motivations of 
self-determination and the countervailing pressures of neocolonial influence and French internal 
colonization. This chapter forges conceptual links between a continuous history of modern 
African diasporic migration and the profound rupture point in 1974 that curtailed labor 
immigration. The period between World War II and 1975 necessitated transformations in 
transnational, racial and intranational identity that in turn affected the process of African 
settlement and community-building.   
Colonial France and Africa (1945-1959) 
Contemporary French nationality policy classifies residents within three categories: 
nationals, foreigners and immigrants. A French national is the equivalent of a citizen. By legal 
definition foreigners are those who “simply do not have French nationality… [Immigrants] are 
people living in France who were born abroad…Immigrants who acquired French nationality are 
no longer foreigners.”84 Immigrants are residents that have not acquired full citizenship. Thus, a 
foreigner may be born in France (a product of immigrant parents) and a French person born 
outside of France can be considered an immigrant upon return to the country.85 As a result, “only 
foreigners, i.e. people permanently residing in France who state that they do not have French 
nationality are officially registered [by the government]. Immigrants are not registered as such 
once they have become French: they disappear as immigrants from the general population 
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census.”86 These porous boundaries between the categories of nationals, foreigners and 
immigrants have historically encouraged movement between all three classifications from 1945 
until 1974. French colonial immigration policy in the first 15 years after World War II hardly 
bothered to categorize Black populations as “immigrants” or “foreigners.” It is partly because 
Africa received so little consideration during these years that the initial establishment of French 
immigration policy lent itself to a porous set of categories between French nationals, foreigners 
and immigrants. Understanding how these categories crystallized and hardened in reaction to a 
more substantial Black population in the metropole ultimately provides a clearer sense of the 
evolution of French state policy in response to race. France’s wrestling with the transition from 
colonialism to decolonization during this era reshaped national policy and redefined the 
boundaries of French citizenship. Charting the evolutions of immigration policy in reaction to 
demographic change and permanency underscores French racial anxieties.   
During this period, French policymakers reframed how they understood the intentionality 
of foreign movement. The distinction between the terminology of immigration and migration is 
critical to understanding the complicated nature of French policy. These distinctions were part of 
the root causes for France’s nearly constant revision of immigration policy. Ironically, the lack of 
guidelines differentiating the use of the two terms during this period stands in stark contrast to 
the strict control that would discourage one and eschew the other, in practice, over the following 
decades. Contemporary scholars define immigration as the movement of people from one 
country to another with the intent of becoming permanent residents of the country to which they 
are relocating. Migration, on the other hand, is the temporary movement of people from one 
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country to another.  Although some migrants may eventually become permanent residents of the 
country, ideally, the French believed the majority of such people would return to their native 
country.87 The creation of new immigration laws and institutions constrained the formerly 
porous classifications in order to maintain the socioeconomic and political hierarchy of France. 
These newly constructed boundaries transformed the language used to describe former colonial 
subjects into “non-desirable immigrants” and as a result prevented their ability to be integrated 
into the French society. Rather than assist in the process of assimilation, these new postcolonial 
polices encouraged repatriation to African nation-states.88  
Following World War II, the expanding economy required a larger labor force. 89 France 
needed a labor population that would accept lower wages and longer hours for unskilled labor. 
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This demand resulted in the arrival of millions of non-Western immigrants. Despite conquering 
its dénatalité française with a significant baby boom, the reality remained that French nationals 
alone could not fulfill the labor demands of mining, steel mills, railroad construction and public 
service jobs.90 As a result, the French government deregulated immigration.  It was considered a 
tool of economic growth for private companies and the government. 
The deregulation of immigration was a temporary solution to labor shortages that 
permanently changed France’s demographic composition. Former Interior Minister Charles 
Pasqua—an architect of more restrictive policies in the 1990’s—wrote, “early immigration was 
essentially a labor policy; the government did not carefully reflect on the non-economic 
consequences of the massive influx of immigrants.”91  Legislative and judicial organizations 
drafted policies in the form of ordinances instead of laws ratified by the government and 
president. More specifically, these ordinances were “developed largely through administrative 
decisions” by ministerial departments and court proceedings in the Constitutional Court and 
Council of the State.92 Stimulated by the promise of economic and industrial growth, these 
policies facilitated both demographic change and a new era of policy reform during the last fifty 
years of the twentieth century.  Beyond economic stimuli, two broad processes informed French 
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immigration policy during the latter half of the century. The first process involved the active 
recruitment and absorption of European laborers from Russia, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. The second process responded to a decline in European labor sources and subsequent 
increase of using French colonial subjects to fill this void.93  
Two waves of migrations defined contemporary immigration policy in the first half of 
twentieth century. The first wave of immigrants arriving from various European countries from 
the late 1800’s to the mid-1940s resulted in their absorption into French society through various 
institutions including the military as well as educational institutions and were defined by the 
French government’s understanding of their permanency. In contrast, the second wave of 
migrations (1945-1960) from North and Sub-Saharan Africa were often temporary and 
dominated by males.94 Migrating to France for travel and/or education, Black males arrived in 
relatively small numbers in comparison to European and Maghreb male immigrants.95  
A month after World War II concluded, France drafted its first immigration law not 
directly linked to attracting a labor force. Ideologically based on the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, the ordinance of 1 October 1945 declared all immigrants equal to French 
                                                          
93 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Kimberly A. Hamilton, Converging Paths to Restriction: French, Italian and 
British Responses to Immigration (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), 6-7. 
94“Avis et Rapports du Conseil Économique et Social: problèmes poses par l’immigration des travailleurs africains 
en France,” Journal Officiel de la République française, July 24, 1964.  
95 In the second half of the century, two more waves shifted racial demographics in France. A third wave of 
migrations (1960-1975) responded to the economic changes occurring within the succession of newly independent 
African nations and France’s increasing demand for an industrial labor force in mining, steel, railroad construction 
and public service. France’s need for a labor population that would accept lower wages, longer hours, and provide 
unskilled labor came to an abrupt halt with the oil crisis of 1973. The forth and largest wave of Sub-Saharan 
migrations (1975-1995) responded to worsening diplomatic relations between France and its former colonial 
entities (particularly the Maghreb). Male workers induced the feminization wave of immigration relocating their 
wives and children to France circumventing the closing of the borders.  
46 
 
nationals making “no distinction on the basis of nationality, religious, racial or cultural 
character.” This ordinance was an official response to the exclusionary rhetoric used by 
European countries that adopted languages of superiority or nationalistic difference during 
World War II. The decree declared France “officially open to immigrants and their families.” 
The ordinance presumed that all immigrants could and would be integrated socially and legally 
into French society.96 Nineteen days later, France amended the 1 October ordinance to address 
French nationality conditions for immigrants. The ordinance 19 October 1945 for the 
Codification of Nationality outlined naturalization policies for children born to immigrants as 
well as voting and citizenship rights for colonial populations.97  
Shortly following this legislation, the 2 November 1945 ordinance ratified changes made 
to the 1 October 1945 ordinance. The ordinance determined that foreigners desiring to live in 
France for more than three months must hold a residence permit. Amending the October 
ordinances that did not delineate any legal criteria for permanency, the 2 November decree 
determined that immigrants must secure legal documentation of employment and residency in 
order to remain in France after three months.98 Meant to recruit workers from other European 
countries—whose populations were “culturally compatible,” the decree also established the 
Office National D’ Immigration (ONI). ONI recruited a male workforce from Italy, Portugal, 
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Spain, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Russia.99 Within a year, the ordinance was amended again 
to take into consideration changing political and social conditions of European nations and 
colonial inhabitants. 100 
In order to avoid instituting ethnic quotas, French policymakers facilitated bilateral 
accords with European nations that outlined labor recruitment, family reunification, housing and 
equal treatment polices. These accords simultaneously stressed “postwar immigration was a 
temporary movement. As guests, foreign workers were expected to maintain ties with sending-
country governments and look first toward homeland officials whenever a grievance arose.”101 
The ordinance 2 November 1945 added a caveat that the French government had the power to 
deport any foreigner that disturbed “public order.” The specifics of “public order” were not 
clearly outlined within the law and left considerable ambiguity and official discretion on actions 
that could constitute a threat to public order.102 Ultimately, the ordinance 2 November 1945 
failed to attract a sustainable Western European male worker migration to France. With the 
exception of Spanish and Portuguese migrants, other European recruited workers did not move to 
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France en masse to fill the employment gap. In the wake of World War II, other western 
European countries worked to develop their economies and discouraged mass immigration. For 
ten years, France experienced a persistent unskilled labor shortage.  
As a result, France looked towards its colonies to jumpstart its economic recovery. 
Having played a vital role in winning the war, most colonial soldiers maintained the expectation 
that they would gain citizenship rights. However, upon the conclusion of the World War in 1945, 
French president Charles De Gaulle gathered colonial leaders in Brazzaville to announce his 
vision for the future and the role of its colonies within this new world order. Colonial leaders 
reconfigured the African colonies into a “union.” This process of reconfiguration outlined in the 
Constitution of 1946 began dismantling the white French administration of the “empire” as 
power shifted to local leaders.  Early drafts of the constitution proposed by government deputies 
cited that “all subjects should acquire the qualities of French citizens with all rights connected to 
that status. And they should have these rights without having to give up their personal status.”103  
Senegalese poet and politician Léopold Senghor was a member of the second 
Constitutional Commission in 1958. He was critical to the development of this constitution and 
arguments for full citizenship for colonial subjects. Basing his defense for full citizenship in 
French revolutionary rhetoric, Senghor cited the 1794 National Convention Decree that 
abolished slavery and established that, “all men, without distinction of color, resident in our 
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colonies, are French citizens and enjoy all of the rights assured by the Constitution.”104  Senghor 
and other members of the Constitutional Commission revised drafts on the Fourth Republic’s 
stance on colonial citizenship which was treated separately from Algeria. As the only colonial 
entity recognized as a legal extension of France, Algerians were granted French citizenship by 
the Loi Lamine Guèye of 1946.105 Despite Senghor’s efforts, Sub-Saharan colonial subjects 
would not be covered by Loi Lamine Guèye. The final iteration of the Constitution outlined 
citizenship rights in Article 80, “all inhabitants of overseas territories have the quality of citizens, 
on the same basis as French nationals of the metropole or of the overseas territories. Specific 
laws will establish the conditions under which they will exercise their rights as citizens.”106 
Although the final version of the constitution did not guarantee specific conditions for the 
exercise of colonial subjects’ rights, Senghor’s petitions were the beginning of a long series of 
actions that resulted in universal suffrage almost ten years later.  
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Thus, colonial subjects were “citizens” of France. Their citizenship status was intricately 
tied to France’s role as an imperial power. As immigration laws delineated work contracts, 
medical exams and residence permits for immigrants, colonial subjects were not considered in 
this immigration legislation given their official status as citizens. This citizenship status made the 
legal distinction between native French and colonial workers almost undistinguishable. 
Additionally it made colonial workers a more attractive workforce to private and public 
industries than foreign workers. Foreign workers were subject to the immigration protocol and 
regulations required by the ONI. In contrast, African migrant laborers had the ability to work and 
reside in France without following the restrictive policies of residency permits and paperwork 
required by ONI.  As employers shifted their focus from European foreigners to colonial 
laborers, they took advantage of this policy loophole. Various industries, including railroad and 
automobile manufacturers, viewed African colonial subjects as key participants in a sustainable 
labor force and aggressively recruited workers.107 This new development established migratory 
patterns that facilitated the movement of laborers between Africa and France supported by 
bilateral agreements between France and its colonial territories.   
After World War II, France focused its efforts on internal colonialism and various forms 
of external decolonization. This two-fold process allowed for the internalization of metropolitan 
ideologies within the colonies and their subsequent renovation upon return to the metropole. 
France exercised considerable power in its exploitive relations with northern and western Africa. 
By the mid-twentieth century assimilationist policies were all but forgotten for the adoption of 
associationalist policies. The application of associationalist policies by government ministers 
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sprung from a belief that it was impossible to assimilate an entire African colonial subject 
population. Thus, these associationalist policies likened colonial subjects to labor pawns-used for 
economic gain. Rather than incorporating colonial subjects into the cultural tapestry of the 
empire, African colonials were subjugated into fitting within the mold of a “model minority.” 
Significant shifts in French-colonial relations in terms of socio-cultural and political 
metropolitan responsibilities made the question of assimilation, rather than citizenship, the 
central issue. Situated within these limitations to French citizenship and forced assimilation, a 
growing number of Sub-Saharan artists used the medium of film to critique colonial portrayals of 
themselves but also visualize themselves within the metropole.   
The Cultural Turn: Artistic Responses to Anti-Colonialism 
Contemporary African film as an artistic medium grew out of the colonial tradition of 
filmmaking. Primarily funded by the government, these early documentary and ethnographic 
films were the first of their kind. Shot, produced and edited in Africa, these productions 
attempted to capture the essence of African life. However, in accordance with colonial protocol 
and legislation, these early films marginalized African peoples and established French colonial 
administrators as the sociopolitical and cultural masters of the continent. This subjective lens 
would remain until African independence. The entrance of African filmmakers into the 
cinematographic world complicated the ways in which African peoples were seen and responded 
directly to the colonial film practices that occupied their imaginations. Rooted in responding or 
retracting colonial imagery, the earliest generation of contemporary African cinematography 
grappled with the socio-cultural legacy of colonialism.108 
                                                          









In the groundbreaking 1955 film, Afrique sur Seine, filmmakers Paulin Soumanou Vieyra 
and Mamadou Sarr offer a compelling reversal of the “colonial gaze.”109 Recognized as the 
beginning of African cinematography, it is one of the first films produced by African directors.  
Shot during a period of time when African presence was confined to the margins of French 
society, it is the first work to give a “panoramic overview of the African community” in Paris. 
The filmmakers arrived in Paris with the desire to explore the “city of promises made by young 
men to help their country.” Paulin Vieyra was born in Benin but lived the majority of his life in 
Senegal.  He was a filmmaker who wanted to present a different image of African life than that 
captured in the colonial films released by his white French counterparts. Funded by the 
government, the majority of white French filmmakers were paid to come to Africa to make films 
that promoted colonial agendas and showed France’s control over the African landscape and its 
inhabitants. Together with fellow Senegalese director and actor Mamadou Sarr, Vieyra wanted to 
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create a more accurate portrayal of themselves on film and to offer an anti-colonial critique of 
French ethnographic film. The colonial administration, however, refused to give Vieyra and Sarr 
permission to shoot a film primarily based in Senegal.   
Written by Pierre Laval, Minister of the Colonies, the Laval Decree required that all films 
made in French Africa be submitted for approval by the colonial government.110 Meant to be a 
safeguard against any films that disputed colonial agendas or objected to colonial rule, the decree 
censored any and all films coming from Africa.111  Given explicit control over all of colonial 
French Africa by the decree, Laval made it effectively impossible for African filmmakers to 
create films. After being refused permission to shoot in Africa, Vieyra and Sarr moved to France 
and reframed their project to make Afrique sur Seine: the first film of its kind examining African 
immigrant life and community in Paris.112  
Afrique sur Seine helps to further disrupt the historiographical consensus around “laissez-
faire” French policy and the subsequent treatment of African populations. A careful analysis of 
this film underscores various elements of socio-cultural and political surveillance. Colonial 
legislation (i.e. the Laval Decree) served as a tool of cultural and political oppression. It 
prohibited African filmmakers from creating audio-visual content that would unsettle the 
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colonial agenda as well as upend stereotypical representations of Black people. In their work, 
Vieyra and Sarr introduced a new set of characters to colonial-era film. They used elements of 
French filmmaking to observe and scrutinize the presence of African peoples in the metropole. 
This film moved the African subject from the margins of cinematography to the center. In its 
almost singular focus on African individuals, the film foregrounds the ways in which Black 
immigrants navigated life in France especially in terms of their interactions with each other and 
white French populations.   
Vieyra and Sarr replicate the process of French filmmakers walking through African 
colonies by similarly “walking” through Paris. Funded by the Musée de l'Homme, the short film 
follows the conventions of French ethnographic filmmaking from its use of long and mid-shots 
to the presence of a singular omniscient narrator who is only interrupted by pauses in the 
music.113 They invert this process by becoming the stars of the film instead of the subjects. The 
ethnographic documentary guides viewers through the city of Paris juxtaposing its monuments 
with statuesque visuals of African life and community along the Seine. Despite the various 
characters’ silence, the film uses their collective images to raise questions about notions of home, 
identity and assimilation.114 The contrast between the non-speaking people that roam the streets 
                                                          
113 Thackway, Melissa. Africa shoots back, 121.  
114 Published a year after the Afrique sur Seine’s completion, Vieyra writes a searing critique of French films 
portraying life in sub-Saharan Africa. Intended for mainly white audiences, he argues these “exotic” films were 
neither subjects of serious analytic inquiry nor screened by African audiences for an opportunity to criticize them 
before their release. This type of negligence corresponds with the goals of colonialism that limits Africa’s ability to 
express “her [own] desires.” Accordingly as anti-colonial protests swelled during the 1950’s, Vieyra identifies that 
“for Africa itself, the great liberation struggle is underway.” This struggle for Africans to speak for themselves both 
in law and politics must also extend to the “cultural side.” Especially given Vieyra’s concerns that “Europe speaks 
and continues to speak exclusively on behalf of Africa, including the film sector.” Within the essay, he analyzes two 
films created in Africa and produced by French directors to reveal that factors of finance, prejudice and policy are 
the underpinnings of an industry intent on using cultural productions to propel images of Africans as inferior which 
subsequently impacts their experiences as immigrants in the metropole.  Most importantly, films that do offer a 
more accurate portrayal of Africans are only “seen by a small number of spectators, either because they are 
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of Paris and the looming voice of the narrator who speaks in poetic meter are technical devices 
challenging the conceptualization of the French motto of “Liberté, égalité, fraternité,” in its 
everyday application to the African community.  
The film begins on the shores of the Niger River. The opening scene shows children 
playing in the water under the warmth of the sun. Moments later the children are seen walking 
toward the horizon alluding to their future journey from Africa to Paris. The conscious decision 
of the directors to begin the film in Africa supports a diasporic framing of migration that “any 
local African character, space or narrative has a legitimate space in the global reality well beyond 
the shores of Africa and [into] diasporic contexts.”115 Thus the movement of these African 
characters from their motherland to Europe fits within a longstanding tradition of diasporic 
movement that was not interrupted by colonization. Instead colonization is the force propelling 
them. The narrator begins his monologue by noting the fleeting experience of childhood and the 
inevitability of migration to France. He states, “We had to grow up, leave home for Paris, capital 
of the world, capital of Black Africa.”116 The narrator places Paris at the center of the world and 
“Black” Africa. In addition, he introduces an archetype of “mythic Paris” which later became a 
standard trope in Francophone cinematography and a lingering idea within the African 
imagination.  Although rooted in French colonial propaganda and education, this notion of Paris 
being a destination for upward mobility and self-improvement foregrounds a new process within 
                                                          
banned or because distribution is difficult.” With this grim prospects, French cinema cannot speak on behalf of 
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the African diaspora mobilized by the first generation of migrants living in France. The fact that 
they viewed themselves as participants instead of mechanisms of capitalism speaks to both the 
internalization of colonial agendas and an attempt to work within these socioeconomic 
structures. 
The directors infuse the movement of Black bodies from Africa to France with an 
unparalleled optimism. Paris is seen as “the center of hope, all hope.”117  In the first sequence 
shot in Paris, viewers see a range of Black faces that counter the storyline imposed upon colonial 
films exported to Africa supporting their invisibility. This introduction of a Black presence in 
Paris not only upsets standard narratives of a “lily-white” Paris but also familiarizes the audience 
with a host of characters seen in everyday life.118 The establishing shot captures an African 
young man descending from a street car. The dominant character of the film, he represents the 
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This character is followed by a homeless African man asking for change. Later images 
include: a young woman walking along the boulevard, an African waiter attempting to persuade 
a group of students to enter the café, an African street sweeper interrupted from his work by an 
elderly African man asking for a cigarette, a lonely alcoholic man drinking on a street corner and 








Countering the establishing shot of success represented by the African male student, the film 
juxtaposes its earlier affirmation of Paris as a “city of hope” with a moment of harsh reality. The 
later images of African characters are introduced by the narrator’s declaration that in Paris there 
are days “without hope. The Paris of loneliness, compensated by eternal fraternity.”119           
This dichotomy between hope and hopelessness speaks to the lived realities of 
immigration. The hopeful dreams that many migrants carried with them to Paris were often left 
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Figure 4. African “street sweeper” character 
interrupted from his work by an elderly 
African man asking for a cigarette. 
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unfulfilled due to the unforgiving set of circumstances that confronted migrants once they 
arrived in the city of light. In this moment, the film challenges the extent to which universal 
French values are translated into the specific experience of African immigrants. The filmmakers 
reveal that hope and the lack thereof must co-exist in order to render a truly accurate portrayal of 
the immigrant experience in Paris. In their portrayal, hope and optimism are the defining features 
of the city. Despite the days without hope, African immigrant loneliness is disrupted by a 
community of individuals that support each other. This process of community-building explored 
throughout the film is a defining theme within Francophone cinematography and also a key 
characteristic within the contemporary African diaspora. As this notion of an “African 
community” in Paris grows and develops beyond the plotline of the film, and becomes such a 
powerful cultural force that it eventually disrupts the ideological basis of French republican 
values. Over time this community will be seen as an uncontrollable threat. In growing numbers, 
these peripheral characters’ arrival within the metropole will be marked by colonial and 
postcolonial legislation attempting to prohibit the sociopolitical and economic advancement of 
their community.  
During the process of making the film, the directors were intentional in their attempts “to 
discover Paris, going in search of Afrique sur Seine, we have the hope of finding ourselves, the 
hope of meeting up, the hope of finding civilization.”120 Their search to find a community proves 
to be complex.  Unable to bridge the gap between all populations of African immigrants, the film 
shows moments of solidarity and moments of fracture.  Along the path of self-discovery, various 
characters are plagued by questions of social integration and belonging.  A second set of 
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“characters” are woven into the film. The historical and immovable monuments of Paris interact 
with the characters constantly in motion. The Latin Quarter, Notre Dame, the Eiffel Tower and 
the Seine are reminders of the characters’ physical negotiation of the urban terrain. As the 
characters meet and confront each other, the monuments serve as a trope for their physical 
immersion into the city. Navigating through the city of Paris becomes increasingly complicated 
as the directors introduce four character archetypes meant to represent the African immigrant 
experience in Paris. The “student,” “the interracial couple,” “the worker” and the “lost” each 
represent a facet of African life and community. Moreover, they represent varying degrees of 







Sarr and Vieyra’s film suggests that the larger Parisian community is both inclusive and 
exclusive of black bodies. The student represents the central figure of the film’s imagination. 
Arriving from various African colonies to Paris, these individuals were the focal points of the 
colonial education agenda. Seen as emblems of “success,” these students signify the arrival of 
civilization to the African continent within the colonial imagination. The film’s optimism is 
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Figure 5. Central African male “student” character seen laughing and talking 
with a young white French woman on a motorcycle.  
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supported by the community of African students living in the Latin Quarter that could “gather, 
assimilate, melting the ancient barriers of prejudice and the monuments of hatred in the sun of 
love, growing closer, understanding one other.”122   Their ability to transcend and meld with 
colonial ideology is connected to their relationship to the “interracial couple” archetype that 
represents full immersion into the Parisian community. Two examples of interracial couples are 
seen during the film. The first example is the central African male student character seen 
laughing and talking with a young white French woman on a motorcycle. The second example is 
a young African woman waiting for her French boyfriend. Both couples are interrupted by an 
African male. Their eyes meet briefly and each character turns away to return to their 
interactions with French men and women. These fleeting interactions are met with moments of 
confusion and uncomfortable silence on the part of the African characters and a lack of 
recognition of this awkwardness by white French onlookers. The movie uses these scenes to 
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Figure 6. Screen capture of the “worker” character represented by the street sweeper. 
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The “worker” character represented by the street sweeper is a central figure within the 
African immigrant community. Symbolizing the thankless and reviled public service 
employment, the worker gets dirty to keep the city clean. Accepted by Parisian society as a 
necessary contributor, he is nonetheless not integrated within typical French spaces. Finally, the 
“lost” represent the lower wrung of society that is at the outskirts of French society. Unable to 
assimilate into the Parisian community, the homeless, the alcoholic and the prostitute are figures 
readily seen in daily life. Embodying the harsh realities of immigration, each of these figures 
came from Africa to Paris with dreams but were unable to succeed.  The film’s consideration of 
Sub-Saharan African presence within the metropole and their varying degrees of assimilation to 
French society coincided with a growing body of anti-colonial cultural productions that 
challenged the French colonial representation of Africa. 
The decolonization of French Sub-Saharan Africa was propelled by a struggle for 
representation. In addition to African peoples vying for positions within the government and 
sociopolitical activism, the arts—both visual and auditory—became increasingly more visible 
arenas to contest colonial control. Trained within the colonial system, many of these writers and 
artists traveled to the metropole for their collegiate education. Upon returning to the African 
colonies, these cultural icons became key administrators within the colonial governments. 
Several other writers and artists would gain control of French Africa’s postcolonial nations. 
These early efforts set the stage for an increasing militancy as independence grew closer. 
African cinematography created a universe where Black characters, narratives and 
experiences could be explored on their own subjective terms. Contemporary African cinema is 
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differentiated from other forms of media due to its development during the post-colonial era.124 
The generation of African directors that found their voice in the years following independence 
brought a unique sense of authenticity to African voices that migrated to European nations. In the 
face of official immigration legislation that banned and denied the existence of any community 
other than republican France, African directors pointed to the failure of French legal policy to 
integrate all African peoples into the larger community. At the same time, their work empowered 
African immigrants with a sense of agency to create their own communities in the face of policy 
that forbade their existence. This act of resistance and activism reveals the interstitial space 
between policy and the lived realities of life in Paris in the period before and after 
decolonization.125  
The paradox of French decolonization: African migration 
It speaks to the complexity and exploitive nature of the age that decolonization coincided 
with the largest waves of postcolonial immigration to France. In 1960, thirteen colonies received 
their independence from France. Within a thirty year period, the immigrant population of France 
doubled to 3.4 million people due in part to the fact that former migrants lost their status as 
“citizens” and were counted as immigrants.  Beginning with the independence struggle of 
Algeria, French decolonization facilitated the largest migration of former African colonial 
subjects to the metropole in history.   
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The Algerian War was a turning point in France’s diplomatic relations with its colonial 
entities. The end of France’s “laissez-faire” posture toward immigrants can be seen in the 
evolution of legal policy that controlled the Maghreb. Beginning in 1948, growing tensions 
between France and Algeria led to the onset of the Algerian Revolution in 1958.  During this 
period, France’s chief goal in Algeria was to prove that complete assimilation to the French 
republican model was possible. Situating the Algerian Revolution as a French Revolution, the 
Algerian War posed fundamental questions about “Who was French,” and how and by whom the 
country must be governed. With independence, Algeria symbolized the first failure of the French 
government’s ability to convince its colonial entities to identify as French. This can be seen in 
the period between 1958 and 1962, when the French government began using religious and racial 
categories (French, Jew, Arab, European, Muslim, and Algerian) to define different groups 
within Algeria in an effort to revoke all-inclusive citizenship rights.   
During this period of extreme turmoil between France and Algeria, labor-driven 
immigration shifted to the exodus of more than 100,000 pieds-noirs and harkis from their native 
country to France.126 Both groups fled Algeria at the end of the war. This mass movement of 
non-laborers increased xenophobic sentiments and overwhelmed the government.127 Coinciding 
with the movement of refugees was a shortage of labor due to the increasing numbers of 
restrictions for Algerian laborers imposed by the French government.  In 1956, France required 
all Algerians to enter the country with official visas. This change complicated the process of 
industrial companies seeking to supplement their labor supply with an expendable source of 
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manpower. Due to these legal restrictions, the population of Algerian migrants dropped 
expeditiously in the late 1950’s. In 1955, 194,000 Algerians arrived in France. One year later, the 
number fell to 79,000.128 During this period of time, those who remained in France were 
frequently promoted to higher-paying and more prominent jobs. This upward mobility of 
Algerian workers left a significant shortage in the semi-skilled and low-skilled industrial 
positions. 
The economic boom characterized as Les Trente Glorieuses reached its peak in the years 
between 1956 and 1962. French industries faced a labor shortage of insurmountable proportion, 
as a result of a lackluster supply of European foreign workers, countless restrictions on Algerian 
workers until 1962, and an insufficient amount of French citizens willing to work in low level 
and low paying jobs.129 Accordingly, the recruitment of Sub-Saharan African workers was a 
necessary shift in labor-based migration.  Following the migratory patterns of Algerian workers 
until 1956 when the French implemented visa restrictions, Sub-Saharan African laborers could 
come to France without the immigration restrictions placed on foreign workers by the ONI. 
During this six year period, French companies sent representatives to various colonies to recruit 
their new labor force. Industries ranging from small-scale factories, automobile manufacturers 
and the Paris city government were all recruiting Sub-Saharan African migrants. Utilizing its 
networks, recruiters sought out men to work as street sweepers, dock hands, and assembly-line 
workers. These efforts were compounded by kinship networks and word of the mouth references 
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from earlier generations of African migrants that spoke of economic mobility and the “mythic” 
proportions of the city of Paris that welcomed Africa’s children with open arms.  
Post-colonial Africa and Migration to France: 1959-1975  
The decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa occurred in the wake of the Algerian War for 
independence. Although violence did occur in the process, it was unmatched by the Algerian 
War. This fundamental rupture point in colonial history occurred in two forms within the Sub-
Saharan African context. One method involved the protracted process of a power transfer. The 
second resulted in a more immediate outcome of independence. France used its influence with 
Africa’s intellectual elite to facilitate a part of the “peaceful” decolonization process. The first 
presidents of newly independent African countries such as Léopold Senghor (Senegal) and Felix 
Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire) were educated within French institutions.  During their presidencies, 
Senghor and Boigny espoused French ideological principles but encouraged African unity and 
progressivism.130 The Evian Accords finalized the process of decolonization in 1962. The 
accords outlined French economic control of African oil reserves and other natural resources.131 
France’s formal withdrawal from its African colonies left a political vacuum that was negotiated 
and contested by elites, student groups and trade organizations. France largely maintained a 
hands-off foreign policy toward its former African countries, leaving them to “figure it out” on 
their own as long as it did not conflict with French economic interests.132 This stance fostered an 
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ethos of corruption and tacitly encouraged various forms of oppression that continue to plague 
Africa in today’s era of neocolonialism. African populations escaped the turmoil of their home 
countries by immigrating to France in search of employment and socio-political stability. This 
massive influx of Black immigrants caused the French to develop new systems of immigration 
regulation. 
The independence of former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa reconfigured the 
legal pattern of labor migration to France. The citizenship status of Black African workers 
changed with the disintegration of the French colonial empire. African workers residing in 
France became “Senegalese,” “Malian,” or “Ivorian” nationals instead of French citizens. The 
closing of nationality categorization in the wake of independence once again altered the 
migration patterns of Sub-Saharan African workers. Instead of moving between the newly 
independent African nation-states, the thrust of the movement shifted to France permanently. 
Before independence, Black workers freely circulated between their nation-states and France. 
Legally protected by French law, workers relied on the 1946 nationality reform to support their 
free movement. Additionally, they could also obtain French citizenship by law. Legislation 
passed in 1960 recognized the French citizenship of individuals born in former West African 
colonies by judicial declaration.133 However between 1963 and 1964, France signed bi-lateral 
migration treaties with Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. These agreements delineated that legal 
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entry into France of immigrants from the former colonies required the possession of a labor 







Beginning after 1960, a growing amount of African migrants began working in France 
without residence and working permits. Rather than deporting these non-European “illegal” 
immigrants, the French government gave them “amnesty ex post facto.” The French government 
legalized their illegal extended residency and employment in order to counter the national job 
shortage.135  Contrary to the belief that these accords would successfully regulate Sub-Saharan 
African migration, they instead created a more frenzied and unregulated situation. Most of the 
immigrants who arrived after the ratification of the accords ignored the stipulations. These 
workers arrived in France without labor contracts and proper medical documentation. Without 
these documents, all of these migrants were considered “illegal” immigrants and subject to 
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Figure 7. A newspaper image of a Black street 
sweeper in 1963.  
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deportation.136  However, French companies continued to recruit these African employees in the 
face of the new legislation.  Eager to profit off the precarious nature of this immigrant labor 
force, private industries continued to employ Black workers. African laborers continued to arrive 
in France seeking the endless economic opportunities that colonial folklore foretold.  
Enticed by the potential for wealth and social promotion, African young men arrived in 
Paris prepared to contribute to the booming French economy and seize the opportunity to make 
enough income to support themselves and their families back in Africa.  Instead of encountering 
the Parisian paradise of their childhood storybooks, most African migrants were confronted by a 
series of problems. Labor migrants suffered housing shortages, sickness, complicated and often 
competitive relations with other immigrant communities, racism and exclusion from the larger 
Parisian society. A byproduct of the French government’s inability to predict this mass 
immigration, the superfluous alterations to immigration policy only accelerated this migration 
and the constant demand for more workers by companies. Ultimately, Paris was ill-equipped to 
manage this mass influx of Black inhabitants to the country.137   
A small community of labor migrants laid the foundation for a permanent African 
community in the Paris region throughout the 1960’s and into the 1970’s. Between 1960 and 
1974, the Parisian African community was dominated by Senegalese, Malian, and Mauritanian 
immigrants.  A 1960s study adds some numerical contour to the often uncountable influx of 
migrants. Statistical analysis of African nationalities calculated that 40% of Black Africans in 
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France originated in Mali, while 25% came from Senegal and 25% from Mauritania. Although 
Sub-Saharan African migration to France seemed to be ballooning during this time it remained 
the smallest of the immigrant groups that arrived in search of employment.  These numbers 
continued to increase radically in the Paris region and in France. Historian François Manchuelle 
cites 2,000 African workers in France in 1953 and 15,000 by 1956.138 In 1963, he estimates the 
figure at between 22,000 and 30,000. The Parisian Prefecture de Police placed the population of 
African workers at 22,000 in 1969.139 Others sources cite the numbers capping at 50,000 
inhabitants.140 This wide range in numbers recorded was a response to the rapidly increasing 
number of “illegal” immigrants. Without work contracts, medical firms, nor guaranteed housing, 
the French government employed a variety of programmatic agendas to “fix” their immigrant 
problem. Among these varied tactics, housing proved to be the most decisive approach to 
preventing Black migrants from integrating within the French socio-economic structure.    
 
Immigration Policy in Practice: Housing Immigrants  
The French government’s institutionalization of housing between 1950 and 1975 led to the 
consolidation of immigrants by nationality and employment. These classifications included public 
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or private housing, specific neighborhoods and types of accommodations. A racial hierarchy 
determined the government’s organization of immigrant housing. According to French social and 
economic integration standards: Italians and Spaniards formed the highest rungs of assimilability, 
Portuguese immigrants occupied the middle rung, while North Africans, Sub-Saharan Africans 
and Turkish immigrants were located at the bottoms rungs of this hierarchy, their presence deemed 
as unassimilable. This categorical method of integration into French society fueled discriminatory 
and racialized terminology. French nationals used such terminology to restrict immigrants from 
various forms of employment and entrance into the social order.141  
In the years leading up to the Algerian War for independence, migrant housing dominated 
government debates and programmatic attention. This preoccupation with controlling immigrant 
accommodations provides a stark counterpoint to a “laissez-faire” model. In fact, the surveillance 
apparatus constructed for Algerian immigrants was quickly adapted to include Black migrant 
laborers. Government housing both separated North African and Sub-Saharan workers as well as 
served as a way to track these communities. In the years between 1950 and 1965, the Parisian 
region experienced a housing crisis driven by a substantial increase in migrants from Sub-
Saharan Africa.  These successive waves of migration were propelled by the vacuum of jobs 
available as Algerian laborers participated in the movement for independence. As more Black 
migrants arrived, they often competed for both employment and housing.142 Due to the 
increasing conflict between Algeria and France, the government created organizations to regulate 
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their presence. The French government deemed housing to be the most pressing issue and the 
most effective way to infiltrate political networks and daily activity. Thus, housing became a 
way to police the everyday interactions of Algerian migrant workers to the detriment of Black 
laborers. 
In 1956, the French government established the National Society for the Construction of 
Housing for Algerian Worker Housing (SONACOTRAL). 143 This “semi-autonomous” 
organization regulated housing for the masses of Algerian immigrants working in France. 
Chiefly concerned with monitoring their political activity during the Algerian War, 
SONACOTRAL suburbanized the fringes of Paris and its surrounding banlieues. 
Suburbanization was the solution to the growing “problem” of housing Maghrebi immigrants.  
Containing Algerians had both social and geo-political implications. By distancing them away 
from the city center, the government limited their access to Paris, censored their activities and 
prevented their growing presence from disaggregating a nuclear white French identity.  
SONACOTRAL’s three ad hoc responses to immigrant housing were: cités de transit 
(housing projects), habitations à loyer modéré (HLM) or low cost housing and foyers (single-sex 
dormitories).144 SONACOTRAL’s “trio of solutions to the housing problem” developed a 
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only did bidonvilles spatially segregate immigrant workers from being integrated with French nationals; but also 
they inadvertently encouraged residential permanency among workers. Due to the utter squalor of these 
neighborhoods, government workers were unwilling to visit the 119 bidonvilles situated throughout France to 
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hierarchy according to assimilability. The “(HLM) dwellings for those who are to remain, the cités 
for those who may or may not remain but are kept segregated until the choice is clear, and the 
foyers for those who are undesirable as permanent residents.”145 This umbrella of housing options: 
dealt with the immediacy of relocating immigrants from shantytowns known as bidonvilles, the 
realization that many immigrants planned on a permanent stay, the presumed level of assimilation 
for the population, and encouraged repatriation.146 In accordance with ONI’s recruitment of male 
laborers, most Algerian workers were housed in foyers.  
As a result of the government’s almost singular focus on policing Algerian migrant 
workers, the earliest waves of Sub-Saharan migrants were not considered for public housing 
accommodations. Black workers were relegated to privately owned lodging. Their options 
included makeshift shacks, hostels, room rentals and building basements. The overwhelming 
                                                          
check employment and residential permits. The Loi Debré legalized the destruction of these neighborhoods in 1964 
under the premise of overcrowding. The demolition of the bidonvilles gave rise to SONACOTRAL’s three other 
housing options. For more information the evolution of bidonvilles see Monique Hervo and Marie-Ange Charras, 
Bidonvilles (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971); Paul White, “Immigrants, immigrant areas, and immigrant 
communities in postwar Paris,” in Migrants in Modern France: Population Mobility in the Later Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, edited by Philip E. Ogden and Paul E. White (Oxon: Routledge, 1989), 197-200; Patrick 
Kamoun, "Bidon, Bidon, Bidonville." Histoire Du Mouvement HLM. L'Union Sociale Pour L'habitat, 04 Apr. 2012.  
<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.union-habitat.org%2Fles-hlm-le-mag%2Fbloc-notes%2F%25C2%25AB-bidon-bidon-
bidonville-%25C2%25BB>; "Le Service Public De L'accès Au Droit." Loi N°59-1557 Du 31 Décembre 1959 DITE DEBRE 
SUR LES RAPPORTS ENTRE L'ETAT ET LES ETABLISSEMENTS D'ENSEIGNEMENT PRIVES. Legifrance and Silverstein, 
Algeria in France, 89, 92-97.  
145 Gilles Verbant, “France.” in European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study, edited Tomas Hammar 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 149.   
146 Cites de transit are “housing complexes dedicated to providing temporary accommodation for families in 
unstable situations, whose access to permanent housing cannot be considered without socio-education action 
aimed at encouraging their social integration and promotion.” The July 10, 1970 Law and the August 27 1971 
facilitated the eradication of “unsanitary housing.” An addition piece of legislation on April 19, 1972 targeted cités 
de transit. This second text designates their housing target as “only those families who are facing social integration 
difficulties and who, as such, may risk being “rejected” by the populations that typically reside in social housing.” 
The hierarchy of housing options situates HLMs (a combination of private and public affordable housing buildings) 
as the most preferable.  Next, cites de transit that were heavily influenced by French social welfare programs and 




majority of these lodgings were virtually inhabitable. Migrants were susceptible to life-
threatening conditions ranging from infectious diseases to crude heating that often led to house 
fires.147 These hazardous living conditions received a considerable amount of press in Parisian 
newspapers which led to administrative reports and investigations. Chronicled by the Journal 
Officiel de la République française, officials confessed “the African worker is undoubtedly 
exploited by landlords and property owners.”148  A combination of philanthropists, employers 
and religious figures organized in response to this housing crisis.  These enterprising individuals 
formed major associations to support Black migrants. Although the various organizations had 
different visions, they were united in their effort to create better housing for Sub-Saharan 
workers.149 These private initiatives were supported by government funding from the Fonds 
                                                          
147 There were several occurrences of shacks burning down due to defective heating systems. As well as a high 
number of tuberculosis cases during the winter and various sicknesses caused by close contact with rodents. See 
Jean-Francois Steiner, "Ils Croyaient Ques Le Paradis S’appelait Paris." Candide, August 7, 1963. (AS/208 (XVI)/62 
and, 28-31 and Jean-Philippe Dedieu, La Parole Immigrée. Les Migrants Africains Dans L'espace Public En France 
(1960-1995) (Paris: Klincksieck, 2012).  
148 “Avis et Rapports du Conseil Économique et Social: problèmes poses par l’immigration des travailleurs africains 
en France,” Journal Officiel de la République française, July 24, 1964, 550. 
149 Over the course of ten years (1955-1965, five major associations were founded. These include: The Association 
for the Parisian Region Foyers (AFRAP), The Association for the Development of Foyers (ADEF), The Association for 
the Reception and Training of Migrant Workers (AFTAM), The Association for Assistance to African Workers 
(ASSOTRAF) and The Association for Solidarity, Dignity and Unity in Welcoming African Workers (SOUNDIATA).  
AFRAP was created in 1950. (ADEF) was created in 1955, "to facilitate the housing of migrant workers." (AFTAM) 
was established in 1962 with the goal of "invent[ing] a type of accommodation that safeguards village traditions 
but facilitates [an eventual] return to [their] country...and [gives] immigrants the opportunity to live simply [so that 
they can] financially support their home community.” (ASSOTRAF) was created in 1965.  SOUNDIATA was founded 
in 1963. With the time period under this chapter’s consideration, it managed 19 foyers comprised of 3,200 beds in 
the Paris region serving a mainly Sub-Saharan African immigrant population. The association was created with 
philanthropic support of Catholic parishioners and sought to differentiate itself to fit the specific needs of Sub-
Saharan African migrants in contrast with SONACOTRA’s focus on the Maghreb.  For more information about these 
organizations see Dennis D. Cordell, The Human Tradition in Modern Africa (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2012); “Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 
1994(AN/20140104/123-130); Christian Poiret, “Immigration Familiale d’Afrique Noire en Region Ile de France: 
Famille et Habitat au coeur des mutations,” December 1994 (AN/20140104/123-130) and Stephanie Jankel and 
Trouillet, Caroline, “Les foyers de travailleurs migrants à Paris,” Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme, Septembre 2011.   
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d’Action sociale (FAS).150 Rapidly reorganizing Black migrants from scattered houses 
throughout the area to massive structures often housing hundreds and ultimately thousands of 
workers, these structures transformed the Parisian landscape. Old factories, warehouses and 
abandoned buildings were hastily converted into foyers around Paris and in surrounding 
banlieues.151  
Despite the public attention and subsequent action of private organizations, the French 
government and SONACOTRAL were reluctant to provide Black migrants with public housing. 
Administrative reports outlined a need for ‘adapted structures” in reference Sub-Saharan workers 
preference for communal living.152 This sentiment changed in 1962 when SONACONTRA (L) 
redirected its emphasis to lodge migrant workers regardless of their own nationality.153 In 
                                                          
150 Fonds d’action sociale (FAS) was established in 1958 as “an umbrella agency that funded social welfare 
programs… [and] was at the center of French efforts to ‘integrate’ immigrants, most from the colonial empire.” See 
Amelia H. Lyons, "Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France: The Case of the Fonds D’Action 
Sociale." Patterns of Prejudice 43, no. 1 (2009): 65-89. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00313220802636072. For a detailed explanation of FAS’ 
connection to French government subsidies, see Christian Poiret, “Immigration Familiale d’Afrique Noire en Region 
Ile de France: Famille et Habitat au coeur des mutations,” December 1994 (AN/20140104/123-130).    
151 Jean-Philippe Dedieu and Aissatou Mbodj-Pouye. "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in 
Postcolonial France (1960–1975): A Struggle for Housing and Rights." Ethnic and Racial Studies39, no. 6 (2016), 
963. The Bara foyer was a notorious example. Repurposed from an old piano factory to a dormitory in 1968, it was 
one of the oldest, most dilapidated and overcrowded foyers in the city of Montreuil. See, "Les Foyers De 
Travailleurs Migrants En Région Parisienne: "copies" Des Villages Africains Ou Centres De Mutations 
Sociopolitiques?" Influxus. September 11, 2014. http://www.influxus.eu/article845.html.  
152 Migrants living in these newly constructed foyers were “often grouped according to national, regional or ethnic 
origins.” See, Dedieu and Mbodj-Pouye, "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial 
France,” 961-963. 
153 This inclusive migrant worker focus is reflected in its name change from SONACOTRAL to National Society for 
the Construction of Housing for Worker Housings (SONACOTRA) examined in “Direction de la Population des 
Migrations,” October 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30). This change was partly due to the unpreparedness of the 
French government and private associations to house the successive waves of migrant workers arriving in France. 
The Sub-Saharan African population increased from 2,296 in 1954 to 17,787 in 1962 (Dedieu, 2012, 24-25).  This 
demand for housing forced the government to actively accommodate workers in spite of its reservations. Despite 
this broadened focus SONACOTRA housed a small population of Black migrants until the late 1970’s, see Choukri 
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practice, both public and private housing did not vastly improve accommodations for Sub-
Saharan workers. The foyers where the majority of Black migrant workers lived were prone to 
“over-occupancy…hygiene problems, noise and an accelerated rate of [structural] 
degradation.”154  
In a series of interviews conducted by researchers, workers from West Africa detailed the 
extent of these awful conditions. One Malian migrant dreamed of “idyllic” living in France. 
Upon arrival to a foyer in the Parisian suburb of Montreuil, he was sorely disappointed. He 
stated, "I could never have imagined in Mali that housing conditions in France were also 
harsh."155 Reflecting on his time in the Parisian suburb of Drancy, another worker commented, 
“It was so noisy…especially during the night. It was very difficult to sleep well. It became 
unbearable. There was no rest.”156 In addition to the noise and often unsanitary living 
arrangements, rooms were overcrowded. Mr. GD arrived from Mali at sixteen years old. His 
older brother offered him lodging at foyer Bara in Montreuil. The room measured at 72 meters 
and housed nine other men. These close quarters propelled his desire to repatriate. He stated, 
                                                          
Hmed, Loger Les étrangers "isolés" En France: Socio-histoire D'une Institution D'État: La Sonacotra (1956-2006) 
(PhD diss. Université Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, 2006), 18-21.  
154 In a government report, a researcher noted in addition to the cited quote that, “although most households in 
the Paris region are experiencing over-crowding, some of them are mainly occupied by Africans originally 
from sub-Saharan Africa, with a number of residents living two or three times above their capacity.” Direction de la 
Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30). 
155 From “Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 
(AN, 20140104/123-30). 
156 Mr. DM stated, “The foyer was too loud and at first I was working at night. It was hard to get good sleep during 
the day. I looked for an apartments [that cost] 2500 to 3000 francs maximum [per month]. But I could not find any, 
because my income at the time was too low… [so] I stayed…because I had no other choice."Entretien Mr.DM, 
Guinéen, 49 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SONACOTRA-Paris XIX, from “Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des 
foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30). These sentiments were 
echoed in three other interviews with Mr. DN, Mr. MY and Mr. SK.  
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“My presence in France is necessary so that I may return to Mali one day. I have tried to build all 
the necessary conditions to get there but they have not been fulfilled yet.”157 
The experiences of migration from West Africa and the uncomfortably close quarters also 
fostered a strong community identity. Several men discussed their arrival to France and the 
family ties that facilitated both their housing and employment process. Mr. GD left Mali at the 
age of 17 in 1961 to join his father in Paris. Although he came to France without a work contract, 
he could legally work and reside in France due to his colonial citizenship. This allowed him to 
find work quickly as a maintenance man at the Citroën factory where his father worked. 
Although his father assisted him in finding work, he decided to share a basement room with a 
friend from his village that also relocated to Paris. Mr. GD remained there for five years before 
relocating to a neighboring foyer.158  
This type of chain migration is replicated in several other interviews with West African 
migrant workers. Mr. MY boarded a ship from Dakar to France in 1961 to reunite with his uncles 
who were living and working in provincial city of Rouen. One year later, he received a job offer 
to join the Renault car factory where he made 3.20 francs per hour. Due to the long commute to 
the Renault plant, he left his uncle’s home. With the help of a Senegalese friend from the factory, 
Mr. MY moved to a SONACOTRA foyer in Parisian suburb of Mantes-la-Jolie where he shared 
a room with three other men from work. Describing his difficulties finding housing, he stated, 
                                                          
157 "Entretien Mr.DG, Malien, 38 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer ADEF de Montreuil-sous-bois, from “Le devenir 
d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30) 
158 Over the course of twenty years, Mr. GD lived in three different foyers within the Parisian suburbs including two 
communal foyers. One in Saint-Denis and another foyer in Pierrefitte before finally earning enough to secure a 
single room at the foyer SONACOTRA d’Aubervilliers in 1982. Entretien Mr.GD, Malien, 50 ans, Ancien Résident du 
foyer SONACOTRA d’Aubervilliers, from “Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population 
des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30).  
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“You know it was difficult to find housing, not because there were not [homes] but for 
xenophobic reasons. There were free houses, but they did not want to give them to us…In 
Mantes-la-Jolie, I was told, ‘We do not want to house any more immigrants.’”159 
Mr. CM moved from Senegal in 1972 at the age of 27. His voyage was paid by his 
brother who was employed at the Citroën factory in the Parisian suburb of Balard. Upon arrival, 
he was housed in Foyer Bisson located within the 20th arrondissement. A single room had five 
bunkbeds housing 10 people. Mr. CM reflected upon his first night in the foyer, “My brother and 
I slept in the same bed…It was very hard. I was completely discouraged the next day. I did not 
understand how we were going to sleep and work in these conditions. So my brother told me, 
‘You’ve got to accept your responsibilities. From today on, you will encounter all types of 
difficulties here in France.’ So I started looking for a job.”160 Arriving in France as a visitor, he 
went to the ONI office to “regularize his situation.” After receiving his residential permit, he 
sought employment at the same Citroën factory where his brother worked. One year later, the 
foyer where he resided was deemed inhabitable and demolished.161 Many inhabitants including 
Mr. CM moved to the foyer SOUNDIATA on the border between Paris and the suburb of Saint-
Ouen. Upon securing a higher paying job at the Renault factory, Mr.CM found better housing but 
                                                          
159 Entretien Mr.MY, Sénégalais, 56 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SONACOTRA-Buchelay de Mantes-La-Jolie, from 
“Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 
20140104/123-30). 
160 Entretien Mr.CM, Sénégalais, 49 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SOUNDIATA de Porte de Saint-Ouen, from “Le 
devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 
20140104/123-30). 
161 Located in the 19th arrondissement, the original foyer Bisson was demolished in 1974 and rebuilt in 1978. See 
Patrick Jedynak, "Les Résidents Africains Du Foyer Bisson Aiment Leur Quartier." Hommes Et Migrations1168, no. 1 
(1993): 26-30. This type of urban renewal occurred through various neighborhoods in Paris including the 15th 
arrondissement. The foyer located at 214 rue Raymond was also destroyed in 1974.  See, Dedieu, and Mbodj-
Pouye, "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France, 967.  
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kept his bed at SOUNDIATA, which he gave to a friend but retained the right to reclaim at his 
convenience.  
Although family ties facilitated the arrival of successive waves of migrants, they were 
also a source of tension. Mr.SG arrived from Senegal on a tourist visa at the age of twenty five. 
Employed at British Petroleum, his family encouraged him to join an uncle in France to make 
more money. Contrary to his family’s advice, Mr. SG experienced both familial conflict and 
wages that prevented him from moving out of the room they shared at foyer SOUNDIATA Porte 
de la Chappelle in Paris.  He admitted, "I was completely discouraged. The work was hard and [I 
was] badly paid. Then I had this sort of generation conflict with my uncle. He was a country 
man. While I had more of an urban education urban in Senegal.  And then, you know, living 
without papers in France and especially in the Paris region is very hard. But my buddies cheered 
me up and finally I stayed."162  
The countervailing pressures of poor housing, spatial segregation and community bonds 
fueled a wave of protests in the 1960’s. Black migrants utilized political networks from their 
countries of origin to pressure the government into action. Furthermore, workers created 
organizations that linked shared discriminatory experiences in employment with those in the 
housing sector.163 In addition to applying transnational pressure, migrants also engaged with 
                                                          
162 Entretien Mr.SG, Sénégalais, 36 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SOUNDIATA de Porte de la Chapelle, from “Le 
devenir d’immigrés à la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 
20140104/123-30). 
163 The creation of Association des travailleurs Maliens en France (ATMF) in 1963 and Union Generale des 
travailleurs senegalais en france (UGTSF) in 1961 campaigned on the related pressures of housing and 
employment. For more information on ATMF see Moustapha Diop, "Le Mouvement Associatif Négro-africain En 
France." Hommes Et Migrations1132, no. 1 (1990): 15-20 and Gregory Mann, From Empires to NGOs in the West 
African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 120-162. His 
chapter entitled “Well-Known Strangers: How West Africans Became Foreigners in Postimperial France” provides a 
concise history of AFTMF activism in the Paris region. Sally N’Dongo served as a key strategist for UGTSF. He used 
political connections in both France and Senegal to address housing concerns. In his book, he explores the political 
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local authorities. Representing 200 migrant workers living in Saint-Denis, Galadio Camara wrote 
a series of letters to the Mayor outlining their grievances.164 This letter writing campaign started 
by Camara was replicated by various workers living in the Parisian area.165 Unlike Galadio 
Camara, none of the workers interviewed were successful in creating a change to their housing 
conditions.  Mr. GD lamented, “The problem is that nobody gave us the means to get out of 
[these conditions]...It put us in difficult situations, sometimes even total despair! I was almost 
desperate. I made multiple demands at the city hall and in the prefecture but I always received 
negative answers."166 These sentiments of frustration led to more confrontational approaches 
including the occupation of the town hall in Garges. Mr. DN recounted, “[Local] families 
mobilized and decided to occupy the premises…The women and children stayed in the town hall 
night and day while husbands continue[d] to work. The mayor trie[d] to dissuade them…by 
                                                          
implications of ties between African and France. See Sally N’Dongo, La "coopération" Franco – Africaine (Paris: 
Maspero, 1972). For a more detailed account of UGTSF activities, see Union Générale Des Travailleurs Sénégalais 
En France: U.G.T.S.F.: Le Livre Des Travailleurs Africains En France (Paris: Maspero, 1970); Gillian Glaes, 
"Marginalised, Yet Mobilised: The UGTSF, African Immigration, and Racial Advocacy in Postcolonial France." French 
Cultural Studies24, no. 2 (2013): 174-83 and Felix Germain, "For the Nation and for Work: Black Activism in Paris of 
the 1960s.” Migration and Activism in Europe Since 1945, edited by Wendy Pojmann (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 15-32. 
164 These written exchanges spurred meeting and the creation of an ‘Assembly of Workers of Black Africa,’ in 
October 1964. The Assembly developed a resolution “calling for coordinated action between trade unions and 
workers from sub-Saharan African to seek ‘as soon as possible the financing and construction of home’ and to 
ensure that African workers enjoyed ‘the same benefits as [white] French workers.” See Dedieu and Mbodj-Pouye, 
"The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France,” 962. Dr. Glaes examines letters 
written by Camara in the recently published book, African Political Activism in Postcolonial France: State 
Surveillance and Social Welfare (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019). 
165 Five interviews conducted with workers outlined writing letters to the municipal mayor. Several of the workers 
noted they wrote a series of letters sent over the span of months and even years. Testimonies from Mr. DR, Mr. 
DN, Mr.GD, Mr. DM, and Mr. CB all were met with failure to address their concerns. From “Le devenir d’immigrés à 
la sortie des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30).  
166 Entretien Mr.GD, Malien, 50 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SONACOTRA d’Aubervilliers, from “Le devenir 




telling them that ‘this is not how they will get housing.’”167 After several days, the mayor 
arranged for a mediator to relay their requests to local housing agencies. Ultimately, very few 
families were relocated from their previous homes. 
Black students and migrant workers were indeed at the forefront of several movements in 
1968. Their political engagements propelled them out of these archetypes into activists. 
Escalating demands and tactics used by Sub-Saharan migrants to garner attention to their 
conditions coincided with an avalanche of activism that overtook France during the month of 
May. A major turning point in the history of contemporary France, 1968 is memorialized as the 
political radicalization of French society. In this celebration of politicization, the actions of white 
French students and workers dominate the literature.168 The homogenizing of national protest 
efforts undercuts the reality that a number of “[white French] radical left wing organizations 
included the deplorable employment and housing conditions of migrant workers on their political 
agendas.”169 In addition to interracial demonstrations and labor coalitions, a number of Black 
                                                          
167 Entretien Mr., Malien, 39 ans, Ancien Résident du foyer SONACOTRA, from “Le devenir d’immigrés à la sortie 
des foyers,” Direction de la Population des Migrations, Octobre 1994 (AN, 20140104/123-30). 
168 For a list of monographs discussing white French activism in May 1968 see Julian Bourg, From Revolution to 
Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2017); Ronald 
Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Kristin Ross, May '68 and Its 
Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Daniel Singer, Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013).  
169Dedieu and Mbodj-Pouye, "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France,” 964-
965. This assessment of “left wing” focus on immigrant is corroborated in a report “on the activity of foreign 
students and university professors” compiled by the Ministry of Interior. It states, “Since the events of May and 
June 1968, a fairly large number of foreign students and academics are periodically associated with subterranean 
political actions. The motives of their intervention are very diverse and at every opportunity the interested parties 
act in close contact with the different French extremist groups...The main themes of their actions are: the defense 
of the Palestine cause, the internal divisions which agitate their country of origin…and the defense of foreign 
migrant workers…Several foreign university students working with left-wing groupings have actively intervened in 
favor of immigrant workers, whose action was previously reported and which has repeatedly been used to 
harangue immigrants who are inciting them to react against the conditions of life in France” (AN (19960134/18).  
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migrants collectively laid claim against the French state.  Senegalese students occupied the 
embassy of Senegal in Paris and a building at Cité Universitaire (the main Parisian housing 
center for foreign students). Organized under the banner Fédération des Étudiants D'Afrique 
Noire en France (F.E.A.N.F), Black students from various countries in Africa campaigned in 
protest of racism and the establishment of French neo-colonial power in their native nation-
states.170  Some students were apprehended for their activities and the French government 
planned to deport them. However, they feared that “expulsions generally provoke a movement of 
solidarity on the part of [white] French leftist movements…reported by the press as a form of 
resistance to attacks on freedom of speech.”171   In addition to student-led protest, African 
migrant workers led strikes in factories and foyers.172 This public display of solidarity by Black 
student and labor organizations was met with significant reproach by the government in the form 
of deportations, arrests and new restrictions on work and student visas.173 In the wake of 1968, 
the French government marshalled increased policing powers of African migrants within Paris. 
                                                          
170 This incident is referenced in Daniel A. Gordon, Immigrants and Intellectuals. May '68 The Rise of Anti-Racism in 
France (Pontypool: Merlin Press, 2012). The ministry of interior filed report marked secret and confidential on the 
activities of “Les Etudiants d'Afrique Noire et Madagascar en France,” agents infiltrated meetings organized by 
Federation des Etudiants D'Afrique Noire en France (F.E.A.N.F) and monitoring their planning of protests 
throughout Paris (AN (19960134/18). 
171 From “Activities for immigrant workers” AN (19960134/18).  
172 Dedieu and Mbodj-Pouye, "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France,” 964-
965; Préfecture de Paris, Logement collectif à caractère non lucratif des travailleurs à Paris et dans les trois 
départements limitrophes, 1968 (AN, 20050150/61) and Fonds d’Action Sociale (AN 19870056/1). 
173 In a report by the Ministry of Interior, it states, “the number of foreigners actually blamed for public 
disturbances by political demonstrations has been significant. It was 270 in 1968, and 53 in 1969. It was 18 in 1970 
13 in 1971 and 7 in 1972.” This significant decrease in number is reflective of the government crackdown on 
students. Later that year in a letter dated September 16, 1968 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry 
of Interior, a government official wrote, “at the request of the representative of the Secretary-General for the 
African and Malagasy community and affairs, the minutes are modified in the following manner...the African and 
Malagasy communities consider the measures of coercion to be untimely initiative of France.” (AN (19960134/18). 
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The Prefecture of Police warned, “African migration poses serious problems, specifically in the 
African foyers that are becoming increasingly disturbed by a climate of demands and violence in 
the face of which the management organizations appear powerless.”174 This action on the part of 
the police, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Labor translated into 
legislative reform in the 1970’s.   
The Hate Speech Laws of 1972 addressed the growing public hostility towards various 
ethnic groups. These defamatory press laws were formed out of the shadows of World War II 
and prohibited Holocaust denial.175 The rationale behind addressing ethnic difference extended 
to racial prejudice against African expatriate labor forces. The French government’s assertion of 
a singular French national identity led to a subversive racism that marginalized non-French 
populations. Although racial demarcations were outlawed, French xenophobia towards 
immigrant cultural practices, race, ethnicity and religion persisted, often virulently.    
These laws marked a turning point in the legal reasoning of France.176 Discrimination was 
declared illegal and it criminalized press referring to differences between people based upon race. 
In the same stroke, racial affirmative action was also banned. French policy announced “a racially 
                                                          
174 Dedieu and Mbodj-Pouye, "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France,” 966. 
This led to proposals to relocate African migrants through the public housing system to prevent their continued 
political agitation. (AN/19870056/1)   
175 Herrick Chapman and Laura Levine Frader. Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of 
Difference (New York: Berghahn, 2004).  




colorblind society.”177 The dismissal of race as a basis of formal discrimination countered the 
reality of immigrant socioeconomic treatment. This reality contradicted the legal jargon that 
declared racist activity a violation of French law by inherently denying that racism existed. 
Succeeding laws prohibited discrimination based upon ethnicity, which further protected the 
French government from accusations of racism.178 
As new waves of immigrants continued to relocate to France, the government 
consciously avoided using race as a distinguishing characteristic to their legal integration into 
French society. The exclusion of race from governmental information gathering did not facilitate 
immigrant assimilation. Although discriminatory language and policymaking was illegal, 
confrontations with race, and the biases that these episodes produced were unavoidable. 
Distinguished by last name origin, education, employment, and housing, immigrants were still 
connected to their race. Immigrant racial and ethnic origin maintained its utility as a 
characteristic for socio-economic containment by employers, educators, law-enforcement and 
government. This “colorblindness” served as a legal buffer against discrimination cases by 
immigrants.  
                                                          
177 Erik Bleich, “The French Model: Color Blind Integration”; "Color Lines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil 
Rights Options for America." Ed. John D. Skrenty. Middlebury, 2001. 
http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/251965/original/The_French_Model.pdf  
178 For example, article one of the Gayssot law states that, “any discrimination founded on membership or non-
membership of an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a religion is prohibited.” Born out of the experiences of World 
War II, the intent of the law was to prohibit individuals, institutions or organizations from negating the existence of 
the Jewish Holocaust. Article two requires the National Consultative Commission of Human Rights (1947) to 
publish annual reports detailing how the nation attempts to fight racism.  See, “Loi n° 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 




Also ratified in 1972, the Marcellin-Fontanet circulaires curtailed immigration to France. 
While the Hate Speech Laws of 1972 aided in the erasure of racialized language, the circulaires 
assisted in the deportation of immigrants. This law’s title came from hyphenating the surnames of 
the Ministers of Interior and Labor. This legislation linked immigration and labor to the need for 
proper documentation for institutional control.179 The circulaire made it legally possible to deport 
any “undocumented” worker who did not possess a valid residential permit and employment 
contract. This policy gave rise to the contested and politicized population of sans-papiers 
(undocumented workers) who were directly targeted by the French government and police for 
deportation. 
Harkening back to the ordinance 2 November 1945, the circulaires construed the lack of 
legal immigration documentation as a “threat to public order” and grounds for deportation.180 
Already an easily exploitable population for employers, the laborers’ situation became even 
more precarious following this new law. Laborers who were laid-off or fired from their 
employment could be deported because of an expired permit and the government’s suspension of 
worker permit renewals. Additionally, the circulaire shifted local regulation of immigrant 
movement across geographic boundaries to a nationalized focus on border control. This 
consolidation of immigrant control by the French government was propelled by the downturn of 
the French economy. Formerly indebted to unskilled immigrant workers for French economic 
                                                          
179 Interview exclusive de Paul Dijoud, secrétaire d’ Etat aux travailleurs immigrés: “Il n’y a qu’une politique de 
l’immigration,” Croissance des jeunes nations 172, (June 1976), 4-7; Yvette Rocheron and Christopher Rolfe. 
Shifting Frontiers of France and Francophonie (Oxford: P. Lang, 2004). 
180 Angéline Escafré-Dublet, “France, Immigration, and the Policies of Culture: Understanding the “French 
Integration Model.” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2007), 6.   
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growth during the thirty glorious years of expansion and prosperity, immigrants were blamed for 
its economic demise. 
Coinciding with an increase in government policy to control immigration was the economic 
decline of the Trente Glorieuses. Catalyzed by the oil crisis of 1973, the French economy took a 
downturn that led to rapid unemployment and a sharp increase of xenophobia that associated mass 
immigration with economic stagnation.181 In October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) declared a five month oil embargo in response to the United States’ 
involvement in the Yom Kippur War.182 The OAPEC used the oil embargo as political leverage. 
The embargo deeply impacted the French automobile industry that employed a largely immigrant 
population. Oil prices quadrupled, causing cycles of unemployment and public demands for social 
welfare reform. More importantly, it signaled the end of France’s thirty glorious years of economic 
expansion, consumerism and the prosperity of the middle and upper class.183  This year was also 
a critical turning point towards the politicization and criminalization of Black immigrants. Situated 
within this context of economic crisis, Sub-Saharan African populations were at the center of 
increasingly punitive and discriminatory legislation that shaped the next thirty years of French 
immigration policy.  
Indeed, the confluence of demographic change, ethnic and class identity form the loci of 
French anxieties between 1975 and 2005.  Over this thirty-year period, France grappled with the 
                                                          
181 Hollifield and Ross, Searching for the New France, 129-135. 
182 Countries comprising OAPEC include: Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar and Syria 
183 Gildea, France since 1945, 249-251. 
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largest wave of Sub-Saharan African migration in the nation’s history. The government 
weaponized legislation as response to growing Black populations. New immigration policy 
increased police powers and implemented structural barriers to obtaining French citizenship.184 
Black communities subsequently challenged the seemingly endless flurry of legislation that 
jeopardized their welfare. African migrants responded to these developments through a variety of 
tactics and gradually gained international attention. Their efforts challenged the inclusivity of 
republican universalism and national rhetoric about immigrants that shaped three decades worth 










                                                          
184 This assimilation process is described as Sociologist, Loretta Bass as a bouillabaisse. She states, “The French 
colonial empire in Africa...serves as the basis for a bouillabaisse of varied peoples, some post-colonial and other 
from European countries, being simmered together in a pot that retains distinctive elements while becoming a 
French stew....this slow cooking process resembles the integration process which maintains that irrespective of 
differences all are equal while taking on a particular French flavor...” in African Immigrant Families in Another 
France, 23. While this analogy is poetic it fails to contend with the complexity of the contemporary integration 
process. Charged with the realities of xenophobia, reactionary politics and racism, all migrants were not equal in 
France, especially those of African origin. Instead, I offer the analogy of mille-feuille, a layered pastry that can only 
be consumed by slicing into the layers. These thousands of layers are representative of both post-colonial and 
varied peoples that maintain their individual integrity but can only be enjoyed when consumed together.  
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Chapter Two: Tout pour la famille: Mother Africa and the Paternal Practices of France 
 
“My father came from Senegal…His father used to have a lot of goats and sheep…but I 
think it’s like the American Dream…most Africans dream of coming to Europe…So 
because of the colonies, West Africans want to go to France. They say, ‘Okay let’s go to 
France for a better life for my family and for the future.’ My father arrived in the early 
1970’s.  He came by himself. When he arrived, the only jobs he could find was working 
for the automobile industry, making cars...My mom was still in Senegal, she was working 
for the daughter of Leopold Senghor. After that she worked at a perfume factory. Then 
she came to visit my father in 1981 and never went back.  I was born in 1985 in 
Paris…185   
 
Reflecting on his parents’ journey to France during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Laurent’s narrative overlaps with the largest wave of Sub-Saharan African migration in the 
twentieth century. Although offering his own history, Laurent’s family migration story can be 
repeated with variations by many other Afropeans in France today. His father arrived from 
Senegal as a single male worker. After the government curtailed labor migration, many other 
West African families induced the feminization wave reuniting male workers with their wives in 
the early 1980’s.186 Laurent became a French citizen by jus soli.187 Living in France for the 
                                                          
185 Laurent (mid-30’s male of Senegalese descent), in discussion with the author.  October, 5. 2016.  
186 Cris Beauchemin Catherine Borrel, and Corinne Régnard. "Les Immigrés En France: En Majorité Des Femmes." 
Population & Sociétés | Institut National D’études Démographiques, no. 502 (August 2013), 
https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/19170/population_societes_2013_502_immigres_femmes.fr.pdf.  
187 Within French nationality law, jus soli is derived from the Latin phrase which means “right of soil.” This right is 
connected to birthright citizenship. In Laurent’s case, his automatic citizenship was a result of a stipulation in 
French law that states “a child born in France before January 1, 1994, to a parent born in a former French overseas 
territory or colony prior to its acquisition of independence,” is French by birth.  See, Article 23 of the Code de la 
nationalité française, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071189&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006
523995. Modified by the Loi n° 73-42 du 9 janvier 1973 complétant et modifiant le code de la nationalité française 
et relative à certaines dispositions concernant la nationalité française - Article 2, see, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=CEE4E4C3E146FF0AF83EA5CA594C670B.tplgfr25s_1?cid
Texte=JORFTEXT000000684539&dateTexte=20180718. This modification was later repealed by Loi n° 93-933 du 22 
juillet 1993 réformant le droit de la nationalité - Article 50, see, 
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entirety of his life, he straddles a complex negotiation of identities that gained traction in the 
1980s and 1990s. Questions of nationality, allegiance and ethnicity punctuated French law, 
media and culture. Moreover, these questions of identity impacted familial relations as parents 
grappled with raising “French” children while attempting to preserve a connection to their 





Laurent Gomis grew up in the 18th arrondissement of Paris, commonly known as Goutte 
d'Or (Drop of Gold), more recently referred to as “Little Africa.” This neighborhood located in 
                                                          
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=CEE4E4C3E146FF0AF83EA5CA594C670B.tplgfr25s
_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000362019&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006528826&dateTexte=20180718&categorieLien=id
#LEGIARTI000006528826.   This automatic citizenship law would be replaced by the Méhaignerie Law (1993) and 
the Guigou Law (1998) which facilitated a naturalization process for children born to foreign parents in France to 
acquire citizenship at the age of legal majority.  
188 This sentiment was echoed in several of the oral interviews conducted:  Gaelle (late-20’s of Congolese descent), 
in discussion with the author. December 10, 2016; Fanta (mid-20’s of Senegalese descent), in discussion with the 
author. April 16, 2017 and Ibrahim (mid-30’s of Mauritanian descent and Senegalese descent), in discussion with 
the author. November 28, 2017. As well as in studies conducted by interdisciplinary scholars, see Jacques Barou, 
“Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective." Identities 21, no. 6 (2014): 642-57, 
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01081685/document; Camille Jackson, "The Dilemma of Dual Identities 
in Black France." Duke Today, published on March 20, 2014, https://today.duke.edu/2014/03/blackfrance and 
Patrick Simon, "French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to the National Community?"(2012) 
Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FrenchIdentity.pdf.  
 
Figure 8. Map of Paris and 
Neighboring Suburbs  
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northern Paris forms the border between the city and the suburb of Saint-Denis. Recognized as a 
working-class epicenter for the past two centuries, the class composition of this location has 
remained the same despite ethnic demographic change that began in the mid-twentieth century. 
After the conclusion of World War II, a growing number of North Africans moved into the area. 
An emergent Sub-Saharan community that arrived in the 1960’s eclipsed this initial influx of 
North Africans. While the fifth arrondissement served as the hub of Black student presence in 
Paris, the development of a robust Black working class community in the eighteenth 
arrondissement neighborhood known as Goutte d’Or ultimately supplanted the fifth as the 
epicenter of Black public life. This vibrant neighborhood is categorized as a “sensitive urban 
zone” (ZUS), and as the central Parisian location for African cuisine, fashion and commerce.189  
Its recognition as a bastion of African presence increasingly fostered police occupation that 
zeroed in on “illegal immigration” after 1974. 
Historical treatment of this period has largely focused on nationality reform and state 
debates over citizenship.190 The scholarship examined the evolving construction of a French 
                                                          
189 "Bouillon De Cultures Africaines à La Goutte-d'Or," Le Monde, December 17, 2009, 
https://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2009/12/17/bouillon-de-cultures-africaines-a-la-goutte-d-
or_1282084_3246.html; Elizabeth Buettner, Europe after Empire Decolonization, Society, and Culture (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 291; Alice M. Craven, "La Goutte D’ôr: Localizing a Banlieue’s 
Aesthetic." Transitions | Journal of Franco-Iberian Studies7 (2011): 17-35, 
http://www.transitionsjournal.org/volumes/Volume 7. 2011/Alice Mikal Craven. La goutte d'or.pdf. More 
information on zoning practices (ZUS) can be found on page 162 and 163. 
190 For works exploring the social conditions of immigrants in France see Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France; Patricia 
M. E. Lorcin, and David G. Troyansky, Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World. Edited by 
Hafid Gafaïti (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Catherine Raissiguier, Reinventing the Republic: Gender, 
Migration, and Citizenship in France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). For works exploring French 
native perspectives on immigrants see, Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and 
Citizenship in Modern France (London: Routledge, 1992); Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the 
Old Regime and after (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: 
Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (Cambridge: MIT, 1998). For works exploring immigration 
legislation after 1975 see, Clifford D Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between 
the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2006); Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Penninx, and Maren Borkert. 
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national identity and the continuous process of redefining nationality in reaction to historical 
turning points.191  Three themes categorize their work: modernity, memory, and globalization.192 
Historians connected the compounded traumas of World War II occupation and the Algerian 
War to globalization, decolonization, immigration and economic crisis in modern France.193 In 
the thirty years after World War II, the French economy had seen unprecedented growth and a 
corresponding rise in immigration. As a result, race remains a central feature in scholarly 
investigations of migration and universalism. Noted French scholar Tyler Stovall uses 
transnationalism as a theoretical framework to interrogate “debates in contemporary France 
about multiculturalism, race and national identity.”194 His scholarship represents the newest turn 
within the historiography that emphasizes the synergetic relationship between transnational 
movement and global economic frameworks.  
Using Stovall’s recent work as a departure point, this chapter intervenes in these 
conversations by challenging historians to recognize the limitations of sociopolitical and 
economic frameworks in their understanding of globalization’s impact on recent French history. 
                                                          
Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in past and Present (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 
191 Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California, 
1993), 6. 
192 Within a broader context, historians have typically treated iterations of modernity and globalization upon the 
French state as unique to the geopolitical circumstances of post-World War II Western hegemony.  
193 Historical considerations of globalization explore the interrelated nature of decolonization, immigration and 
economic crisis. Informed by sociopolitical and economic frameworks, scholarly works explore Americanization 
and the evolution of the French state to propose a “heterogeneous framework.” See Philip H. Gordon and Sophie 
Meunier, The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001), 8-10; 
Timothy B. Smith, France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality, and Globalization since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Thomas, Black France, 2-3.  
194 Stovall, Transnational France, 3.  
91 
 
By foregrounding the cultural and interpersonal dimensions of transnational history, this chapter 
introduces a more far-reaching narrative about the ways in which African migration to France 
after 1975 reshaped not only notions of Black “Frenchness” but also white French identity. Most 
importantly, it excavates the legacy of white French resistance to Black French efforts to expand 
concepts of inclusivity and citizenship. Occurring in multiple fora, official legislative debates 
often excluded the multi-layered viewpoints of Parisian Black populations. Thus, this chapter 
emphasizes the Afropean position within this debate as a valuable contribution to the current 
historiography.   
As economic historians grappled with financial decline in France, they considered the 
downfall of the automobile industry, soaring crime rates and an energy crisis. These 
developments coincided with other transnational economic currents occurring within the western 
world (United States, England, Germany, Spain, Italy, etc.).195 Social historians contended with 
French identity retrenchment toward multiculturalism by exploring French policing of religious 
paraphernalia. Through their scrutiny of laïcité, scholars paired the frustration engendered by a 
series of “hijab scandals” in the late 1980s with urban rioting in the new millennium.196 Recent 
                                                          
195 Several monographs situated the French context within Western decline, see these transitional texts Roderick 
D. Bush, The End of White World Supremacy: Black Internationalism and the Problem of the Color Line 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009); Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative 
Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2008); Jeffrey M. Togman, The Ramparts of 
Nations: Institutions and Immigration Policies in France and the United States (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002); 
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and 
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
196 Laïcité is a concept that endorses secularism. Within France, outward displays of religious patronage are 
discouraged within the public sphere. Much of the historical emphasis on postcolonial immigration to France has 
remained focused on Algeria and the Maghreb as France’s focal sphere of influence and the initial source of 
tension over differences of religion, ethnicity and national belonging. For examples see John Richard Bowen, Why 
the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); 
Scott, The Politics of the Veil; Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization; Trica Danielle Keaton, Muslim Girls and the 
Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
92 
 
scholarship highlighted 1998 as the triumph of diversity and 2005 as the failure of the diversity 
model.197 The current periodization is a reaction to the international attention France garnered in 
celebration of its first World Cup championship in 1998 and the urban uprisings that swept the 
nation in 2005. By canonizing these two dates, historians have largely disassociated the sans-
papiers protests of 1996 and France’s loss to Senegal in the first round of the 2002 World Cup as 
critical flash points to this short-lived experiment with diversity.    
This chapter reframes how historians have contended with the disaggregation of 
contemporary French national identity. It bridges the historiographical gap between punitive 
immigration legislation and its impact on African families by exploring both communal and 
cultural responses to state-led repression. Most importantly, this examination of national 
legislation and African responses to these laws complicates the current scholarship’s 
periodization.  By focusing on events that predate 1998 and events after 2005, it challenges the 
utility of linear narratives of success and defeat. Using three case studies, the rise of the National 
Front (FN), the 1996 sans-papiers protests and France’s participation in the 1998 and 2002 
World Cup matches, this chapter analyzes the significant evolutions in policy and public debate 
about immigration during this period. Gradually hardening, policy and public opinion veered in 
the direction of exclusion, marginalization, and demonization. These three case studies were 
focal points of transnational debate. They underscore France’s wrestling with contemporary 
national identity and the role of race within these negotiations. A final section grapples with how 
                                                          
197 For more works that examine the trajectory of diversity within public discourse from 1998-2005 see, Dubois 
Soccer Empire, 160-162 and 218; Didier, Gondola, and Bloom, Frenchness and the African Diaspora, 11.  
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Black French youth populations voiced their experiences with this hardening of policy through 
the medium of Hip Hop.  
The first section analyzes the rise of the right-wing political party called the National 
Front (FN) and its impact on immigration law during the 1980s and 1990s. Pairing legal turning 
points such as amendments to citizenship and residency criteria with the growth of the FN 
highlights the crystallization of the national government and public opinion toward immigration. 
Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 43% from 1990 to 1999. 198 This influx of Black 
people made them a policy priority for the French government. During this period, the 
government passed over thirty immigration laws to curtail this demographic shift.199  The FN 
gained traction by framing African migrants as a threat to national security and unity. Ultimately, 
the FN brought together the Left and the Right in their opposition to immigration. This political 
consolidation spawned legislation that pushed many migrants from “legal” to “illegal” positions 
in the eyes of the law. Such categorization fostered a racial ethos that targeted non-Europeans as 
“illegal” irrespective of their citizenship status. Evidenced by the implementation of identity 
checks, policing forces increasingly targeted Afropeans as “illegal.” These prescriptive attempts 
by the government to “fix the immigration problem” were resisted by African peoples in the 
form of hunger strikes and public protests. Indeed, the violent nature of identity checks, the use 
of force to end peaceful protests and the occupation of predominantly African neighborhoods 
                                                          
198 Julien Boëldieu and Catherine Borrel, “La proportion d’immigrés est stable depuis 25 ans, Recensement de la 
population 1999,” Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques #748, November 2000, 
https://www.epsilon.insee.fr/jspui/bitstream/1/551/1/ip748.pdf  
199 F.N. Buffet, “Rapport n° 716 (2014-2015) fait au nom de la commission des lois, déposé le 30 septembre 2015, 
Projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers en France: Annexe 4 - Les lois sur l'immigration depuis 1980,” Sénat, 30 
September 2015, http://www.senat.fr/rap/l14-716/l14-716.html. Since 1981, the year it adopted its first law 
explicitly providing for immigration detention, the country has passed some 30 immigration laws.  
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fostered a growing animosity between immigrants and police that detonated in 2005. However, 
the seeds of this manifestation of fury were planted in the 1980’s with the rise of the FN.   
In addition to policy, broader currents of popular resistance shaped public narratives 
around non-white French identity. The second section uses sport as a lens into how Black French 
and white French populations grappled with expanding conceptions of national identity, 
particularly in the last decade and a half of the twentieth century.  Two of the most prominent of 
these narratives were the 1998 World Cup championship team and the 2005 urban uprisings. The 
section analyzes France’s national soccer team to consider the possibilities for equality and 
diversity on the eve of the new millennium. United under the slogan, “Black, Blanc, Beur,” this 
ethnically diverse soccer team evoked both French anxieties about immigration and race as well 
as hope that “multiculturalism” could work in France. Their ultimate victory during the summer 
of 1998 not only brought France its first World Cup championship but also changed the face of 
its national heroes.200 The team comprised of immigrants and the children of recent migrants 
allowed France to rise above whispers of racism and discrimination to symbolically fulfill its 
promise of liberty, equality and brotherhood for all. The section concludes with considering life 
                                                          
200 Posterized by historians and the public, Zinedine Zidane became emblematic of France’s embrace of diversity 
and the triumph of immigration. The development of micro-histories about Zidane coincide with “great men” 
narratives that propose a singular model for diversity. Indeed, the shortcoming of microhistory is that it tells only 
one story which cannot represent the whole. The over examination of Zidane undermines the activities of his other 
teammates that were also non-white.  See Frédéric Benoit, Zidane: Média, Mensonges Et Vérité (Paris: La Revue De 
Presse, 2012); Hugh Dauncey and Douglas Morrey, "Quiet Contradictions of Celebrity: Zinedine Zidane, Image, 
Sound, Silence and Fury." International Journal of Cultural Studies 11, no. 3 (2008): 301-20; Patrick Fort and Jean 
Philippe, Zidane (London: Ebury Press, 2018); Lindsay Sarah Krasnoff, The Making of Les Bleus: Sport in France, 
1958-2010 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013); David Rowe, "Stages of the Global: Media, Sport, Racialization and 
the Last Temptation of Zinedine Zidane," International Review for the Sociology of Sport 45, no. 3 (2010): 355-
371.By foregrounding the actions of Zidane’s teammates Lilian Thuram, Marcel Desailly and Bernard Lama, this 
chapter broadens narratives of social and political agency to include Black actors and builds on the scholarship of 
Laurent Dubois, who examines the lives of both Zidane and Thuram. See Laurent Dubois, Soccer Empire: The World 
Cup and the Future of France (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).  
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in the wake of the team’s win. How did France arrive at a state of emergency, black and brown 
bodies lying on the floor of an electrical station and Paris ablaze, just seven years after more than 
a million French people hugged, joined hands and marched down the long streets of the Champs-
Élysées cheering on the triumph of diversity?  
In the wake of 2005, international criticism centered on France’s failed integration 
models. In turn, the French government blamed Black migrants for the uprisings. Led by the 
conservative parliament member François Grosdidier, the Ministry of Justice sought to 
criminalize the lyrics and content of French Hip Hop. 201 The final section of this chapter 
reverses the use of Hip Hop by the government as a destructive force and instead examines it as a 
tool of societal critique. Describing Hip Hop’s migration to France from the United States in the 
late 1980s and tracking the development of the art form into the new millennium, it details how 
Hip Hop facilitated an evolution in Black French identity.202  Uncovering the voices of protest in 
                                                          
201 For examples of how mainstream media and politicians blame rap and its negative impact on black communities 
see, Christian Combaz, "Petite Anthologie Du Rap Anti-français." Le Figaro. October 05, 2015, 
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edited by Monica R. Miller, Anthony B. Pinn, and Bernard Freeman (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 115-
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the banlieue, this section examines how youth addressed the hypocrisy of the French state and 
how they narrated their parents’ and their own struggles for socioeconomic and political 
inclusion in France. In addition to examining these experiences, this section challenges the 
gendered narrative of hyper-masculinity within Hip Hop and creates a space to consider the 
impact of women emcees and their influence on the development of the genre.  Studying their 
lyrics and popular criticism, this work illustrates that rappers consistently protested the 
conditions of the banlieue but also drew artistic inspiration from these spaces. Their songs 
encouraged youth to transcend disadvantaged conditions and succeed as a metaphorical expletive 
to France’s dominating narrative of urban failure and the state’s rationale for an increasingly 
aggressive and combative presence in their communities.   
Together, these case studies and cultural texts examine the distinctive challenges and 
opportunities facing Sub-Saharan African families in Paris. The legislative debates over 
immigration that dominated the 1980s came to a crisis point in 1996 with the occupation of the 
Saint-Bernard parish, hunger strikes and public protests in the Republique city square. Two years 
later, 1.5 million people marched down the Champs-Élysées celebrating France’s first World 
Cup championship won by its “rainbow” team. This public embrace of diversity suffered a 
decisive blow when the returning champions were defeated in the first round of the 2002 World 
Cup games. Three years later, suburban fires enveloped the nation. In order to make sense of 
these disparate manifestations of immigrant mobilization, this chapter foregrounds the ways in 
which African populations push back against a monolithic national rhetoric.  Juxtaposing the 
political context with cultural case studies in music and sports provides a powerful frame of 
analysis for examining white France’s often contentious relationship with Black French 
populations.   
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Legislating Urban Upheaval and Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s 
Almost immediately the 1974 prohibition on family reunification came under challenge 
in the French courts. The 1975 court ruling that overturned the suspension of family reunification 
induced a wave of feminized migration. Legally allowing families to reunite signaled a 
residential permanency that previous immigration policy sought to avoid.203 This process led to a 
shift in gender dynamics, class positioning and public reception of Black migrant steams. Sub-
Saharan women’s mass arrival to the metropole enflamed white French anxieties about racialized 
immigration waves and disrupted the notion of a “uniform” national identity in ways that single 
Black male migrant presence did not. The gendered structures within these migration patterns 
contributed to a hardening of immigration policy. Many male workers brought their families to 
France instead of repatriating. This decision caused the French government to attempt to purge 
the banlieues of ‘illegal’ residents by conducting deportation raids. Police forces entered 
immigrant neighborhoods empowered by the 1981 Peyrefitte Law, which permitted them to stop 
“suspicious-looking” immigrants who appeared to be sans-papiers.204 Without any specific 
criteria outlining the terms of conducting a contrôle d’identité, the police intimidated immigrants 
who did not have paperwork verifying their legal presence.205 Using descriptive terms such as 
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“good foreigners” and “bad illegal immigrants,” the police deported thousands of sans-papiers 
each year. 
The closing of the border signaled a negative shift in national rhetoric and public 
sentiment towards immigrants. Soaring unemployment rates and the collapse of blue-collar 
industries propelled public disenchantment and categorized immigration as a “problem.” The 
French government, led by the newly elected President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, intended to 
resolve it. Governmental attempts to repatriate immigrants began in 1977. A policy of aide au 
retour gave financial incentives to migrants who returned to their home country. The government 
offered unemployed immigrants who had previously worked in France for more than five years 
the equivalent of 1,524 euros to leave. Although the initiative targeted North and Sub-Saharan 
immigrants, it was Portuguese and Spanish migrants who left in the greatest numbers, totaling 
over 100,000 people.206 As a result, the government suspended both of the latter groups from 
program eligibility in 1979. Ultimately, these policies failed to encourage an immigrant exodus 
and negatively impacted Giscard d'Estaing’s popularity.  
The French government’s frustration with immigrant resistance to returning to Africa 
surfaced during a wave of deportation raids in 1981. Residents and police clashed violently. 
Residents overturned police vehicles and police officers often used force to round up “illegal” 
immigrants. Both Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan African workers used their socio-political 
networks in the Arab Workers’ Movement (Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes) and Union 
                                                          
http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/F1036.xhtml; "Police et minorités visibles: les contrôles d’identité à Paris," Le 
Open Society Justice Initiative (2009), http://www.cnrs.fr/inshs/recherche/docs-actualites/rapport-facies.pdf.    
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Générale des Travailleurs Sénégalais en France (UGTSF) to protest these actions.207 The 
growing marginalization of African populations engendered distrust in the government. These 
violent confrontations signaled a shift in national sentiment toward separatist phrases such as 
“France is for the French.” This divisive slogan spearheaded by local politician Jean-Marie Le 
Pen presented immigrants, specifically non-European immigrants, as a threat to public order and 
national security.208 French officials and political commentators began referring to these 
outbreaks of violence between oppressed immigrants and reactionary police as “problème des 
banlieues (suburban problems) or the violence urbaine (urban violence).” Popular support for 
migrants waned in the late 1970s and early 1980s as public opinion deemed African immigrants 
a “problem.”  Despite this categorization by the government, urban uprisings became a tool of 
“political bargaining” for Black people in order to gain greater access to better housing, 
education and immigration amendments.209 
In an article by the left wing magazine Libération, author Thomas Guénolé described 
French society’s “voluntary…problem of collective amnesia,” in regards to the role of urban 
uprisings.210 The 1981 uprisings in Lyon brought intense attention to the inequitable treatment of 
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African populations. However, these violent and quite visible confrontations between African 
populations and the police were ultimately unsuccessful in changing discriminatory practices by 
the government.211  Instead, their actions provoked a political backlash. The government 
retaliated with increasingly restrictive immigration laws and residency requirements. Despite 
their efforts, the 1981 uprisings in France brought the festering issue of policing immigrants into 
the spotlight of reactionary political discourse. Later that year, the government drafted new 
legislation that complicated the process of regularizing working and residency permits resulting 
in approximately 100,000 immigrants becoming sans-papiers.212 This shift in legislation forced 
many migrants from the categorization of “legal” to “illegal.” Moreover, it overturned the 
government’s tacit position that “illegal immigration” was an indispensable part of the French 
economy. Instead, government rhetoric criminalized “illegality.”213   
The 1981 presidential election was a turning point in the negotiation of the immigrant 
presence in France. The “return policies” of 1975 were largely unsuccessful.214 Commenting on 
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the escalating immigration concerns, Secretary of State Lionel Stoléru stated, “There is no longer 
a question of welcoming a single [additional] foreigner to France.”215 Giscard d'Estaing’s initial 
popularity waned due to his failure to “resolve” immigration. He faced a strong opponent in 
François Mitterrand, a socialist.  While on the campaign trail, Mitterrand promised to repeal 
some of the restrictive immigration legislation. His public overtures suggested that there was still 
some contingency in the hardening of French immigration policy.  In several speeches, he 
focused on the most crippling legislation, the 1980 Bonnet Law. Not only did it further restrict 
working and residency requirements but the regulation construed the entry and presence of 
‘illegal’ immigrants as a “threat to public order and deportation was necessary, if found.” The 
Ministry of Interior deported thousands of immigrants who were purportedly a threat on the 
grounds of criminal convictions.216    
After his election, President Mitterrand repealed the Bonnet Law. In addition, he added a 
court order as a stipulation to deportation. In response to lobbying from pro-immigrant 
organizations, Mitterrand endorsed the legalization of undocumented immigrants already in 
France while upholding the suspension of labor immigration.217 Although the legalization 
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process offered by the government was set to end in a year, Sub-Saharan African immigrants led 
a hunger strike protesting the denial of their applications. As a result, approximately 1,000 
applications were re-examined.218 In an additional 1981 circulaire, the new socialist government 
ended the use of police deportation raids.219 Although Mitterrand repealed the Bonnet Law and 
various levels of amnesty were offered to “illegal” immigrants, the government drafted new 
legislation that shifted deportation from an administrative to a judicial process. Thus, the 
shadows of the Bonnet Law remained. In addition, the new legalization program for 
undocumented immigrants only allowed a nine-month period as a condition of the application 
cut-off date. Despite public overtures that announced the retraction of unforgiving laws, 
Mitterrand’s leftist government maintained the status quo of restricting immigration.220 This 
measured response by the Left was in part a reaction to the growing traction of conservative 
ideologies that would soon dominate French politics for the rest of the decade.   
One of the forces that was most responsible for this rightward turn particularly in regards 
to immigration policy was a group of small nationalist organizations that joined together to found 
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the National Front (FN) on October 5, 1972. 221 Led by politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, the 
organization built its conservative reputation by railing against immigration. The FN used 
immigration as a cornerstone of their critique of the Socialist French government. Their 
demonizing and inflammatory rhetoric around immigration attracted new members to the party 
who had not typically associated with right-wing politics.222 During the first ten years of the 
party’s existence, it struggled to gain traction at the national level.  Compounding the party’s low 
membership numbers was a string of political losses by Jean-Marie Le Pen.223  
Despite its early failings, the 1980s brought the party’s national prominence and success 
on the ballot. The first turning point was in 1983. In the small town of Dreux, located 73 
kilometers from Paris, the FN overcame its electoral losses and captured a municipal win.224 
Continuing the winning streak, Le Pen was elected to the local Parisian council.225 Once seated 
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in a political position, he began a campaign to garner more media attention in an effort to expand 
the membership numbers of the organization on a much larger national stage. 
Le Pen increased the party’s popularity through the media. Soon after his election, he 
protested a broadcasting boycott of his party’s activities due to their polemical stances on the 
Mitterrand administration, immigration and nationality. In a series of letters, Le Pen critiqued 
governmental support of the media ban as well as challenged their position and support of free 
speech. One year later, the president ordered the leaders of the national television channels to 
give equal coverage to the FN.226  By January 1984, the party earned a slot in a monthly political 
poll for the first time.  Quantifying political popularity, 9% of respondents answered that that 
they held a “positive opinion” of the FN and voiced their support of Le Pen as a politician.227 
Later that month, Le Pen conducted his first prime-time television interview, which he later 
proclaimed, “the hour that changed everything.”228 This media visibility propelled the party from 
relative obscurity to national recognition and was reflected in the polls later that year. The FN 
won 11% of the national vote and ten seats in parliament in the 1984 elections.229Two years 
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later, the party gained an even larger political and electoral following. The 1986 legislative 
elections resulted in the National Front winning thirty-five deputy seats and about 10% of the 
national vote.  
The rise of the National Front as a political party rooted in an anti-immigrant sentiment 
coincided with a distancing of the Socialist national government from supporting migrant rights. 
The latter half of the 1980s signaled an increasingly staunch resistance to immigration. Sub-
Saharan migrants became a particular target of the FN.  Several public policies targeted France’s 
“illegal” and seemingly “unassimilable” immigrant populations. Public desire to “purify” the 
country of its residents who did not fit into the mold of a uniform French identity sparked 
xenophobic popular opinion and legislation that fostered rhetoric unfriendly to non-European 
peoples.230 Within a ten-year period, the French government endowed law enforcement entities 
with an overwhelming amount of power to police immigrant movement. These expanded powers 
contributed to heightened violent interactions between the police and immigrants. Moreover, the 
FN shifted the legislative balance of power from the Left led by Mitterrand to the Right by 1986. 
The newly elected right-wing parliament passed the Pasqua Law in 1986. Named after 
the Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua, it reduced the number of residence permits available to 
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immigrants and gave the government power to refuse permit renewal.231 Overturning 
Mitterrand’s 1981 ordinance, the Pasqua Law reinstated the government’s power to expel 
migrants without a court order. This legislation gave local authorities the ability to bring 
undocumented immigrants to the border for deportation. As a result, it not only affected the free 
movement of immigrant peoples between the city of Paris and the banlieues, but also severely 
limited immigrant employment opportunities due to employer’s unwillingness to hire “non-
nationals.”232  
In March 1986, the center-right wing organization Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the 
centrist organization Union for the French Democracy (UDF) proposed an amendment to the 
Nationality Code under the pretense that immigrants posed a threat to national identity. The 
proposed amendment would abolish the automatic acquisition of French nationality for foreign 
children born in France at eighteen years old. In protest of the legal measure, student 
demonstrations erupted throughout Paris on December 6, 1986. A critical turning point in the 
demonstrations was the death of Malik Oussekine that evening. Oussekine was one of 20,000 
students participating in the protests against the Devaquet Law, new immigration restrictions and 
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changes to the Nationality Code.233 During the rally, the twenty-two-year-old was beaten by law 
enforcement and later arrested. After being transported to the local precinct, Oussekine died of a 
heart attack in police custody. Despite conflicting accounts of the events that led up to the 
cardiac arrest, his death reignited university student protests. Two days later, parliament retracted 
the Nationality Code amendment as well as the proposed Devaquet Law. In the wake of 
Oussekine’s death, public opinion turned against the National Front, which supported the 
legislation. François Mitterrand’s vocal objection to the proposed modifications proved to be a 
catalyst in his re-election campaign.234 
After Mitterrand’s successful reelection in 1988, right-wing parliament politicians 
proposed an update to the Pasqua law. The League of Human Rights and several left-wing 
parliament officials immediately opposed the draft legislation. Protesting its harmful effects on 
immigrant families and children, the government ultimately rejected the update to the Pasqua 
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law.  Instead on August 2, 1989, French parliament passed revised legislation.235 It mollified the 
harsh impact of the Pasqua laws but also established a “residence commission for foreigners.”236 
By the year’s end, the Left wing was moderately successful in reversing the most egregious laws 
passed under the previous right-winged administration. This calculated reaction to tempering 
former immigration legislation while maintaining closed borders was encapsulated by 
Mitterrand’s statement, “the threshold of tolerance [for immigrants] has been reached.”237  
This threshold of tolerance quickly evaporated. A month after Mitterrand’s triumphant 
declaration, a local school suspended three Muslim girls for refusing to remove their 
headscarves.   The event sparked heightened disdain for migrants and the return of right-wing 
reactionary discourse. The “Foulard Affairs” also known as the “Hijab scandal” shifted public 
opinion toward islamophobia and rhetoric centered on the politics of difference. Debates erupted 
on the right and part of the left over the legality of public displays of religious symbols and 
Islamic students’ lack of willingness to conform to laïcité.238 Embedded in these public debates 
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were gendered and racialized negative tropes about immigrants and public opposition to 
communitarianism.239  In an attempt to calm the sea of discontent, the government created the 
High Council for Integration. 240 The council was charged with “integrating” migrants into 
French society. Their efforts focused on the inclusivity of the French model as well as social and 
cultural methods for assimilation. In a 1991 report, the Council stressed that, “the French concept 
of integration must obey a logic of equality and not a logic of minorities.”241 Counter to liberal 
attempts to quell public resistance to religious and racial difference, conservative public officials 
fanned the flames of discord. Prime Minister Édith Cresson announced government-chartered 
flights to send undocumented immigrants back to their home country.242 The Mayor of Paris 
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legislation and organizations that were deemed in support of immigration.  
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Jacques Chirac denounced the “overdose” of immigrants living in France. In his 1991 speech, he 
referred to African and Muslim immigrants as “noisy,” smelly, and said that their presence drove 
French neighbors “crazy.”243 Adding to government retrenchment against immigration, former 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing declared that France must fight against the “invasion” of 
immigrants into the country.244 
Coinciding with the public commentary offered by left and right wing officials, the 
government passed another two laws that reflected the hardening anti-immigration position. On 
July 22, 1993, parliament passed the Méhaignerie law. An amendment to the Nationality Code, it 
outlined that as a condition of French nationality for children born in France to foreign parents, 
they had to request the right to French citizenship at eighteen years old. The law also withdrew 
the benefit of jus soli citizenship to children born in France whose parents were from the former 
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colonies.245 The passage of this law signified the triumph of the FN in unifying the left and the 
right against immigration. Adding to this retreat from immigration liberalism was an update to 
the Pasqua law. It delineated the following changes: lengthening of the detention period, 
limitation of a judge's jurisdiction, the possibility for local authorities to organize deportation of 
individuals at the border, restriction of the categories protected against deportation, restriction of 
the right to live with family, and suppression of the right to social protection for any person in an 
“irregular” situation.246 These stipulations reversed formerly legal practices. The update 
lengthened the duration of family reunification; barred foreign students from employment in 
France after graduation; denied migrants the right to an automatic residency renewal; and most 
formidably it rejected residency requests from foreign spouses that resided in France “illegally” 
before marriage to a French resident. Together these brutal measures placed between 250,000 
and 600,000 people into the category of “illegal immigrants.” As a show of strength, Minister of 
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Interior Jean-Louis Debré noted that these measures allowed the forcible deportation of 7,352 
immigrants in just six months. This represented a 25% increase from the previous year.247  
 
 The 1996 Sans-Papiers Movement 
In reaction to these legal changes, two Parisian churches organized protests in 1996. On 
March 18th, 300 undocumented immigrants primarily from Mali and Senegal sought sanctuary at 
Saint Ambroise church in the 11th arrondissement of Paris. The Archbishop of Paris Cardinal 
Lustiger requested that police forcibly remove the 300 migrants.248 In an interview, Lustiger 
condemned their actions by calling them “manipulative” and a “political strategy.” His 
skepticism was further exposed by his comments that over a hundred women and children sought 
refuge in the church without the permission of a “political entity.”249  
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One of the protesters recalled the police arriving at the Saint Ambroise church on March 
22nd. Dressed in riot gear, officers carried batons which they used to hit several of the men 
participating in a hunger strike. Chronicled in his diary, Mamady Sané detailed the chaos. 
“Women and children were screaming, men running to try and escape arrest, chairs flew through 
the air and broke against the walls of the church…Sixty two adults were arrested and the others 
who had escaped were surrounded by policemen. They told them that they should know blacks 
had no place here in France.”250 After their forcible removal from Saint Ambroise, many of the 
asylum seekers occupied a theater in the Parisian suburb of Bois de Vincennes until April. Ten 
days later, a collective of lawyers, academics and other mediators met with Prime Minister Alain 
Juppé. Regrettably, the Prime Minister rejected all of the mediators’ recommendations. Then the 
group moved to an abandoned warehouse until they received word from the government that 
only 48 individuals were to receive residency papers. Many immigrants in the group soon sought 
refuge at the Saint Bernard church in the 18th arrondissement of Paris in hopes of forcing a more 
equitable response from the government. 
With the support of the parish priest Henri Coindé, the “Sans-Papiers of Saint Ambroise” 
staged a second occupation at Saint Bernard. Within six weeks, over 300 African migrants 
gathered again in the church. Some participated in the hunger strike and others sought protection 
from the police dispatched to deport them.251 In conversation with one of the group’s leaders, 
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Coindé suggested renaming the coalition the “Saint Bernard Sans-Papiers.” Distancing Saint 
Bernard from Saint Ambroise served two purposes. The first was a political maneuver to 
separate the hardline response of Cardinal Lustiger from the more humanitarian engagements of 
Saint Bernard. The second was to jumpstart a new public relations campaign to gain more public 
support.252     
Led by two West African immigrants, the Saint Bernard movement for undocumented 
immigrants received international media coverage. Madjiguène Cissé and Ababacar Diop were at 
the helm of the battle. Their work represented the larger struggle of those that sought refuge in 
the church. Ababacar Diop was born in Senegal and arrived in France clandestinely in the 
summer of 1988. He immediately gained an occupation as a janitor and maintained other 
domestic jobs while pursuing a degree in computer studies.253 After seven years working and 
studying in France, the prefecture of Seine-Saint-Denis denied his residence renewal application. 
Without working papers or a residency permit, Diop was one of the asylum seekers in the Saint 
Ambroise church.  
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After the police raided the church, he found a second home at Saint Bernard, where he 
met Madjiguène Cissé. Born and raised in Dakar, Cissé left Senegal to receive a degree in 
Germanic studies at Saarbrücken University in Germany. In 1993, she moved her family to Paris 
to facilitate her daughter’s studies in France. Although she maintained legal residency papers, 
Cissé served as spokeswoman replicating her earlier work as an activist during the 1968 student 
demonstrations in Senegal.254 As Cissé and Diop spoke to the media and collaborated with local 
NGOs, activist networks and anti-racism organizations, their cause drew a larger audience. 
Several other “sans-papiers” collectives were formed throughout Paris and in other cities around 
France.  On July 20, a national coalition of “Sans-Papiers Collectives” formed. The collective 
utilized a variety of tactics to pressure the government including press releases, individual 
applications for residency supported by French nationals, demonstrations and the most 
importantly the press.  At its peak, about 2,000 individuals came to the church daily to record 
their stories, offer supplies and various other donations. Both national and international press 
helped swing the pendulum of public support in the direction of the sans-papiers. Two national 
opinions polls noted that 46 to 53% of French people supported their campaign. 255 Among their 
high-profile supporters was actress Emmanuelle Béart and Professor of Medicine and former 
Minister of Health Léon Schwartzenberg.  
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On the 34th day of the occupation Ababacar Diop spoke with reporters. In the wake of a 
meeting between the group’s lawyer, Henri Leclerc and Minister of Interior Debré, Diop 
responded to questions about the group’s demands. He stated:  
If Debré wants us to meet him to hear his usual litany, it's not worth it. But if he is willing 
to listen to us, listen to our proposals, listen to our arguments…we agree to go meet 
him. On the other hand, the hunger strikers are determined to go all the way, so that 
people whose situation can be regularized through the defined criteria are actually 
regularized. That's all we ask.256 
 
The meeting between the “Saint Bernard Sans-Papiers” and Minister Debré never materialized. 
In the face of this setback, Madjiguène Cissé gathered many of the Saint Bernard women to 
develop a new plan. She noted, “Each time the movement ran out of steam, the women met and 
worked out initiatives which relaunched the struggle.”  During the hunger-strikes, they led a 
Women’s March reigniting support from the press and occupied the 18th arrondissement town 
hall. The day after their protests at the town hall, the “Saint Bernard Sans-Papiers” received 
notification that their cases would be heard. Cissé linked their demonstrations to a Senegalese 
tradition of “self-organization.”  The Saint Bernard women were a driving force in the sans-
papiers movement in 1996. Despite their critical contributions, these women were often 
marginalized by male members.  
In a reflective essay, Cissé detailed the degree of sexism within the movement. She 
wrote,  
Women have played an extremely important role in this struggle…At the beginning it 
seemed to be taken for granted that women would not participate in general meetings: it 
wasn’t necessary, since the husbands were there! Not only did women not have the right 
to speak; they didn’t even have the right to listen to what was being said at general 
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meetings. Two or three women began imposing their presence at general meetings. Then 
they spoke. The third stage was to have women’s meetings. Then the men were really 
puzzled; they saw us as scheming, plotting, up to no good; they used to hang around our 
meetings to try and find out what we were saying. In fact, these meetings gave great 
strength to the women, and enabled them to play an important role in the direction of the 
struggle. When we were in the 15th arrondissement…SOS-Racism (a national anti-racist 
organization) suggested that we submit our case files to the Ministry and that we go 
home, the men were ready to do that, because they trusted the priest. It was the women 
who didn’t want to. 257 
 
Contrary to the original plan of the “Saint Bernard Sans-Papiers,” women demanded a seat the 
negotiation table. After three women “imposed” their will during the meeting, Madjiguène Cissé 
was selected as an additional spokesperson. Originally deemed the “Women’s” leader, Cissé was 
recognized along with Diop in official negotiation meetings. The efforts of these Black women 




Despite of all their efforts, the occupation ended unceremoniously.  At dawn on August 
23, over 1,000 riot police broke through a “human wall” of supporters. Using axes, they hacked 
through the church doors and a barricade of pews. Forcibly entering the church, the police threw 
chairs and released tear gas. Then they “started to sort people and separate the whites from the 
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blacks. Anyone who resisted received numerous blows.”258  Local paramedics removed ten 
emaciated hunger-strikers on stretchers. They vowed to continue their protest till death. Amongst 
those arrested was Madjiguène Cissé. One journalist attributed this to the fact that, “Diop…is 
more diplomatic than the volatile Marxist Cissé.”259  Over 10,000 angry Parisian protesters took 
to the streets in opposition to the government’s removal of the Saint Bernard occupants. As a 
result of these protests, President Chirac faced public uproar and damaging international reports.  
In response to this upheaval, he assured the press that a court order released most of the arrested 
immigrants and that all but one of the asylum seekers received their residency papers. Several 
days later, Chirac stated he hoped that this show of strength by police and the government sent 
the message to “[undocumented migrants] that there are no more chances for you in France.”260  
This dismal “end” to the Saint Bernard and Saint-Ambroise church protests catalyzed 
more demonstrations against draconian immigration laws.261 On February 27, 1997, 100,000 
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Parisians protested a proposed bill that required individuals hosting foreign visitors to report to 
the prefecture on the departure date of their visitors’ visa. This legal maneuver was an attempt to 
round-up “illegal migrants” that had over-stayed their residency permit. After gathering 
thousands of signatures protesting this measure, the French government responded with an 
amendment to the law.262 Authorizing the confiscation of foreigners’ passports in “irregular 
situations,” the collection of fingerprints of foreigners who applied for a residence permit and the 
restriction of judicial powers in matters of detention, this law was a strong reproach to the in-
roads created by the sans-papiers activism.    
As public protests escalated in 1997 after the legislative elections, new Minister of the 
Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement presented a regularization process for undocumented migrants.  
This measure only benefited approximately 80,000 applicants. The restrained response did not 
repeal the harsh constraints of the previous laws, but it did offer new provisions for immigrants. 
It introduced a procedure of permanent regularization (although only eleven cases were approved 
                                                          
residence permits.” See "French Police Remove Immigrants from Church." September 1996. 
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1029.  
262 On April 24, 1997, the Debré law was passed (two months before legislative elections) named after Minister of 
Interior Jean Louis Debré. As a response to closing “legal loopholes” left open by 1993 legislation, the Debré law 
intended to close any remaining options to regularize migrants. “France now holds a record for legislative change 
in the area of immigration. Major reforms were passed in 1980, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1997, and most recently 
in 1998.” From Virginie Guiraudon, "Immigration Policy in France." July 28, 2016. 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/immigration-policy-in-france/.For further detail on these changes see Philippe 
Bourbeau, Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order (London: Routledge, 2013), 138; Shelese 
Emmonsm, "Le Debre Bill: Immigration Legislation or a National "Front"?" Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
17th ser., 4, no. 1 (1997): 357-66. 
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=ijgls; Nicole Gauthier, "Deux 
Dispositions Sur L'immigration Recalées." Libération. April 24, 1997. 
http://www.liberation.fr/evenement/1997/04/24/deux-dispositions-sur-l-immigration-recalees_201841; "Loi N° 
97-396 Du 24 Avril 1997 Portant Diverses Dispositions Relatives à L'immigration. Loi Dite Loi Debré." LegiFrance: Le 




under “private and family life” and “medical reasons”), it legalized territorial asylum, and 
required a reason to be offered when certain visas were refused by the government, it also 
reinstated residence commissions and increased the maximum duration of detention from ten to 
twelve days.263 After almost twenty years of immigration reform, the Chevènement law 
represented a critical turning point in French legal history. 
One of the last laws to revise protections offered by the original 1945 ordinance opening 
France to immigration, the Chevènement law marked the achievement of a “zero immigration 
policy.” A reversal of the 1945 ordinance that opened France to immigrants, the 1997 legislation 
marked the end of an era. More importantly, the legislation turned government attention from the 
language of policing its outside borders to the “threat within.” Increasingly, government officials 
focused on second-generation youth and implemented various methods for integration. This anti-
immigrant climate affected many Black youth born to immigrant parents. Contemporary French 
scholars often note that policy focused on increased policing of immigrant neighborhoods and 
the assimilation of second-generation youth through the French education system.  Primary 
                                                          
263 On May 11, 1998, the Chevènement law was passed, despite being objected by factions on the right and left. 
Although seemingly progressive, it did not retract any of the previous immigration constraints outlined by French 
law. The Chevènement law continued previous practices by the French government of deporting sans-papiers by 
using charter planes. Air France and Air Afrique pilots protested “systematically” accepting passengers for 
deportation (specifically to Mali) after Chevènement criticized churches for aiding illegal immigrants. See Béatrice 
Bantman, "Les Avancées De La Loi Chevènement Rognées Par Une Circulaire." Liberation. July 29, 1998. 
http://www.liberation.fr/france/1998/07/29/les-avancees-de-la-loi-chevenement-rognees-par-une-
circulaire_242519; Philippe Bernard and Anne Rohou, “Protestations contre le durcissement du projet 
Chevènement sur l’immigration,” Le Monde. (14 Mars 1998), 3; "Loi No 98-349 Du 11 Mai 1998 Relative à L'entrée 
Et Au Séjour Des étrangers En France Et Au Droit D'asile." Legifrance - Le Service Public De L'accès Au Droit. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000191302&categorieLien=id; J. 
Winders, Paris Africain, 116-121.  
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education served as a fundamental part of France’s model for integrating the children of 
immigrants into French society.264  
In a series of interviews, several French children born to African immigrants reflect on 
their childhood. In their comments, they discussed the impact of an anti-immigrant sociopolitical 
climate and how schools restricted their expression of a racial and ethnic identity. Reflecting on 
her childhood, Gaelle, a woman of Congolese descent in her late 20s, stated:  
I’m a part of the second generation of the diaspora in France...I feel like I grew up like 
any other French person just with immigrant parents...They never really insisted that I 
have this African legacy. Their goal was for me to fit in and get good grades. My dad was 
very uncomfortable in France. He tried his best to fit in...Growing up, I always felt like 
France did not want you to be too connected to Africa, in the way you look dress, or even 
smell. When you go to school, you have to look French. Detached from anything from 
Africa.265  
 
Her experiences as a child where complete detachment from Africa meant assimilation into 
French society were a result of her father’s experiences. His inability to gain acceptance in 
France resulted in raising a daughter where acceptance equated to not speaking their indigenous 
language of Lingala nor visiting their country of origin in the Congo. Although Gaelle ultimately 
did well in school and earned the grades to go to college, she felt a key piece of her identity was 
missing.  Separation from the language, food, customs and history of the Congo impacted both 
her familial relations and her self-esteem.  
Another young woman named Fanta, of Senegalese descent in her mid-20s, echoed this 
sentiment. She stated, “I grew up in a mostly white environment. Most of my friends were white 
                                                          
264 Hollifield and Ross, Searching for the New France, 134.  
265 Gaelle (a woman of Congolese descent in her late 20’s), in discussion with the author. April 11, 2017.   
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girls. They never really seemed to accept me completely. I didn’t grow up around people who 
looked like me. I couldn’t quite fit in because of it...my self-esteem was really impacted by 
this.”266 After completing high school, Fanta moved to the United States to complete her 
education at Madison College in Wisconsin. While there she found a small community of Black 
young women who helped her express her frustrations with assimilation in France and supported 
her process of embracing her identity as a woman who identifies as both African and French.  
Laurent, a mid-30s male of Senegalese descent, also expressed the significance of a dual 
identity.  He stated, “I’m French but my parents are African…I know there are people who don’t 
want me to be here, but I’m still gunna be here. I’m not going anywhere.  France is my home too, 
I don’t really know Africa.”267 Growing up in a family that embraced its African roots, he 
recognizes his Senegalese origins. His parents visit Senegal often and aim to return to their 
“home” upon retirement. Born and raised in France, Laurent identifies Paris as his home and 
does not want to ever live in Africa. This desire to be absorbed by France while also grappling 
with an African identity and culture is part of a larger narrative of negotiating space and place 
within society. Despite encountering frequent incidents with racism, Laurent has no interest in 
leaving the country. This recognition of his “Frenchness” despite rejection from the state and 
society is contrasted by Fanta who said, “As I grew up, I became increasingly frustrated with 
how republican French ideals do not include non-white people. No matter how hard we try. 
                                                          
266 Fanta (a woman of Senegalese descent in her mid-20’s,) in discussion with the author. April 16, 2017. 
267 Laurent, in discussion with the author. October 4, 2016.  
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When I go to another country, I’m French. When I go to Africa…they tell me I'm French. But 
when I’m here [in France], I can’t be French.”268  
These sentiments of frustration, dual identity and a connection to their African roots 
would find an international audience in 1998.  As France prepared to host the World Cup, its 
national team would become a symbol of hope for many second-generation youth. France’s 
multi-ethnic national team had roots in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. For many, the 
twenty-two player squad represented the possibility that France could embrace racial diversity 
and immigration.   
 
“Black, Blanc, Beur” France’s 1998 World Cup Team & the Myth of Racial Harmony 
 On March 10, 1996, the qualification process for the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) World Cup began.269 174 national teams competed for 30 
tournament slots. FIFA reserved two spaces: one for Brazil, the defending champions, and 
another for France, the host country. In ten cities across the nation, stadiums gathered spectators 
from around the world.270 As France prepared for the arrival of hundreds of thousands of 
                                                          
268 Fanta, in discussion with the author. April 16, 2017. 
269 Founded in 1930, FIFA awards its coveted World Cup trophy every four years. Eight years later, France hosted 
the World Cup games in 1938. Sixty years later, the world championship games returned to the hexagon for the 
second time. 
270 Cities that host the World Cup matches are determined by the size of the stadium. All stadiums could hold a 
capacity of over 30,000 people. Locations included: Saint-Denis-Stade de France (suburb of Paris), Marseille- Stade 
Vélodrome, Paris-Parc des Princes, Lyon-Stade de Gerland, Lens- Stade Félix-Bollaert, Nantes-Stade de la Beaujoire, 
Toulouse-Stadium de Toulouse, Saint-Étienne-Stade Geoffroy-Guichard, Bordeaux-Parc Lescure, Montpellier-Stade 
de la Mosson. Of all the stadiums selected to host the games, Stade de France located in Saint-Denis was the 
largest. With a capacity of 80,000, the stadium was commissioned for the World Cup games. Then Mayor of Paris, 
Jacques Chirac brokered an agreement with acting Prime Minister Édouard Balladur for construction of the 
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international fans, the sélectionneur carefully selected the members of the 1998 French soccer 
team.271 Out of the twenty-two players comprising the squad, eight players were non-white: 
Lilian Thuram, Marcel Desailly, Christian Karembeu, Zinedine Zidane, Bernard Lama, Patrick 
Vieira, Thierry Henry and Bernard Diomede.272  
This multiethnic team was much more representative of the diversity within France than 
previous teams. Based on the 1990 census, 4.2 million people within France were born outside of 
the country amounting to 7.4% of the total population.273 This “rainbow team” came to represent 
the hope of diversity in France. Nicknamed “Black, Blanc, Beur” to replicate the tricolor French 
flag, the team was a particular target of the FN.274  In remarks offered in 1996, Jean-Marie Le 
                                                          
stadium for the sum of 2.67 billion francs. See Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare. France and the 1998 World Cup: The 
National Impact of a World Sporting Event (Taylor and Francis, 2014), 90-110.  
271 The sélectionneur is the head coach of the national team 
272 Lilian Thuram was born in Guadeloupe and immigrated to France in 1981. Marcel Desailly was born in Ghana 
and immigrated to France in 1972 at the age of four. Christian Karembeu was born in New Caledonia and 
immigrated to France at the age of seventeen. Zinedine Zidane was born in Marseille, France to Algerian 
immigrants in 1972. Bernard Lama was born in French Guiana and immigrated to France in 1981. Patrick Vieira was 
born in Senegal and immigrated to France in 1984. Thierry Henry was born in Les Ulis (a Parisian suburb) to parents 
from Guadeloupe and Martinique. Bernard Diomede was born in France to parents from Guadeloupe.  
273 However, this estimate may undercount the actual migrant population. The 1990 census was the last one 
conducted before the World Cup, see "France - General Population Census of 1990 - IPUMS Subset." INSEE (Institut 
national de la statistique et des études économiques) http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2146.  
This demographic shift in the foreign population is a marked shift from statistics gathered in 1975 (when 
immigration was further restricted). At the time, Europeans accounted for over 60% of the foreigners living in 
France. By 1990, Europeans accounted for 40% of the foreign population. Whereas, populations from the Maghreb 
account for 39% and populations from Sub-Saharan Africa account for 6% in 1990. See "How Racist Is France?" The 
Economist. July 16, 1998. https://www.economist.com/europe/1998/07/16/how-racist-is-france.  
274 “Black, Blanc, Beur” was supposed to champion racial diversity in France. Interestingly, Black is the only English 
word in this phrase and is used to describe African diasporic populations.  
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Pen stated, “It's a bit artificial to bring players from abroad and call it the French team.”275 Of 
course all the players were French citizens, but Le Pen hoped to capitalize on notions of 
exclusively white Frenchness. His comment was quickly rebutted in the popular press and by the 
players. Bernard Lama responded, “Our team gives you a sense of the sociocultural mix that is 
France today.”276 Le Pen continued his tirade against the players by protesting against those that 
did not sing the national anthem, “La Marseillaise.” He retorted, “We put an Algerian to please 
the Arabs, a Kanak who does not even want to sing the Marseillaise and Blacks to satisfy the 
West Indians. All of this, has nothing to do with a team from France!”277 Yet, the multicultural 
team did represent France, as both a symbol of its colonial history and the postcolonial legacy of 
migration of these populations to the metropole. Contrary to Le Pen’s comments, many non-
white people living in France saw the possibility of achieving racial equality epitomized by the 
team.    
Over the course of the month, France’s “rainbow” team marched its way to the FIFA 
World Cup championship. On July 12, 1998, France faced the defending champions. In front of 
more than 75,000 fans, Zinedine Zidane scored two goals before half-time. French goalie Fabien 
Barthez prevented Brazil from scoring a single goal, and in the final minute Emmanuel Petit 
scored another goal sealing Brazil’s defeat 3-0. That evening 1.5 million people descended upon 
                                                          
275 Christopher Clarey, "World Cup '98; France Hoping for Title At End of the Rainbow." The New York Times. July 
07, 1998. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/07/sports/world-cup-98-france-hoping-for-title-at-end-of-the-
rainbow.html.  
276 Clarey, "World Cup '98,” The New York Times. 1998.  
277 Kanak (is a person from New Caladonia). See Delphine Bancaud, "1998-2018, Deux Victoires Des Bleus... Et 
Toujours Les Mêmes Réactions Racistes?" 20 Minutes. July 19, 2018. https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2309783-
20180718-video-1998-2018-deux-victoires-bleus-toujours-memes-reactions-racistes. Le Pen failed to discuss the 
white French players like Christophe Dugarry that did not know all of the words to the national anthem. See 
Dubois, Soccer Empire, 104.  
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the streets of the Champs-Élysées.278 For many Black youth, the 1998 World Cup win was the 
first time French people celebrated their visible presence. This national euphoria was bittersweet 
for Afropeans who both joined in revelry but also marked disappointment that “it took a World 
Cup victory for the white elite to find out that…minorities existed and that we were actual 
French citizens.”279 The face of France’s World Cup team was Zinedine Zidane, who scored two 
goals that night after receiving a red card earlier in the play-offs in a match against Saudi 
Arabia.280 His desire for redemption propelled France toward its first World Cup win. That night 
crazed fans clamored “Zidane for President.”281 Their cries echoed loudly in the night air. In his 
remarks following the historic win, French President Jacques Chirac declared, “This is a France 
that wins and is, for once, united in victory.” In the popular press, Le Monde described the team 
as a “symbol of the diversity and of the unity of the country.”282 Even Le Pen backpedaled his 
                                                          
278 "Fête Sur Les Champs-Elysées Après La Victoire De La France En Coupe Du Monde De Football - Ina.fr." INA. 
November 08, 2016. https://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-media/InaEdu01144/fete-sur-les-champs-elysees-apres-
la-victoire-de-la-france-en-coupe-du-monde-de-football.html.  
279 Rokhaya Diallo, “Opinion | Don't Let France's World Cup Victory Erase the Issues Affecting Black French 
People.” The Washington Post. July 16, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2018/07/16/dont-let-frances-world-cup-victory-erase-the-issues-affecting-black-french-
people/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3af08ddf703e.  
280 Bonnie DeSimone, "FRANCE 4, SAUDI ARABIA 0." Chicago Tribune. June 19, 1998. 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-06-19-9806190041-story.html; "Zidane Sur Son Rouge En 98: 
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281 The euphoric cries for “Zidane for President” were both symbolic of the possibility for a sports win to translate 
into a political victory. See Julien Leclercq, Christian Schmitt, Fabrizio Tribuzio-Bugatti, Benjamin Fayet, Rémi 
Loriov, Guillaume Duhamel, Christophe Berurier, and Charles Guiral. "12 Juillet 98: Quand Zinédine Zidane Devient 
Président." Revue Consacrée à La Littérature, La Philosophie Et La Politique. December 17, 2013. 
http://lenouveaucenacle.fr/12-juillet-98-quand-zidane-devient-president. Their jubilation also marks a pointed 
turn from when fans lambasted his behavior in the previous match, where he earned a red card. See Julien 
Laurens, "Allez Les Bleus! The Story of France's 1998 World Cup Triumph." ESPN. June 08, 2018. 
http://www.espn.com/soccer/club/france/478/blog/post/3495197/the-story-of-france-1998-world-cup-triumph. 
282 For context surrounding Chirac’s quote, see Lincoln Allison, The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global 
Institutions in Sport (London: Routledge, 2006), 134. For more about Le Monde’s media coverage see Tom Adams, 
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previous polemic comments and praised the team, “This is the victory of the France team, but I 
claim it also like the victory of the National Front…The FN has always recognized that French 
citizens can be different races and different religions as long as they share the love of their 
country and the will to serve it."283    
                                                          
"Ronaldo's Darkest Day." ESPN. February 10, 2011. http://en.espn.co.uk/football/sport/story/73108.html. Just one 
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Algerians' Football Celebrations Turned into a Battle." The Guardian. November 22, 2009. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/22/france-algeria-paris-riots-football and Andrew Hussey,  
"Interview: Zinedine Zidane." The Guardian. April 03, 2004. 
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This celebratory euphoria was short-lived. Within four years the spirit of the “Black, 
Blanc, Beur” fizzled. In 2002, as the French soccer team prepared to defend their world title, the 
French presidential elections were in full swing. Jean-Marie Le Pen garnered 17% of the national 
vote and was set to face the incumbent President Jacques Chirac. If the French team was 
supposed to be representative of the triumph of diversity and racial equality in France, this 
legacy was in jeopardy. Players from the 1998 World Cup Team were called upon to squelch Le 
Pen’s momentum. Marcel Desailly, captain of national team and of Ghanaian origins, published 
a statement denouncing Le Pen, “Like the vast majority of French [people], I am shocked…I just 
hope that the French come to their senses and vote against him.”284 Echoing his teammates’ 
sentiments, Bernard Lama explained, “There is a lot of discontent and people living in misery 
and Le Pen has been able to exploit all the social evils…The values we stood for in 1998 have 
been blown apart.”285 In the spirit of solidarity, the players threatened to boycott the 2002 World 
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symbolism to speak to French voters. Desailly’s teammate Robert Pires echoed his concern, “As players we have 
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Figure 10. The 1998 French World 




Cup games if Le Pen was elected. Explaining both the frustration of the players and the growing 
sense of disillusionment for the non-white citizens in France, Mouloud Aounit, president of anti-
racism group MRAP (Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace) stated, “The 
politicians thought they had solved all the problems through football…In fact the effect lasted 
about as long as the fireworks.”286  
The use of soccer as a model for racial integration and harmony failed to live up to its 
predicted utility within French society. Serge July, the editor of Libération, explained, “A World 
Cup victory does not change social reality…but it can change the image the French have of 
themselves.”287 This duality was reflected in the final outcome of the Presidential race. Chirac 
won the 2002 election in a landslide garnering 82% of the popular vote.288 Chirac’s approval 
                                                          
286 This game of “political football” ended in French loss after 1998, when Zidane failed to symbolically live up to 
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say there are “too many Arabs” in France…and over a quarter say there are “too many blacks.” For more 
information from this study and other polls conducted on race in France after the 1998 World Cup Win see, "How 




ratings soared by 18 points in the wake of the team’s victory.289  The “World Cup Effect” helped 
elevate Chirac’s previously dismal standings in reaction to a stagnant national economy, housing 
deficits and rising unemployment rates in 1998. The success of the “diverse” soccer team carried 
political gravitas which Chirac benefited from and resulted in a decisive win over Jean-Marie Le 
Pen in 2002.  
Later that year, France entered the 2002 World Cup tournament. Many of the players 
from the 1998 World Cup team returned for a chance at earning a second title. Their journey 
began at the Seoul World Cup stadium with 62,561 fans in attendance.290 On May 31, 2002, 
Senegal defeated France in the first round of the tournament. French media claimed the match to 
be a “short but damaging loss…in a stadium in Seoul, deafened by the sound of African 
drums.”291 French magazine Le Point offered the following commentary, “Senegal humiliates 
France… [France] is considered the number one favorite. But the Blues were knocked out by 
                                                          
289 Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, France and the 1998 World Cup: The National Impact of a World Sporting Event 
(Taylor and Francis, 2014); "France's Macron Can Thank His Lucky Stars, Again, after World Cup Triumph." France 
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Senegal - who played their first match in World Cup history…France is eliminated without a 
single goal scored. Never has a title holder so badly defended his trophy.”292  
Most of the Senegalese players representing the national team maintained professional 
contracts with various teams in France.293 A retrospective article in Le Monde reflected on the 
match’s significance.  Ferdinand Coly, a player on the Senegalese team expressed his mental 
state in that moment, “We were motivated as ever. Between Senegal and France, there is a strong 
relationship, a common history. We respected these players a lot.”294 In contrast to a Senegalese 
team that experienced pre-game jitters and excitement, Khalilou Fadiga remembered a French 
team that was “very sure of herself, bordering on arrogance.” He stated, “I remember that Roger 
Lemerre [the French coach] did not seem to know us very well, while almost all of our players 
were on teams in France....In short, it had stung us!”295 Using this hurt to propel their energy, 
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19, 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/06/19/le-jour-ou-le-lion-senegalais-a-croque-le-coq-
gaulois-au-mondial-de-2002_5317361_3212.html and "Quand Le Sénégal Fit Chavirer La Planète Foot." Slate 
Afrique. May 31, 2012. http://www.slateafrique.com/88183/quand-senegal-fit-chavirer-la-planete-foot-lions-
teranga.  
295 Billebault, "Le Jour Où Le Lion Sénégalais a Croqué Le Coq Gaulois,” Le Monde.  June 19, 2018. See also, Alexis 
Billebault, "Sénégal-France: Le 31 Mai 2002, Le Jour Où Les Lions De La Teranga Ont Terrassé Les Bleus." Jeune 
Afrique. June 18, 2018. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/579179/societe/senegal-france-le-31-mai-2002-le-jour-ou-
les-lions-de-la-teranga-ont-terrasse-les-bleus/. Khalilou Fadiga, a key player for the 2002 Senegalese national 
team, was born in Senegal and moved to France when was six years old. After a short tenure at Paris Saint-
Germain, he signed with a team in Belgium. Although, he had a Belgian passport through marriage, Fadiga opted to 
play for Senegal in the World Cup. See Alexis Billebault,  "Sénégal: On a Retrouvé... Khalilou Fadiga, Un Des Lions 




Senegal ejected the defending champions in a 1-0 victory. Upon the team’s return to Senegal, the 
crowd roared, “We devoured the Gallic Rooster!” Their efforts resulted in a stunning defeat that 
shook France to its core. 
2002 was a critical year for white French political retrenchment. Beginning with the 
World Cup team’s defeat at the hands of its former colony, notions of French superiority were 
threatened to the detriment of non-white populations. Scholarship and the press had heralded the 
1998 World Cup as the achievement of France’s experiment with diversity. However, this 
position swiftly eroded. Within four years, a new political reality emerged. National Presidential 
and legislative elections resulted in a series of policies that doubled-down on reducing non-white 
populations. In his May 5th re-election speech, Jacques Chirac announced, “that the nation should 
reunite— that politics should change.”296 Yet, discord reigned. In the 2002 legislative election, 
the Right wing earned 394 seats and controlled the national parliament. Resolute in their 
determination to end the “problem” of sans-papiers, Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy 
passed a circulaire demanding police forces to double the amount of sans-papier expulsions and 
chartered flights to oust them from France.297  Under his direction, the French government 
furthered restricted entry and residency permits and targeted the children of sans-papiers for 
deportation. The spirit of 1998 was gone and new tensions pushed the nation toward insurrection. 
 
 
                                                          
296 "Jacques Chirac Wins by Default." The Economist. May 09, 2002. 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2002/05/09/jacques-chirac-wins-by-default.  




As the World Cup effect waned and Senegal reveled in defeating France on the World 
Cup stage, the myth of French racial harmony disintegrated. The final critical turning point in 
destroying this illusion was the year 2005. At the start of the year, a Malian man named Abou 
Bakari Tandia died in police custody. Held in a local precinct in the Parisian suburb of 
Courbevoie, Tandia was arrested on December 5, 2004. After being stopped in a routine identity 
check by police, he was detained for not possessing residency papers. Despite living in France 
for thirteen years, he had not finalized his residency and employment paperwork. After being 
transported to the precinct, he mysteriously fell into a coma and was transported to a local 
hospital. A little over a month later, he died on January 24, 2005.  
In an official account, officers stated that Tandia fell into a coma after continuously 
banging his head on the cell bars. Neither the autopsy nor the medical reports of the two 
hospitals where he was treated cite injuries to the head.298 Instead, the official autopsy attributes 
his death to visceral decompensation or multiple organ failure. Armed with this evidence, his 
family demanded an official investigation into his death. In March, the family opened a case 
against the officers who arrested him. During the trial, the prosecution admitted that the 
surveillance camera of his cell was not working. By the trial’s conclusion, the court found all 
five officers not guilty. In his explanation the judge said, “There is nothing to hold police officers 
accountable in the process that led to the death of the victim.” The judge based his ruling on 
“contradictory” medical evidence. The officers were acquitted, despite one of the officer’s 
                                                          





admission to strangling Tandia to “control” him.299 Seven months later, another seemingly 
innocuous run-in with the police by African-descendent youth catapulted France into 
international media scrutiny and planted the seeds of a millennial suburban revolution.  
On October 27, 2005 fifteen-year-old Bouna Traoré and seventeen-year-olds Zyed Benna 
and Muhittin Altun joined a group of six other boys to play soccer after school in the Parisian 
suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. After a few hours of spirited matches, the boys disbanded to head 
back to their cité for the night.300 As they passed a construction site, a group of police officers 
responding to a robbery report at that location raced toward them. Attempting to avoid routine 
police harassment in the form of a contrôle d’identité, the boys scattered in various directions. 
Traoré, Benna and Altun sprinted toward an adjoining electrical substation to hide from 
the police pursuit, but upon hearing the officers’ approaching footsteps, the boys scaled the 
chain-link fence surrounding the power facility’s transformer. As they gripped the metal, 10,000 
volts of electrical force sent shock waves through their bodies. The charge hurled Altun into the 
air and outside of the substation. Severely burned, he was rushed to the hospital.  Still inside the 
substation laid the electrocuted bodies of Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna.301 That night word 
                                                          
299 His death classified under “mysterious causes” occurred in January 2005. For more information regarding the 
events surrounding The Tandia Affair see “Garde à Vue Tragique à Courbevoie: La Police Désavouée." Le Parisien. 
March 11, 2010. http://www.leparisien.fr/hauts-de-seine-92/garde-a-vue-tragique-a-courbevoie-la-police-
desavouee-11-03-2010-843900.php ; “Non-lieu Dans L'affaire Abou Bakari Tandia.” Le Parisien. September 28, 
2012. http://www.leparisien.fr/hauts-de-seine-92/non-lieu-dans-l-affaire-abou-bakari-tandia-28-09-2012-
2185871.php and "Violences Policieres en France: Abou Bakari Tandia." Amnesty International. September 2009. 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR210132009FRENCH.PDF.  
300 Cité HLM: suburban housing project.  
301 There are conflicting accounts on the actual events of the police chase. For more narration on the incidents 
occurring on October 27, 2005, see Thomas Crampton, “Behind the Furor, the Last Moments of Two Youths,” The 
New York Times, published on November 7, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/07/world/europe/behind-
the-furor-the-last-moments-of-two-youths.html?_r=1;  Michel Delberghe, “Clichy-sous-Bous, radiographie d’une 
ville pauvre,” Le Monde, published on November 5, 2005, 
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spread through text message, online chatroom and the reverberating screams of Traoré’s Malian-
born parents and Benna’s Tunisian-born parents. Illuminating the dark sky, North and Sub-
Saharan African youth descended from their decaying housing projects to set the streets of 
Clichy-sous-Bois ablaze.  
Overturning police cars and lighting them on fire, enraged youth threw stones and bottles 
at the growing crowd of officers. An empty school was engulfed in flames as they marched 
toward the town hall. Preventing the youth from reaching the building were fifty police officers 
armed with plastic bullet pistols.302 While the tense stand-off unfolded, uprisings erupted in other 
banlieues of outer Paris including Montfermeil, Dijon, Val-d’Oise, Seine-et-Marne and various 
provincial cities. They too felt the frustration and all too familiar injustice of police harassment, 
social exclusion and economic disparity. That night their fury metamorphosed into flames. 
Television screens and social media worldwide carried the images of burning buildings and 
violent clashes between the officers and the largely teenaged youths who poured out of the cités 
and into the streets.  For the first time since the Algerian War, France declared a state of 
emergency on November 8, 2005 after two weeks of continuous uproar. This moment of civil 
                                                          
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/11/05/clichy-sous-bois-radiographie-d-une-ville-
pauvre_706880_3224.html; Didier Lapeyronnie, “Primitive Rebellion in the French banlieues: On the Fall 2005 
Riots,” in Frenchness and the African Diaspora, 21-47; “French police cleared in teen deaths that sparked riots,” 
France 24. May 19, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20150518-france-police-teenagers-electrocuted-court-
death; Marwan Mohammed and Laurent Mucchielli, “La police dans les quartiers populaires: une vrai problème,” 
Mouvements 44 (March-April 2006):58-66; Olivier Roy, "The Nature Of The French Riots," Social Science Research 
Council. November 18, 2005, http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Roy/.   
302 For more information about the use of Flash-Ball pistols by the French police during the 2005 uprisings see 
Laurent Bonelli, “The trouble with the banlieues,” Le Monde Diplomatique. December 2005, 
https://mondediplo.com/2005/12/05unrest; and Laurent Mucchielli, "Autumn 2005: A Review of the Most 
Important Riot in the History of French Contemporary Society" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 5 
(2009): 733-35.  
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unrest brought international attention to the largely invisible crisis of policing immigrant 
populations within the banlieues that had grown and festered for the last thirty years.303  
 
Le Rap- Generational Influences and Gender in Hip Hop 
 
In the wake of the 2005 urban uprisings, parliament member François Grosdidier 
requested that the Ministry of Justice take action against rappers such as Fabe, Salif, Monsieur R, 
113 and the group Lunatic for “inciting hatred against certain races and the republic.” With the 
support of almost two hundred other members of parliament, Grosdidier proposed legislation that 
would prosecute rappers whose lyrics were deemed “discriminatory, violent, hate-filled or anti-
white.” The law would fine rappers up to $58,000 or up to one year in prison.304 This was part of 
a public narrative that placed the blame for the events of 2005 on the influence of Hip Hop. The 
musical genre remains a target of governmental scrutiny. Yet, Hip Hop also served as a 
continuous cultural response by Black French communities to the hypocrisy of the French state.  
                                                          
303 The international attention brought to the banlieue in 2005 fostered a growing body of scholarship that 
examined these uprisings within transnational frameworks and attempted to connect them to the mounting tide 
of urban conflict with police forces across the globe. French journalist Bernard Cassen’s description of the urban 
unrest as “The “French Katrina” made use of the word “riot” to offer a violent binary between “the “French” and 
“culturally different” immigrants in the banlieue. Leading Francophone literary scholar, Dominic Thomas in Africa 
and France challenges both Cassen’s use of the term “riot” and his analytic framework of opposing racial and 
cultural binaries between the French state and African migrants that engendered a wave of combative and 
defensive forms of state intervention, 62. Thomas notes the linguistic baggage of calling the uprisings “riots” and 
has actively resisted this term. Furthermore, he has re-interpreted Cassen’s use of the term “French Katrina” to 
draw a parallel between the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the socioeconomic, 
cultural and political disaster of the France’s own making in reaction to the 2005 uprisings.  
304 See, "N 2957 - Proposition De Loi De M. François Grosdidier Visant Renforcer Le Controle Des Provocations La 
Discrimination, La Haine Ou La Violence." Assemblée nationale. March 14, 2006. http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/propositions/pion2957.asp for more on the proposed law. Ultimately, the law did not pass. See, 





Embodied in its lyrics and visual art, conscious Hip Hop voiced the concerns and visions of 
second-generation Black migrants. 
Since 2005, a subset of Hip Hop scholars focused on French rap as a commercial 
phenomenon. Others examined the transnational connections between France and America and 
the ways in which the first borrows heavily from the stylistic influences of the latter. Most 
recently, scholarly attention has turned toward emphasizing the connections between France and 
Africa.305 Analysis of the lyrical content, instrumentation and album covers demonstrated the 
depth of rappers' connection to their African roots.  Ranging from the use of indigenous words in 
Bambara, Lingala and Wolof to sampling the work of key African artists such as Fela Kuti, the 
presence of Africa in French Hip Hop is ubiquitous. In advocating for Black French rappers that 
accentuated their connection to Africa, Musicologist Veronique Helenon contends that “songs 
entirely dedicated to this theme are rarely among the most promoted by mainstream radio 
stations.”306 In stark contrast to Helenon’s assertion, this analysis intervenes that rappers tackling 
issues of visibility, identity and racism and discrimination did reach mainstream society.  This 
movement is seen most clearly by the career of MC Solaar. This section contends that Hip Hop 
facilitated a new evolution within Black French identity pioneered by second generation Black 
French migrants. Rappers’ lyrics and thematic content continually challenged negative narratives 
                                                          
305 Veronique Helenon, "Africa on Their Mind: Rap, Blackness, and Citizenship in France” in The Vinyl Ain’t Final: 
Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture, edited by Basu, Dipannita, and Sidney J. Lemelle (Pluto 
Press: 2006), 151-67. 
306 While there is some validity to this claim, it would be factually incorrect to say that songs dedicated to the 
theme of Africa are not promoted by radio. DKR (an abbreviation for Dakar) is a homage to the capital of Senegal 
and the homeland of French rapper, Booba’s father. This song debuted in the number #1 slot in France and stayed 
on the charts for 29 weeks. See Helenon, "Africa on Their Mind” in 151 and 
https://lescharts.com/showitem.asp?interpret=Booba&titel=DKR&cat=s for chart information on “DKR”.   
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about African communities generated by the French government and created a space to reject 
white French perceptions of superiority. 
MC Solaar’s rise to becoming France’s first international Hip Hop star was paved by a 
congruence of media (print, radio and TV) as well as a community of African diasporic 
populations. Paris functioned as a port of entry and exit for Hip Hop: a crossroads between 
America, Europe and Africa.  An American invention, the story of Hip Hop began in the Bronx 
in 1973. On a warm August day, Kool Herc was in charge of music for his sister’s back to school 
party. Using two turntables and two vinyls, Herc pioneered the method of scratching and 
extending the beat beyond the original song’s length. Hip Hop’s migration from New York to 
Paris began almost ten years later in 1982 with the arrival of the New York City Rap Tour. 
Sponsored by French station Radio 1, the tour was produced by Jean Karakos and Bernard 
Zekri.307   
On Saturday November 27, 1982, the New York City Rap tour arrived in France. Hip 
Hop artists performed in Paris at the Hippodrome de Pantin. Among the acts that night: Afrika 
Bambaataa served as one of deejays, the Infinity Rappers were the emcees and the Rock Steady 
Crew break danced.308 Adding to the spread of Hip Hop in France was the radio. Two hosts are 
credited with French infatuation with rap: DJ Sidney and DJ Dee Nasty.  Later in 1982, Sidney 
                                                          
307 Jean Karkos was the head of the Celluloid label in France and Bernard Zekri was the New York correspondent for 
French newspaper, Actuel.  For more on the tour see, Eric S. Charry, Hip Hop Africa: New African Music in a 
Globalizing World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 4-7.  
308 Other performers included: Grandmixer D.S.T. as a secondary deejay, the Double Dutch Girls, and several 
graffiti artists: Futura 2000, Phase 2, Ramelzee and Dondi. The tour and performance at the Bataclan was 
chronicled in the popular press by Jean-Pierre Thibaudat in Liberation magazine, “Une Semaine en Rap: Africa 
Bambataa, Roi Zoulou du Bronx.” Liberation. October 26, 1982, 20-21 and on television. Mr. Freeze from the Rock 




began his career in media as a host for Radio France (on Radio 7).309 His show aired weekly and 
could only be heard in Paris. Listeners recorded his shows and sold the tapes to Hip Hop 
enthusiasts living various Parisian banlieues.  
Sidney’s successful radio show paved the way for him to host a television show. H.I.P. 
H.O.P. was a weekly televised show dedicated to Hip Hop music and culture. The first broadcast 
aired on Sunday, January 14, 1984 on TF1.310 Although the show only lasted 43 weeks, it was 
crucial in spreading the influence and sounds of Hip Hop.311 Mainly a dance show, focusing on 
breakdancing and several aspects of freestyling, it was a platform for Hip Hop artists to perform 
as well.  Furthermore, the television show was the first hosted by a Black person in France.312 
Reflecting on the show’s influence on local youth, DJ Babaflex (who was a teen at the time and 
is now a prominent Parisian deejay) states, “We had the first Hip Hop TV show in the world, 
even before America… Much earlier than YO MTV Rap! That’s what introduced a lot of us to 
                                                          
309 In 1982, Sidney invited Afrika Bambaataa in his radio show during the New York City Rap Tour. Throughout the 
two-hour show, break-dancers taught participants how to break dance and graffiti artists created new pieces. 
Bambaataa appearance on Sidney’s radio show was crucial to establishing Sidney’s reputation and offering him 
authenticity. Just Bambaataa’s “presence…He didn’t really need to do anything more. And he helped give the show 
authenticity, like Futura 200. Futura 2000 would come and go these big graff[itti] pieces.” Sidney recounts the 
significance of Afrika Bambaata in James G. Spady, H. Samy Alim, and Samir Meghelli, Tha Global Cipha: Hip Hop 
Culture and Consciousness (Black History Museum Press, 2006), 287. 
310 In 1981, he hosted a radio daily program from 22h00 to midnight on Radio 7. His was one of the first daily 
shows dedicated to hip-hop in France alongside the show Lionel D (who became Dee Nasty several years later) on 
Radio Nova. Program director Marie-France Brière became a fan of Sidney’s show and suggested that he be the 
host of the television show which would become H.I.P. H.O.P.  See Eric S. Charry, Hip Hop Africa: New African 
Music in a Globalizing World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 5.  
311 Artists featured on the show included: Sugarhill Gang, Kurtis Blow, Afrika Bambaataa, The Rock Steady Crew 
and Art of Noise.  After the show’s conclusion, Hip Hop would migrate from the metropole to the periphery and 
would be embraced by the suburbs.  
312 Farida Chadri, "Oise: Sydney, L’incorrigible Défenseur De La Culture Hip-hop Est Sur Radio Mercure." Le Parisien. 




the culture of Hip Hop. We were proud to be the first.”313 Among the young viewers was a boy 
named Claude M’Barali, he would become MC Solaar. 
Born on March 5, 1969 in Dakar, Senegal, M’Barali and his family moved to the Parisian 
suburb of Saint-Denis six months later. Over the years, M’Barali lived in several suburbs 
including Maisons-Alfort, Villeneuve-Saint-Georges and Évry. At the age of twelve, he was sent 
to live with his uncle in Cairo for nine months. Over time, M’Barali was introduced to the music 
and ideology of Afrika Bambaataa. These principles served as a foundational part of his future 
lyricism.314 Inspired by Zulu Nation‘s call to “rap in [y]our native tongue and reflect daily 
realities,” M’Barali  took on the persona of MC Solaar.315 Bambaataa introduced French banlieue 
youth to rapping and breakdancing as a tool of liberation to combat the socioeconomic ills of 
living in the banlieue often deemed the French equivalent of the American ghetto. Although the 
influence of Zulu Nation was small and contained to a few banlieue communities, there were 
                                                          
313 DJ Babaflex (mid 40’s of Togolese and Algerian descent) in discussion with author. March, 29, 2017.  
314 "Q & A with MC Solaar." CNN. February 13, 2006. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/TRAVEL/02/03/cairo.qa/. In the 
interview, Solaar credits Zulu Nation with the start of his career. He states, “It all started with the Zulu Nation. 
Afrika Bambaataa came to France and it felt like we had a new family. We shared something together. That was 
the beginning. We tried to be the best at rapping, sometimes painting, sometimes dancing, sometimes turn-
tabling. And I chose rapping. I wanted to make music in which I was able to talk about life. I am very happy because 
I wanted to talk, and I am talking.”  




some rappers like Solaar who embraced this message.316  In the 2001 song, “Lève-toi Et Rap,” 
MC Solaar chronicles his migration from Senegal to France. 317 He raps, 
 
Born in Senegal, my two parents came from Chad 
Son of Sahel I had the aspirations of King Faad318 
But I came here to a foyer in Saint Denis 
With my brothers and sisters, we moved to Évry319 
My mother cleans hospitals 
She knows that knowledge will be my only ally320 
 
One of the central themes within the song is his identity as an immigrant. He describes himself as 
a beneficiary of his mother’s hard work and her sacrifices to give him a better life. Instilling 
within him a desire to be better educated and the hope of achieving the “French dream,” it was a 
notion carried by many African migrants in their journey to France.  
                                                          
316 Although the French chapter of Zulu Nation declined in prominence beginning in 1987, it is credited as a faction 
that brought both the art form of rap and the breakdancing as form of expression to France. This movement is 
detailed in Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-hop Culture in the Francophone World, edited by Durand, Alain-
Philippe. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005. Particularly in André J. M. Prévos’ chapter entitled “Two Decades of 
Rap in France: Emergence, Developments, Prospects,” 1-22.  
317 From the album, Cinquième as. Warner Music, 2001, CD. In Chapter One, the early novels of Camara Laye, 
Dadie, etc. are examples of early migration narratives. This section presents the song as a new iteration of a 
migration narrative set to music.  
318 This lyric is a reference to the Sahel the region between the Saharan desert to the north and the savannah in 
the North (locating him as a son of Africa). King Fahd was the ruler and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia until his 
death in 2005 (Fahd is used as a metaphor for greatness).  
319 Évry is a suburb located about fifteen miles south of Paris.  
320 His mother encouraged him to take his education seriously in order to leave the banlieue and rise above 
suburban poverty. Throughout the song, MC Solaar references the challenges he faces since his family moved to 
France. He discusses gang violence and street fights. Later in the song, he likens himself to Gandhi with the phrase: 
I'm puny like Gandhi and only kill in kilowatts. This is a reference to his “fight” against racism, economic inequality 
without the use of weapons to resolve the battle. Thus, the only weapon he needs is his mind (embodied in his use 
of the word “knowledge”).  
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A talented storyteller, MC Solaar narrates the experiences of being an immigrant in Paris. 
These experiences are chronicled in the second verse of the song. 
Back then skinheads openly roamed in Paris  
If you were an immigrant, better not call for help321 
But instead make sure to keep the same course 
Maybe because one day a guy told me “Go on, stand up and rap” 
 
Upon M’Barali’s return from Cairo, he earned his baccalauréat (equivalent to a high 
school diploma) and went on to study languages and philosophy at Jussieu University. 
Simultaneously with his educational endeavors, MC Solaar pursued a career as a rapper.322 
Releasing his debut album in 1991, Qui Sème le Vent Récolte le Tempo became the first rap 
album to earn platinum status selling over 500,000 copies in France. The album’s title “He who 
sows the wind reaps the tempo” is a pun on the Biblical passage, “he who sows the wind reaps 
the whirlwind” (Hosea 8:7). In addition to the chart-topping and light-hearted songs Bouge de là 
and Caroline, Solaar also released tracks that spoke to the experiences of Black French 
populations in the suburbs.  
Solaar released his album the same year that the Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, decried 
Black people living in the suburbs as loud, smelly and driving their neighbors mad.323 Solaar 
                                                          
321 Referring to “back then,” MC Solaar recalls the period in the 80’s when a fight led several African gangs to face 
off with members of the skinhead movement. Further in the song, he references this again, “Getting me to join a 
gang? Yo, you crazy or what?”  After witnessing this violence, he does not be to be victim or perpetrator of 
violence. His reference to “help” is a double entendre. Solaar raps it was not necessary to shout "for help.” So he 
tells listeners that given the atmosphere, they should not ask for help around you, but "help" can also be 
understood. The lyric has a deeper meaning in reference to being an immigrant. Typically, youth were warned to 
avoid association with foreign origins and aspire to remain discreet. 
322 Claude’s rap name "MC Solaar" came from combining his graffiti tags "SOAR" and "SOLAAR" 
323 In a speech in Orleans, France, Chirac said there was an “overdose of foreigners in France and that ‘having 
Spanish, Polish and Portuguese workers in the country posed fewer problems than having Muslims and blacks 
that…lived within three or four wives and 20 or so children in council flats, earning three times more in social 
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contends with the socioeconomic and cultural conditions of his neighborhood, “I come from the 
south of the capital of the city called Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, northern district ... Hardcore.324 
He juxtaposes the “hardcore” conditions of the suburbs with aspirations for success. Villeneuve-
Saint-Georges is also the hometown of several soccer players and rappers.  His triumph as a, 
“pro, prophet…Professor, poet, prodigy,” is further pronounced in the song “Armand is dead.”325 
In this reversal of fortune, the suburbs are also a place where ruin is just as prevalent as success. 
Armand is an everyday guy from the “hood” that once had it all: a job, a wife and family. Solaar 
chronicles his tale, 
Armand was having a good time 
Until he had an accident at work, and got some compensation 
He found another job, then is fired 
Invited to his wife’s wedding 
Armand lost custody of his children in court 
It’s too late to be interested in his sad fate 
Armand is dead326 
 
                                                          
security payments than the combined wage of an average couple without working…If you add to that the noise and 
the smell, French workers were understandably driven mad.” (Emphasis added by author).See Jennifer 
Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2014), 100; P. Fysh, The Politics of Racism in France (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 
2016), 72-74 and “Le débat sur l’immigration Le maire de Paris: ‘Il y a overdose.’” Le Monde, June 21 1991. 
Available at http://www.lemonde.fr. 
324 MC Solaar. Quartier Nord. Polydor, 1991, CD.  Casey in her song entitled, “Banlieue Nord”, also expresses these 
experiences of living in the northern suburbs. She raps, “Northern suburbs remain first in being hardcore/First in 
the producing the strongest rap/First in police and their reinforcement/The northern suburbs put the whole world 
on his passport.” Casey. Banlieue Nord. Dooeen Damage, 2006, CD. 
325 “Armand is dead” used samples from Marvin Gaye’s “Inner City Blues (Makes Me Wanna Holler).” From his 
revolutionary album, What’s Going On, “Inner City Blues,” Marvin Gaye details life in the American ghetto, the 
socioeconomic realities of the Black people living within these urban settings and its impact on their emotional and 
mental health.  These themes are extrapolated for a French context within Solaar’s song.  
326 MC Solaar. Armand Est Mort. Polydor, 1991, CD. 
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After losing his job due to an accident at work, Armand finds a new job and is quickly fired 
presumably due to the injuries he sustained from his previous job.327 When he runs out of 
money, he is “abandoned by his wife and dog Albert.” She later remarries and he loses custody 
of his children. Broken by the hardships of life, Armand ends up in a psychiatric asylum where 
he is a tool of medical experimentation. The doctors perform a lobotomy that ultimately fails to 
cure his “mental illness.” By the song’s conclusion, Armand is homeless and commits suicide.  
The tale of Armand is a story of an ordinary man who lost it all and is consumed by misfortune. 
Solaar upbraids the audience for not caring as they witnessed Armand’s fall from grace. Their 
apathy resulted in his death so they can feel no sense of remorse or sadness. This heartbreaking 
narrative details the vulnerability of Black men in the French migrant labor ecosystem where 
their labor is expendable and a single injury could ultimately result in premature death.   
 In a follow-up album recorded in 1996, Paradisiaque turns Solaar’s attention from 
socioeconomic exploitation to political hypocrisy. In his rebuttal of right-wing political rhetoric 
that the suburbs are dirty, dangerous and unwelcoming, he extends an invitation, “Come to the 
hood to find heaven.”328  Using a series of metaphors, he analyzes the French political system 
and its duality in the treatment of Black peoples living in the suburbs commenting on police 
                                                          
327 The French government kept relatively ambiguous statistics on the nationality of foreign workers that suffered 
accidents at work. However, over a five-year period from 1971-1976, over one million accidents occurred at the 
workplace each year. The percentage of foreign victim’s averaged 21-22% each year and these numbers do not 
include clandestine workers of which Sub-Saharan migrants increasingly fell into this category. Nor does this report 
consider accidents that were not reported due to employing non-regularized or “illegal” immigrants. See the 
following reports for working conditions of foreigners, M. Gentili, “Aspects épidémiologiques des migrants en 
France,” Bulletin d’ Institut National de la Santé et le Recherche Médicale, No. 26, 1971 and Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salaries and a report concerning Sub-Saharan migrants, Christian Poiret, 
“L’immigration familiale d’ Afrique Noire et Region Ile de France: Famille et Habitat au Coeur des mutations,” 
Association Vivre-La-Ville Ingenierie Urbaine et Sociale, December 1994.  
328 MC Solaar. Paradisiaque. Polydor, 1997, CD. 
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brutality, crime and unemployment. In one verse, he emphasizes the duplicity of French 
politicians. On one hand, elected officials like former Parisian mayor Jacques Chirac criticize 
these neighborhoods as urban cesspools while simultaneously campaigning in them. He raps:     
The mayor markets a few catchphrases in the ‘hood 
And then parents go and give him their vote  
He makes neat speeches and offers happiness like a Reciprok video329 
Throwing his hands up and prancing around to get elected 
To each his own heaven 
 
In this searing critique, Solaar chastises the mayor’s Janus-faced behavior and the first-
generation of parents who believe his circus act.  He resigns himself to the fact that everyone has 
their own interpretation of “heaven.” Moreover, he is openly critical of both the political system 
and members of the first-generation that sought acceptance by the system. Instead, Solaar has his 
own vision, “my heaven is seeing kids grow up, and sheltering them from the rain…to turn hell 
into heaven.”  
This growing disjuncture between the first and second generation is also expressed by the 
rapper Hamed Daye. Born in the 12th arrondissement to Malian parents, Daye moved to the 
suburbs of Val-d’Oise at 11 years old. Reflecting on his father’s journey from Mali to Paris in 
the 1990’s, he recounts his father’s hellish experience living in “ramshackle immigrant housing 
projects, with one shower per floor and over-crowded rooms.”  While Hamed credits his father’s 
persistence, he chose not to re-live these experiences. He states, “My father’s generation would 
rather submit while wheeling and dealing on the side. I call it a moral imbalance. It’s all these 
frustrations that made us so arrogant. Our generation doesn’t want to shut up and we demand 
                                                          
329 Reciprok is a French hip-hop group from the 1990’s.   
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equality of treatment.”330 As this first generation of male rappers became international rap icons, 
they used their lyrics to demand justice.  A second generation of rappers led by women also 
commanded attention in their fight against racism and sexism in France.  
As a musical genre, Hip Hop is often criticized as a bastion of misogyny.331 In the new 
millennium, Black French women emcees challenged the sexist lyrics and gendered roles within 
Hip Hop culture. One of the female rappers pushing back against this categorization is Bams.332 
Criticizing the commercialization of Hip Hop in France, Bams states, “Rap is a musical 
movement [just] like jazz or rock and [it’s] varied. It's just that the industry and the press likes 
people, particularly black or brown people, who fit the format.” In an interview discussing 
sexism within the music industry, Bams clarifies, “'Rap's no more sexist than rock, where women 
have well-defined roles too…Women in rock are always either fragile and in need of protection 
or wearing ripped clothes and sexual objects of desire.” For her, the difference between white 
female rock stars and Black female rappers is their commercial success when they do not 
conform to standard tropes. She laments, “What I do is moderately successful, but I am too adult 
and too intelligent for the industry.”333 Unlike Black French male rappers that achieved 
mainstream success on the airwaves and international acclaim, very few Black French women 
                                                          
330 See Helenon, "Africa on Their Mind”, 156 and an interview by L’Affiche, No. 89 (February 2001).  
331 Unlike many other Black French commercial rappers, MC Solaar recognizes that much of Hip Hop industry is 
“sexist.” See Phil Daoust, "Rapper MC Solaar Talks to Phil Daoust." The Guardian. May 03, 2004. 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2004/may/03/popandrock.  
332 Dupont Pascal, "Les Filles S'emparent Du Rap." L’Express. November 26, 1998. 
https://www.lexpress.fr/informations/les-filles-s-emparent-du-rap_631318.html.  




rappers duplicate their counterpart’s commercial success. This is in part due to their challenge of 
gendered stereotypes.  
Known as a free-style rapper, Bams grew up in the Parisian suburbs. She credits her 
introduction to rap to her roots in Cameroon.  Her rapper name comes from Bamileke, an ethnic 
group located in the Northwest region of Cameroon. While in Cameroon, members of the village 
“practice bensikin, a traditional song. People swing from one foot to the other, then, in turn, enter 
the circle and improvise a stanza. It’s like their rap.”334 Employing the techniques learned in 
Cameroon, she found a community of fellow female rappers including: Sté Strausz, K-Reen, 
Princess Aniès, Bee Djy, Casey, Diams and Viv. Embracing their African roots and challenging 
the “all-boys club” of Hip Hop culture, the popular press deemed their songs “black 
manifestos… [delivered] with force and conviction.”335 Bams links her embrace of African 
ancestry, desire to rap and opposition to sexist rhetoric in her song, “Si Je Rap,” (Yes I rap) 
I'm the rap Nikita…336 
I rap the same way you eat 
But I do not forget the things I'd like to see change 
And yes I rap for my family in Cameroon 
I keep in mind the injustices I want to see avenged 
I’m starving, I dream of a better world 
Where my parents’ distress, passion, courage will give me honor 
Will get me out of this stench of infernal morality that saturates my mood  
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336 Nikita is a reference to a French film by Luc Besson. Starring Anne Parillaud, Nikita is a convicted felon that 
accepts as new identity as a secret police assassin. The film was repurposed for an American audience with the 
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Likening her rapping skills to that of a trained assassin, Bam pairs ethnic pride with avenging 
injustice. Recognizing the experiences of her parents, she refuses to let their sacrifices go 
unnoticed. The song empowers people to “move, think, [and] change.” While calling attention to 
issues within the Black community, she also challenges male rappers that “rap for glory, show, 
women, power and weed.” Viewing music as a tool of liberation and uplift, she contends that 
rappers discussing such frivolous topics should be, “prosecuted for malice.” For her, the 
“dangers” of police brutality, crime, drugs, and poverty are too great to not use one’s platform to 
address these social ills. 337 While expressing her disdain for a lack of action on the part of Black 
French male rappers and society, she also opposes political and economic systems which oppress 
African migrants.  French linguist André Prévos argues that Black French female rappers like 
Bams, “saw themselves…as natural commentators and observers of a seldom seen and largely 
ignored world where poverty, violence, and despair are prevalent…as voices of a criticism of 
French society at large and of the establishment, as well as of its normal forces which led to the 
personal and social situations they had to face.”338 Facing these various forces, Black French 
women Hip Hop artists link systemic racial oppression with gendered domination.  
In her song entitled, “A Woman’s Pain,” Bams narrates the experiences of women since 
the Biblical fall of Adam and Eve. A poignant feminist manifesto, she cites Adam’s blame of 
Eve for eating the apple as the beginning of a long history in which men abuse women. Bams 
raps, “Nothing changes, history just repeats itself.” This cycle has continued to the present. 
Women are subject to, “depression, disgrace… rape, aggression,” at the hands of men. She raps, 
                                                          
337 Bams, Si Je Rap. Tréma, 1999, CD. 
338 André J. M. Prévos, "The Evolution of French Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the 1980s and 1990s." American 
Association of Teachers of French 69, no. 5 (April 1996): 713-25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/397134.  
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“My only compensation is that I was born a woman and you will bury me as a wife.”339  These 
lyrics reflect a resistance to heteronormative constraints normalized in society. Coinciding with 
the political activism of Madjiguène Cissé and her involvement with the sans-papier movement, 
Black women’s musical and socio-political voices complicate norms that emphasize their racial 
identity over gender.  Their emphasis on womanhood and Blackness represent a new iteration of 
Black French migrant identity that links intersectionality with social protest.340 These 
intergenerational efforts by Black women contend with systems of structural and interpersonal 
oppression. Consequently, their vocal reproach of institutional and communal oppressive 
systems of power reveal that gender is at the heart of various experiences of Black empowerment 
and disempowerment in recent French history. Most importantly, their early strivings form the 
basis of a new wave of sociopolitical activism led by Black French women in the post-2005 era.  
Outside of the United States, France serves as the largest worldwide market for Hip 
Hop.341 This cultural art form produced rap stars of African descent that gained substantial 
monetary and cultural influence in France. Their economic and social clout in the Black 
community is only rivaled by France’s soccer stars, many of them also born and raised in the 
Parisian suburbs. For many Black youths the road out of the economically-disadvantaged 
suburbs leads to two main paths: soccer or music. In the wake of 2005, a new generation of 
entrepreneurs are expanding this trail to economic freedom.  
                                                          
339 Bams. Douleur De Femme. Tréma, 1999, CD. 
340 French rapper Casey further challenges this narrative by discussing communal resistance to lesbianism in her 
2006 album, Tragédie d'une trajectoire  and follow-up 2009 album, Ennemi de l'ordre/Hostile au stylo. 
341 Marcyliena Morgan and Dionne Bennett, "Hip-Hop & the Global Imprint of a Black Cultural Form." Daedalus140, 
no. 2 (2011): 184-185. 
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Chapter Three: A Niche of their Own: Afro-French Employment and Entrepreneurship 
 
On the tenth anniversary of the 2005 uprisings, scholars and reporters canvassed the 
Parisian suburbs of Seine-Saint-Denis and Clichy-sous-Bois searching for signs of progress. In 
an interview, Mikael—the son of a Congolese immigrant and a white French woman—reflected 
on what the events signified to him. At the time, Mikael was the same age as Bouna Traoré and 
lived in a banlieue neighboring Clichy-sous-Bois. The day after Traoré died, Mikael experienced 
his first contrôle d’identité on his walk home from school. Police forced Mikael to the local 
station for further questioning and detained him for a day and a half, informing his parents that 
he had been arrested for burning cars in the neighborhood as part of the protests. Mikael still 
maintains his innocence.  Unlike Traoré and Benna, who died trying to avoid a contrôle —
Mikael survived this encounter with the police but he notes that police continue to target young 
Black and Arab males. The overwhelming attitude Mikael feels is one of sameness. “It’s crazy,” 
he states, “because nothing has changed.”342 
 In a series of interviews conducted by reporters, they asked participants to reflect on 
their memories of the 2005 uprisings. Mady Traoré laments, “It was hot, so hot.” Recalling 
images from the age of fourteen, he states, “Everywhere, stuff was burning - cars, vans, 
buildings. That’s what I think of when I think of the riots. I think of the heat.” In contrast with 
Mikael, Mady asserts that progress has been made since the urban uprisings that destroyed a 
significant portion of his neighborhood. Currently twenty-four years old, Traoré works as an 
information clerk for Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF), the French state-
                                                          
342 Mikael, in discussion with the author. October 28, 2015. 
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owned railway. Resolute in his progress, he states, “if you really want to get on, then you can get 
on - and I’m proud of the work I do.”343 Nadira Achab was thirteen in 2005, she remembers, 
“watching from the window, seeing buses burning, cars burning, everyone worried that their cars 
would be torched…I remember the police, the climate of fear and not being allowed to go 
outside.”344 Ten years later, she is another banlieusard success story.345 At the age of twenty-
three, she is a business school student and co-founder of the association Our Estate Has Talent, 
which encourages local youth to continue post-secondary education. She states the mission of the 
organization is to “break the culture of failure.”346  
The term “banlieusard,” is often used pejoratively. It was repurposed as a sign of pride 
and inspiration for African peoples within Paris by the rapper Kery James in the 2008 song 
“Banlieusards.”347 The song’s music video features cameos from 1998 World Cup soccer player, 
                                                          
343Liam Halligan, "The heat rises in France's banlieues." The Telegraph. November 23, 2014. 
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344 Angelique Chrisafis, "'Nothing's changed': 10 years after French riots, banlieues remain in crisis." The Guardian. 
October 22, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after-french-
riots-banlieues-remain-in-crisis.  
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346 Chrisafis, "'Nothing's changed'" The Guardian. October 22, 2015.  
347 This shift is terminology is described by Sociolinguist, Christian Topalov. He notes, “A third type of response to a 
pejorative exonym was its adoption by those it stigmatized, transforming the stigma into a banner, as happened 
with the French word banlieue…The word was perceived as pejorative by some so much so that in 1899 the 
elected officials and prominent citizens from the district west of Paris wrote in a local newspaper; ‘Let us be bold 
banlieusards, since banlieusards is what they call us’…Nevertheless in twentieth century, with the considerable 
extension of the suburbs and their swelling population, the word banlieusards, generally kept its negative 
connation…It then disappeared altogether with the emergence of the ‘problème des banlieues [suburban 
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Lilian Thuram; clothing designer and business man Mohammed Dia; print and runway model 
Adama Diallo; award-winning actor Omar Sy; and TV personality Claudia Tagbo. All of these 
individuals grew up in Parisian banlieues and achieved mainstream and international success. 
Seen holding picture frames with their occupations written below, James uses their stories to 
send a message to youth growing up in the suburbs. He raps,  
‘Cause til this day, there’s two Frances who can deny that  
And I’m from the second France, 
The one with violence, instability, potential terrorists, helpless, on welfare 
That’s what they expect from us, but I got other plans  
May they remember this, I ain’t a victim, I’m a soldier  
Look at me, I’m black and I’m proud 
I manipulate the language of Moliere, mastering its letters  
French because France colonized my ancestors  
But my mind is free and Africa owes them no debt348 
 
The geographic separation between metropolitan Paris and the suburbs, the division between 
these “two Frances,” has sociopolitical and economic ramifications. James attacks popular 
stereotypes of the suburbs as violent, dangerous, a breeding ground for terrorists, filled with 
shiftless immigrants and dependent on the French system for their livelihood.  In the face of 
these stereotypes and expectations for their failure, James disavows this narrative of 
victimization. Instead, he takes pride in his blackness, his mastery of the French language and his 
ability to transcend the shackles of colonization.  He too is a story of progress despite popular 
narratives of regression. Throughout the song, James reflects on his ability to overcome the 
difficulties commonly associated with life in ghettoized spaces.  In the next verse, he outlines a 
                                                          
problems],’ which no longer referred to exhausted employees but to the unemployed ‘youth of the quartiers [poor 
neighborhoods].’” See Christian Topalov, "The Naming Process." In What's in a Name?: Talking about Urban 
Peripheries, edited by Richard Harris and Charlotte Vorms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 49-50.     
348 Kery James, "Banlieusards." In À Lombre Du Show Business. Warner Music France, 2008, CD. 
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political, social and economic system that remains the same in France. However, he suggests that 
the solution to overcoming this system can found within the ghetto itself. His vision of 
cooperative economics is further explained in the following verse:  
 
We are condemned to succeed  
To break through barriers, build careers  
See what our parents have accomplished  
What they suffered for our access to education  
Where would one be without their sacrifices?   
Of course, their work has merit  
How much I admire our fathers  
Laborers but proud  
If we ruin everything where is the respect?  
If we fail where is the progress?  
Every immigrant’s son is on a mission  
Every poor man's son must have ambition349 
 
Reversing the narrative of suburban failure, James alludes to their condemnation to succeed. By 
offering examples of success in various careers ranging from writers, architects, film directors, 
actors, athletes, entrepreneurs, activists, artists and teachers, the music video portrays that 
success is not limited to a specific occupation. The rapper reminds youth of their parents’ 
sacrifices to give them a better life and that they should keep this narrative of progress moving 
forward. Thus, Hip Hop became not only a mechanism for cultural uplift but it also serves as a 
forum to expound upon the virtues of entrepreneurial and financial success for Black French 
populations.  
In recognition of African migrant contributions to both the economy and French society, 
this chapter explores a new wave of Afropean entrepreneurship and economic self-empowerment 
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that subsequently took shape after the urban uprisings in 2005. Offering a counter-narrative to 
the socioeconomic marginalization of African migrants, this section marks the shift from a first 
generation “worker” identity to attempts at increasing the middle/upper class as Black French 
populations became more established and economically mobile.  Entrepreneurial efforts before 
2005 were characterized by a combination of street vendors and established businesses within 
predominantly immigrant neighborhoods that served local residents.350 In the new millennium, 
there is a shift in these business efforts to expand their spheres of influence. Exploring the lives 
of men and women who came to France to receive a degree and second-generation adults who 
subsequently graduated from French universities, these stories are central to expanding the 
narrative of opportunity and change for Black migrants beyond the banlieue uprisings of 2005. 
This chapter examines the establishment of businesses that bridge the gap between Afropean 
lives in France and a commitment to improving conditions in individual African nation-states. 
Using oral histories with various entrepreneurs in Paris, the following narrative surveys 
community attempts to circumvent French employment discrimination by creating their own 
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businesses and employing other people of African descent.351 Organized in three sections, this 
chapter grapples first with the historiographical origins of French economic decline. This 
segment analyzes the period after 1980 to contextualize shifts in the economy before and after 
the 2005 uprisings. The second section chronicles and analyzes the efforts of Black French 
entrepreneurs and their vision of economic uplift through the use of oral histories. Emerging 
from these narratives is a deeper sense of the institutional forces that complicate Black French 
entrepreneurship and participation in the economic market while also outlining how a younger 
generation of Black French individuals seize economic success as a form of political advocacy 
and belonging. The chapter concludes with a consideration of both the opportunities and 
limitations of Black Capitalism as a model for success.     
As entrepreneurs endeavored to create a space of their own to service Black communities 
and participate in the French economy, their increasing visibility challenges the contours of 
spatial marginalization. By analyzing several examples of economic empowerment that emerged 
after the 2005 rupture point, these stories reveal not only the ways in which narratives of 
economic disempowerment shaped popular attitudes toward the uprisings; but also the role of 
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Black Parisian communities in remedying the circumstances that led to uprisings through new 
efforts in economic cooperation and entrepreneurship.  
This analysis offers a reinterpretation of economic marginalization as the primary 
explanation for urban uprisings. The blue-collar labor migration that characterized the earliest 
waves of Sub-Saharan immigration to France evolved in the new millennium in order to contend 
with the modern market economy. These developments in the form of access to the internet, 
increased social capital and professionalization offer a parallel story to the dominant narrative of 
economic stagnation and retrenchment. By examining a variety of entrepreneurial efforts, this 
chapter foregrounds the agency of Black communities and complicates the dominant 
interpretation of historians and the press regarding the economic legacy of the 2005 urban 
uprisings. Afro-French entrepreneurial efforts shed light on one of the critical ways that migrants 
and citizens interact with the French state. 
The 2005 uprisings called attention to the fact that systemic changes needed to be made 
at the political, social and economic level in France. Pundits and policymakers outlined various 
reasons for this explosion of fury. However, they focused very closely on the depressed French 
economy. This chapter does not deny the grave material conditions that exist within the 
outermost arrondissements and the banlieues.352 Instead, it contextualizes these material 
conditions within a longer economic history of swelling social service costs and a shrinking 
                                                          
352Gurvan Kristanadjaja, "Paris: manifestation tendue après la mort d'un homme d'origine chinoise tué par la 
police." Libération, March 28, 2018. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/03/28/paris-manifestation-tendue-
apres-la-mort-d-un-homme-d-origine-chinoise-tue-par-la-police_1558795; "Marche pour la paix dans le XIXe 
arrondissement." Le Figaro, November 24, 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/11/24/97001-
20171124FILWWW00125-marche-pour-la-paix-dans-le-19eme-arrondissement-le-25-novembre.php; Ivan Rioufol, 




workforce. Central to these arguments were the ramifications of failing state initiatives to 
integrate the Black population within the socioeconomic context of France. This negligence 
caused the marginalization of non-white peoples, planting the seeds of both economic and social 
discontentment. Accordingly, African migrants responded to this rejection by the state with 
communal empowerment efforts and innovative entrepreneurial ventures. From the ashes of 
violence and economic implosion, a growing group of men and women are using the resources 
available to carve a niche of their own. In a variety of industries and servicing a large cross-
section of Parisians citizens, Afro-French entrepreneurs are working within and outside of the 
dismal economic climate of France.   
 
The Origins of Urban Crisis: The Demise of the French Economy 
The evolution of the French economy after 1980 and especially after 2005 remains a 
subject for debate among historians as well as constant quarrels between social scientists and 
economic scholars. Two critical interpretations populate these discussions. The first contends 
that the decline of the French economy persisted long after the 1973 oil crisis and destabilized 
the labor market, which led to persistent high unemployment.353 The second, grapples with 
France’s acceptance of globalization and its resistance to adapting economic, political and 
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France (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008).  
158 
 
cultural practices that challenge conceptions of statist universalism.354 In the most recent 
literature, scholars use France as a case study to examine capitalism under the countervailing 
pressures of social and political conflict.355  Published one year before the 2005 uprisings, 
historian Tim Smith offered an alternative position. He argued that the French state’s 
unwillingness to implement more inclusive fiscal policies were ultimately to blame for economic 
dislocation, particularly among non-white youth.356  
In 2005, the explosion of popular discontent propelled discussions about the economic 
state of the country. Indeed it became the subject of exigent national and international study. 
Scholars and popular commentators isolated two main causes for these events: a legacy of 
discontentment over the process of colonization and the ongoing marginalization that came from 
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Lévy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2013); Stéphane Hessel, Time for Outrage: 
Indignez-Vous! (New York, NY: Twelve, 2011). 
356 Smith intervenes that many of France’s socio-economic problems are the direct result of social, fiscal, taxation 
and economic policies that protect the upper-half of the income ladder at the expense of youth, women, 
immigrants and the unemployed. He contends that the majority of “social spending” serves to strengthen existing 
inequalities instead of reducing them. These inequalities include: an aging population, the rise of the working poor, 
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internal colonization within France. As the events unfolded, the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC) organized an international forum for scholars to examine the uprisings’ genesis. In order 
to offer their expert opinions in “real-time,” the Council encouraged scholars to participate in a 
web forum. The majority of the essays published by the SSRC were written after the French 
government declared a state of emergency on November 8, 2005. Thus, their work symbolizes a 
sense of urgency on the part of scholars but also a widening sea of disagreement with the French 
government’s response to these incidents.  By chronicling the failures of policymakers and 
politicians in addressing these “root causes,” scholars challenged France’s commitment to 
progress.  
The SSRC Forum reviewed the French government’s response to the 2005 uprisings.  
Categorizing its actions as “swift” and “predictable,” they focused on the activities of Minster of 
Interior Nicolas Sarkozy.  After Sarkozy declared a “zero tolerance” policy towards urban 
violence, the civil unrest continued. Over the course of several weeks more than 2,900 
individuals were arrested, 126 police and firefighters were injured, almost 9,000 cars were set 
aflame and dozens of public buildings were damaged amounting to almost 200 million euros in 
damage.357 Sarkozy increased military powers by deploying “law and order” rhetoric. In order to 
support his extensive use of police force, he vilified the banlieue as a hotbed of illegal 
immigration, Muslim extremism and polygamy. Countering this official narrative, scholars used 
their work as a corrective measure to offer a more accurate portrayal of the undercurrents 
culminating in urban uprising. Historians, economists, psychologists and other social scientists 
redirected attention from the government’s focus on social deviance to offering concrete 
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examples of social and economic exclusion, racial discrimination and lackluster responses by the 
government on these issues.358  
These scholarly examinations of urban unrest among Black and Arab youths were 
juxtaposed with white French expressions of discontent over the sordid state of the economy. 
Two months after the deaths of Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré, another set of protests began in 
Paris and various provincial cities. In January 2006, a new law entitled the First Employment 
Contract sparked a wave of massive demonstrations.359 Proposing lower wages and redrafting 
legislation to erode certain labor rights, French workers deemed this law a threat to their civil 
liberties. Over a million predominantly white French individuals participated in these protests 
including two mass marches on March 7th and March 19th.360  In addition to these “peaceful 
protests” there was also “extensive and violent rioting by youths, strikes and occupations of 
French universities, and levels of violence that at moments recalled the suburban unrest several 
months earlier.”361 The Sarkozy administration repealed the law in response to this public 
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outcry.362 In stark contrast to its response to the employment law protests of 2006, the French 
government, failed to address “the ever growing crisis of social exclusion and racism affecting 
the French suburbs.  No parliamentary commission has been convened to understand the [2005] 
riots, and no major governmental policies have been proposed in response to the social problems 
revealed by the riots.”363    
This failure to address the social and economic inequalities impacting non-white 
residents of France was further emphasized by scholars who stressed that participants in the 2005 
urban uprisings were not sans-papiers; instead, they were second-generation immigrant youth 
and their actions were a result of exclusion from republican rights guaranteed by the government. 
Inherently, an inadequate system was at the center of their discourse. Economist Bernard Salanié 
identified “one of the root causes of the [urban uprisings] as…the obscene low employment rate 
[40%] of the young in France, and especially of low-skilled young men.”364 These scholarly 
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interventions were echoed in the popular press. Television station France 24 noted the “chronic 
poverty and rampant unemployment” of non-white French populations in Paris living in the 
outer banlieues made them ripe for an uprising.365  Despite the fact that these suburbs have been 
the priority of national policy since 1996, government initiatives were largely unsuccessful in 
redressing economic and spatial inequality. Categorized under three different “sensitive urban 
zones” headings: zone urbaine sensible (ZUS), zones de redynamisation urbaine (ZRU) and 
zones franches urbaines (ZFU) – suburban neighborhoods are classified by a number of social 
and financial factors including foreign status, education, family size and wage status.366 
Moreover, these zones contain the highest populations of non-white peoples within the Parisian 
metropolitan area. In the last census before 2005, unemployment rates within ZUS 
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neighborhoods were at 25% in comparison to a national average of 10%. Youth unemployment 
rates were at 40% versus a national average of 20-27%.367 Of the 750 ZUS areas, 27% percent 
lived in the “Paris conglomeration” composed of several suburban areas, most of which were 
impacted by the 2005 uprisings.368  
In the ten years following these events, French presidents Jacques Chirac, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and François Hollande all offered various stimulus packages to offset growing 
unemployment rates that began with the economic downturn in 1974.369 Two years after the 
urban uprisings, Sarkozy created the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National identity, and 
Co-development (2007-2010), this committee of policymakers focused on a series of bilateral 
reforms that studied population movements between Africa and Europe.370 The economic policy 
that emerged impacted both French and African international relations. A deeper consideration 
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of this economic relationship between France and several postcolonial African nations informs: 
the treatment of African immigrants, Black French citizens presumed to be migrants in France, 
and also the continuation of colonial economic policies in the postcolonial period. Dubbed la 
Françafrique, French economist François-Xavier Verschave explained, “the French thought that 
they were in the process of decolonization when in fact de Gaulle was doing all he could...to 
extend colonialism into the neocolonial period.”371  
This economic link between Africa and France is supported by a historical relationship 
that began in the colonial period but continued well into the twenty-first century. The historical, 
political and economic ties that connect Africa and France are repurposed by both Afro-French 
populations and the French state. In their process of self-identification, Black populations refuse 
to separate their socio-political, cultural and economic association with both locations. This 
linkage between Africa and France is also reformulated by French political strategists that target 
Black peoples as the locus of its migration anxieties and policymaking. In his explanation of 
mounting tensions in France, Sarkozy stated, “Immigration has become a central issue in 
relations between France and Africa; it is thus worth repeating that domestic and foreign policy 
cannot be decoupled when considering this question. French support has been concentrated on 
the idea of Eurafrica…”372 
                                                          
371 François-Xavier Verschave and Philippe Hauser, Au mépris des peuples: Le néocolonialisme franco-africain, 
entretien avec Philippe Hauser (Paris: Editions la Fabrique, 2004), 7. Verschave’s creation of the term Francafrique 
was an exercise in irony and wordplay. Finding its origins in the term France-Afrique used by former Ivorian 
President Félix Houphouët-Boigny to describe the positive relationship between newly independent African 
countries and the France in the years following decolonization, Verschave repurposes Boigny’s words to express 
the exploitative relationship between France and African countries in the postcolonial period. See François-Xavier 
Verschave, "L'Afrique soumise à la raison des affaires." Survie. January 19, 2001. 
https://survie.org/themes/francafrique/article/l-afrique-soumise-a-la-raison-des. 




 These sentiments were supported by a 2010 study in which “only 38% of the French 
population said that immigration is an opportunity in France, and their perceptions of 
immigrants’ impact on culture, labor markets and crime has been more negative.”373 Despite this 
overwhelming negative perception of African immigrants in France, the state is intricately linked 
to economic infrastructures in contemporary Francophone Africa.374 Scholarly study and the 
popular press have rightly highlighted the exploitive nature of Françafrique interactions. Their 
work details the nature of French profiteering, the unscrupulous extraction of African resources 
and the widespread corruption of African figureheads, who are protected from criminal charges 
by the French state.375 The reality is that “Africa [its resources, people and culture] continues to 
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sustain France as a national state as well as its capacity, within new global and European 
configurations, to maintain its status as a world power.” 376 The simultaneous dependency on 
African nation-state natural resources and the rejection of African peoples within France by 
national leaders demonstrates the imbalanced nature of these power relations.  
In response to these dual forces of oppression in Africa and France, a growing wave of 
Black French entrepreneurs use their businesses to return revenue back to Africa. Many of the 
businesses established by Afropeans maintain socio-economic and cultural ties to Africa in the 
face of the Françafrique system that continues to drain resources from the continent. A growing 
number of these businesses bring funds, employment opportunities and media attention to the 
creativity, experiences and historical legacies of African populations. This method of economic 
uplift draws attention to Françafrique’s neocolonial impact on Africa as a system that 
perpetuates cycles of poverty which in turn propels clandestine immigration to France in search 
of employment opportunity.377 Black French entrepreneurs call attention to their transnational 
activities through the creations of businesses that view Afropean identity as foundational to their 
business model and situated within a longer history of African contributions to both France and 
their native nation-states. This position is in stark contrast to Sarkozy’s understanding of African 
diasporic history and the conceptualization of Sub-Saharan identity.  In a speech delivered at 
University Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar, he stated  
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“I came to tell you that this African part and European part of yourselves form your torn 
identity…The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history. The 
African peasant, who for thousands of years have lived according to the seasons, whose 
life ideal was to be in harmony with nature, only knew the eternal renewal of time, 
punctuated by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this 
imaginary world where everything starts over and over again there is no place for human 
adventure or for the idea of progress.”378  
 
Joining the scholars, activists and journalists who have emphasized the inanity and gross 
minimization of Sarkozy’s understanding of African contributions to history, the following oral 
histories challenge the conceptualization of Africans as “peasants” and offer an analysis of Afro-
French businesses. These narratives examine how Black men and women bridge the gap between 
Africa and France economically, socially, politically and culturally.379 In the wake of 2005, 
Black French communities began to interact with the economy differently.  This shift coincided 
with significant technological change, increased access to the internet, e-commerce and the rise 
of the “gig economy.” As these developments took root, first and second generation Black 
French populations participated in these new trends.  However, second and third generation 
Afro-French residents have been particularly engaged in these developments as a means of 
pushing forward a mission of Black Capitalist economic advancement. 
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 Oral histories complicate and contextualize the meta-narrative of economic stagnation in 
the wake of 2005. Indeed, these stories offer a vision of Black Capitalism as a means of 
economic success. These accounts provide a window into a community mentalité that the 
archives fail to capture.  The interviews used in the following section highlight both the triumphs 
and challenges of navigating a struggling French economy. These stories reveal a collective 
history of migration, attempts at integration and frequent isolation within the workplace. The 
transformative experience of becoming an entrepreneur is an attempt to reclaim an element of 
self-determination often sequestered within the traditional French workspace and create more 
space for other Afropeans. Along the way, these men and women established businesses that 
reconnected them to their African roots. Many narrators cite replicating business models and 
drawing inspiration from African American entrepreneurs. Devoid of any Black French 
billionaires, there are several Afro-French millionaires including Élie Yaffa, Malamine Kone, 
Badiri Diakite and Kylian Mbappé.380 Undeterred by the dearth of Afro-French billionaires and 
multi-millionaires, interviewees acknowledge that growing numbers of individuals are opting out 
of joining Entreprises CAC 40 (the equivalent to the American Fortune 500 companies) and are 
instead creating their own businesses.  
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These oral histories represent narratives of hopeful upward economic mobility and 
community activism as well as counter-narratives of marginalization and intra-communal 
competition. Commentators contend that their individual advances do not offset collective Black 
French struggles with political and socio-economic gains. However, these stories document the 
uneven but rapidly expanding pace of economic growth amongst Afro-French entrepreneurs. 
Their collective actions can be grouped within five themes: experiences of socio-economic 
limitation; transnational movement; a connection to Africa through inheritance, politics and 
identity; a duty and responsibility to their individual families and larger ethnic community; and 

















Conceived in the shadows of familial exile, Kahi Lumumba is an heir to the African 
Revolutionary Struggle. He is the grandson of the martyred Patrice Lumumba, the first 
democratically elected prime minister of an independent Congo. Although he never met him, 
Kahi states that his grandfather represents “[a] kind of personal magic potion in which I draw 
values of courage and passion, as well as an unwavering faith in the strength of the African 
continent.”381 Born in 1984, he was raised in Belgium. He finished his high school education in 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In 2002, Lumumba moved to France to begin college. After completing his 
university education, he relocated to London for two years. During this time, he worked for 
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Figure 11. Kahi Lumumba photographed for a 2017 article in Jeune Afrique. 
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General Electric, the IT department of the Postal Bank and Gaz de France (GDF). The latter 
position allowed him to foster business relations between London and Paris.  
Despite the comfortable earnings, Lumumba felt “out of place” in the workplace.382 
Lacking a direct connection and impact on the African communities in London and Paris, he felt 
isolated in the Parisian business district known as La Défense.383 He states, “I knew I loved 
creating things but when you are at university you always dream to work for a big group.”384 
Despite achieving his dream to work for larger corporations, he admits that soon he became 
unmotivated. Lumumba reflects on these experiences by saying, “I knew I needed to be 
passionate about something on a daily basis to do my work well.” After working for these 
various companies, he realized that he wanted to be an entrepreneur.385   
In 2012, Kahi Lumumba created his company named Totem. A nod to its symbolism in 
African culture as emblematic of an animal or spirit being, this sacred object, the “Totem” began 
as “a webzine…so that young Africans could reclaim their own story."386 Dedicated to 
                                                          
382 Trésor Kibangula, "Innovation 2.0: Kahi Lumumba, influenceur panafricain." Jeune Afrique, August 10, 2017. 
383 Kibangula, "Innovation 2.0: Kahi Lumumba." 
384 Kahi Lumumba, in discussion with the author. April 4, 2017. This sentiment is echoed in study conducted by 
KPMG (one of the “big four” auditing companies), which states, “France has long been known for the high 
standards of our education system. However, this drive for excellence had an unexpected consequence that 
previously hindered early growth of entrepreneurialism: students learned through experience that there was no 
room for failure – especially not for those who wanted secure a good job or go on to an elite business school. The 
resulting risk-adverse mindset was largely incompatible with startup activity.” See François Bloch,"Rise of 
Entrepreneurship in France." KPMG. February 23, 2016. 
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2016/02/rise-of-entrepreneurship-in-france.html. 
385 Kahi Lumumba, in discussion with the author. April 4, 2017. 
386 John N. Oriji, "Transformations in Igbo Cosmology during Slavery: A Study of the Geneses of Place-Names, 
Totems & Taboos (Transformations Dans La Cosmologie Igbo Pendant L'esclavage: Une étude Des Genèses Des 
Noms De Lieu, Des Totems Et Tabous)." Cahiers D'Études Africaines 49, no. 196 (2009): 953-67. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40380044; Nadia Rabbaa, "Diaspora - Kahi Lumumba: sa voix veut porter le revival 
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promoting African creativity on a digital platform, the company expanded its website by adding 
history, lifestyle and conceptions of modernity content. Reflective of its demographic, Totem’s 
daily articles range from how to create a start-up to Beyoncé’s African influences. The business 
model promotes pairing African or Afropean digital influencers with major brands.387 Drawing 
from its large network of digital influencers, Totem assists both the influencer and the company 
create original content for the internet and various other digital platforms including Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat. Although the company is based in France, it has 
offices in Ivory Coast, Congo, Benin and Senegal.  
Since the company’s creation five years ago, African aesthetics have become en vogue. 
Multi-billion dollar media and technology industries have increasingly discovered a new home in 
Africa. Seeking to tap into new markets across the continent, international companies have 
turned a frenzied gaze toward an African el dorado.388 Despite the hundreds of companies that 
have flocked to take a stake in Africa, Kahi is not worried about the fate of his company. He 
states, "The multiplication of media focused on Africa does not bother me, on the contrary, it is a 
                                                          
africain." Le Point Afrique. July 28, 2015. http://afrique.lepoint.fr/culture/diaspora-kahi-lumumba-sa-voix-veut-
porter-le-revival-africain-28-07-2015-1953001_2256.php. 
387 These brands include: Dove, Air France, Canal+ Afrique, Axe, Heineken, ECAir, ViaMondo, AfriknFusion, Société 
Générale, CFAO, Orange Money Diaspora and Accor Hotels.  
388 For a detailed description of media and technological efforts in Africa see Larisa Epatko, "How the emerging 
tech hubs of Africa are getting connected to Silicon Valley." PBS. December 21, 2017. 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/nonprofit-touts-the-emerging-tech-hubs-of-africa-and-their-inventors; 
Matteo Maillard, "Mamadou Dramé, pionnier des nouvelles technologies « Made in Africa »." Le Monde Afrique. 
March 9, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/03/09/mamadou-drame-pionnier-des-nouvelles-
technologies-made-in-africa_4879321_3212.html; "Technology may help compensate for Africa's lack of 




good thing for all Africans hungry for information." 389 This competition has propelled his new 
business strategy. Creating a niche of his own, Lumumba blends a series of platforms for 
information dissemination including a magazine format, a blog and a web-TV series called 
“African Geek” that tackles African clichés.390 Using these short films, he hopes to spread a 
“positive image of the continent” to help his target audience of Afropeans be proud of their 
layered identities and facilitate connections between the continent of Africa and countries where 
members of the African diaspora currently reside. 
This ambition to revolutionize the communications industry in Africa can be seen most 
clearly in Lumumba’s newest venture called ADICOM Days (Africa Digital Communication).  
In March 2017, he gathered 400 of the most recognizable African influencers in Paris for the first 
time. Over two days, thirty speakers discussed social media trends, brand content and marketing 
strategies. The conference culminated in the presentation of ADICOM Awards, which 
recognized individuals and brands for their creativity, talent and innovation in African digital 
communication.391 On the last day, he unveiled TINA, a digital marketing influence platform for 
                                                          
389 Kahi’s rise has been chronicled by Forbes Afrique, Africa 24, and TV5 Monde. See Nadia Rabbaa, "Diaspora - 
Kahi Lumumba: sa voix veut porter le revival africain." Le Point Afrique. July 28, 2015. 
http://afrique.lepoint.fr/culture/diaspora-kahi-lumumba-sa-voix-veut-porter-le-revival-africain-28-07-2015-
1953001_2256.php. For media citations see: Africa24. L'invite du jour avec Kahi Lumumba, expert en nouvelles 
technologies. YouTube. August 26, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tkfpENQP5w; Viviane Forson, 
"Totem World, premier "pure player" de l'actualite afro-caribéenne." Forbes Afrique, March 2015, 24-26; TV5 
Monde. L'Afrique en marche avec Dycosh. YouTube. November 01, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jElNEGt0Urg. 
390 Nadia Rabbaa, “Diaspora - Kahi Lumumba: sa voix veut porter le revival africain."  
391 "ADICOM Days, le rendez-vous digital." My Afro Week. March 2017. 
https://myafroweek.com/evenement/adicom-days-rendez-digital-afrique/. For more information on the ADICOM 
Days see Trésor Kibangula, "#AdicomDays2017: les influenceurs africains à l’honneur à Paris, « Jeune Afrique » 
primé – JeuneAfrique.com." Jeune Afrique. March 03, 2017. 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/408743/societe/adicomdays2017-influenceurs-africains-a-lhonneur-a-paris-jeune-
afrique-prime/ and Kahi Lumumba, "Il est grand temps de miser sur la créativité des influenceurs africains." 
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Africa. The first of its kind, TINA connects companies and advertisement agencies with more 
than 600 African influencers across the continent directly on the site.392 The success of 
ADICOM Days and his various business ventures propelled Lumumba to move to Abidjan and 
host the second edition of the conference there in 2018.  
During his final months in Paris, Kahi insisted that this move was not permanent instead, 
moving to Africa would help him continue to expand his business on the continent but also “keep 
a foot in France.”393  He cites two reasons for this type of transnational movement: the first is a 
business point of view, “we cannot ignore that the largest companies we work with have their 
headquarters in France. So, if you want to conduct business and broker new deals, you need to 
negotiate them in Paris even if the project will happen in Africa.” The second reason is 
connected to his perception of African development. He contends that his travels to France, the 
United States, and Brazil provide him with the inspiration to come back to Africa with new ideas 
and an expanded vision of African diasporic communities. He uses the following metaphor to 
explain the future of his company, “If we were to say the world is a restaurant, then you have to 
sit down at this global table and talk with the others. That’s the way I see it. That’s why it’s 
                                                          
Stratégies. November 6, 2016. http://www.strategies.fr/blogs-opinions/idees-tribunes/1050358W/il-est-grand-
temps-de-miser-sur-la-creativite-des-influenceurs-africains.html.  
392 Intent on promoting African creativity internationally, Lumumba has experimented with various platforms to 
help non-African companies use and promote African voices, faces and personalities in their advertising content. 
This venture is essential to changing the ways in mainstream Western companies promote their products and how 
they interact with African populations. Moving past historically stereotypical or colonial campaigns (see Uncle Ben, 
Banania, and Woolite), Totem allows for influencers and companies to work together to create content that is 
reflective of modern and borderless Africa. 
393 Kahi Lumumba, in discussion with the author. April 4, 2017. 
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important to stay open-minded, travel, connect with others and bring that knowledge back to 
Africa.394  
Although Totem’s mission to help all the “creatives” in Africa monetize their gift is far 
from complete, Kahi Lumumba’s confidence is unwavering. He asserts that the growth of Afro-
French entrepreneurs in Paris is a positive development. The existence of business men and 
women in different industries including fashion, food, and media is suggestive of a socio-
economic evolution for the Black community. He states, “I think the next generation is even 
more optimistic than the one before. They are benefiting from the work of their parents who 
came from Africa to France to create a better life for themselves and their family. They worked 









                                                          
394 Kahi Lumumba, in discussion with the author. April 4, 2017. 
395Kahi Lumumba, in discussion with the author. April 4, 2017.  
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Oumou Diasse  
 
   
In 1958, Oumou Diasse was born in Senegal during the waning years of French 
colonization. Her birth two years before the “Year of Africa” made her a jus soli French 
citizen.396 Arriving in Paris at the age of eighteen, Diasse was the first woman in her family to 
attend university. Reflecting on this moment with pride she states, 
                                                          
396 The “Year of Africa” has been historically recognized as a central rupture point in colonial history. This year 
marked the independence of seventeen nations and catalyzed the decolonization of several more African countries 
in the years to come. The process of decolonization is understood as the longer process of a power transfer or as 
the more immediate outcome of independence. For historical treatments on this period, see Frantz Fanon, Jean-
Paul Sartre, and Constance Farrington, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1965); Prosser Gifford and 
William Roger Louis, Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988); Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of 
the Colonial Empires (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2008). The term jus soli refers to the right to citizenship based on 
birth in the nation or territory occupied by the nation.   
Figure 12. Oumou Diasse (pictured in her official 
Conseillère municipale de Créteil photo).  
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In my family, girls did not go to school. For many years my father did not know I was 
going to school… When my father would come, my mother would give an excuse for 
why I was not home…By the time I got accepted to the University of Paris, I still did not 
tell my father that I was going to school. The day I was leaving for France, I read the 
letter to my father and he was proud. With this, I opened a door for my little sister to go 
to school, even though my older sister didn’t go. But the sister after me had the 
opportunity to go to school, it was a new beginning.397   
 
Leaving behind two sons with her mother, Diasse went to Paris in 1976 with dreams of 
becoming the first African woman pilot. She arrived with no family or friends to support the 
transition from Senegal. She worked two jobs in an effort to save enough money to bring her 
children to France. Once Diasse completed her education, she united with her children after 
almost six years of separation. Finding adequate housing for her family proved to be increasingly 
difficult in Paris. When her applications for housing were refused, Diasse moved to the Parisian 
suburb of Créteil for a new beginning. She wrote to the Mayor and asked for a meeting to discuss 
some of her concerns. 
 In the two weeks before the meeting, Oumou canvassed the local University campus 
asking black students what they needed most in the city. The majority of students voted in favor 
of a hair salon. Armed with this knowledge, she met with Mayor Laurent Cathala in 1983. With 
his help, she moved to an apartment large enough for her children and was given an empty space 
to begin her salon.  
So now I had a place, but I’m not a hair stylist. I didn’t have much money for this project. 
I went to the bank for help and they said, I had no business plan and no start-up money, so 
there was not much they would offer me. But with the little I had and the help of the Mayor, 
I started. Black Hair stylists and vendors that heard about my project all came. Thirty-four 
                                                          
397 Oumou Diasse, in discussion with the author. February 27, 2017.  
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years, I’m still here. I opened the first black hair salon in Créteil and people still are coming. 
With that I began my life as a businesswoman.  
 
Ten years after the launching of her hair salon, Diasse thought it was time to expand. Initially, she 
considered moving to England but finally settled on relocating to the United States. In 1996, she 
arrived in Harlem. After spending to two weeks visiting salons along 125th Street, she realized that 
she did not want to move to the United States. Upon return to France, Diasse informed her business 
partner that she wanted to change directions. Although, she loved managing hair salons, there was 
something else she wanted to do.  
Over the years, I’ve learned that you must develop your self-esteem. Which is why I have 
this hair salon. I love seeing the women leave my place feeling beautiful and saying, ‘Wow 
I feel great’. I’ve seen young people born and raised in my salon. When they have some 
problems with their parents, they come to me at the hair salon. If a couple gets into an 
argument, the woman comes to the hair salon for advice. If I cook, everyone eats here. It 
really is the house of the neighborhood. Everyone comes and it’s a big family and that’s 
how it stays. But after many years and different experiences, I realized I am more of 
humanitarian than a business woman. My greatest pleasure in life is to make others happy. 
I always wanted to help...398  
 
In 2007, Diasse founded the NGO, Miss Oumy À Coeur Solidarité Internationale 
(M.O.A.C.O.S.I.). Naming the organization after her “heart” for international solidarity, Diasse 
manages projects both in France and Africa. From her base in Créteil, the organization runs four 
programs within the city: a summer program, a woman’s network, a food bank, and a computer 
literacy program. Concurrent with these local programs, M.O.A.C.O.S.I. also manages the same 
four programs in Senegal. In addition to her humanitarian work, Diasse still owns her hair salon. 
                                                          
398 Oumou Diasse, in discussion with the author. February 27, 2017. 
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For her efforts, both within the Parisian suburbs of Créteil and work abroad, Diasse was elected 
to the municipal council in 2015.399 As a city councilor, she serves as a member of the 
Education, Youth, Culture, and Sports Committee. One of fifty-three members, she is also 
instrumental in the elections for the mayor of Créteil every six years as a member of the Socialist 
Party.400  
Ten years after its inception, her summer program for children and families drew 3,000 
people for a day of fun in the sun at the local Parc des Bordes. Activities included a barbeque, 
music, live performances, water games, mini-golf, cultural events, and a soccer tournament, all 
free of charge.401 In an interview with local newspaper, Le Parisien, Diasse stated, “This day 
permits those who cannot afford to go on holidays to escape for bit. A shared moment, young, 
old, black, white, Senegalese, Comorians, Hindus, Jews, Christians and Muslims, the objective is 
to gather and mix everyone for a moment of sharing and tolerance.”402 Many of the families that 
come to the yearly summer program are recipients of the food bank drive that distributes baskets 
                                                          
399 Mairie De Créteil, "Composition des commissions permanentes." Ville de Créteil. March 7, 2017. 
http://www.ville-creteil.fr/composition-des-commissions-permanentes. 
400 “The municipal council is elected by direct universal suffrage by the voters registered on the electoral lists of the 
municipality. The council then elects the mayor every six years, by secret ballot and by an absolute majority. Through 
its deliberations, the municipal council regulates the affairs of the municipality and gives its opinion whenever it is 
required by the laws and regulations.” For more information on the committee composition and responsibilities see, 
Mairie De Créteil, Conseil municipal. March 7, 2017. http://www.ville-creteil.fr/conseil-municipal. 
401 Mairie De Créteil, "Journée de vacances." August 30, 2017. http://www.ville-creteil.fr/journee-de-vacances. 




on a weekly basis at Maison de solidarité and they send their children to the organization’s 
computer literacy program that is open six days a week.403 
Diasse’s newest venture seeks to bring Africa and France together in a joint humanitarian 
effort. With a group of sixteen people comprised of volunteers and “at-risk youth” from the city, 
the team repaired the Diamniadio School located on the Saloum islands in Senegal.404 During the 
month, the group rebuilt the school that holds classes for school-aged children and a nightly 
women’s literacy class.  This project also allowed local Parisian youth to get involved in 
humanitarian actions alongside volunteers of the NGO. Some of the youth she recruits are 
unemployed or have dropped out of school. During the stay in Senegal, she arranges activities 
such as sports tournaments, meetings, meals and local excursions that allow them to make 
transnational connections. She states, “The type of experience allows them to meet other young 
people from different cultures, to make them reflect on their current situation and to develop 
their self-esteem. These children often return to France on the road to recovery.”405  
She speaks frankly of the challenges that face her while maintaining a business and a 
non-profit organization. The initial rehabilitation of the Diamniadio school occurred over a two-
year period from 2013 to 2015 and an additional year of fundraising to secure the necessary 
10,000 €. After four years, Diasse completed the project in 2017. In addition to re-building 
                                                          
403 "Miss Oumy à Coeur ouvert permet de nourrir 6 personnes pour 10 € à Créteil." France Bleu. October 18, 2017. 
https://www.francebleu.fr/emissions/le-top-positif/107-1/le-top-positif-31. 
404"Miss Oumy parlera de ses projets au Sénégal." Le Parisien, November 25, 2017. 
https://www.pressreader.com/france/le-parisien-val-de-marne/20171125/282583083319875.  





schools, she is also committed to helping women from the local community combat poverty and 
discrimination. Each year, she returns to Senegal to host conferences that help women find 
solutions to the devastating impact of climate change. These conferences allow women to 
develop small businesses and act as support groups for other women who are often abandoned by 
husbands while they search for work and are left alone to care for their children and elderly 
parents.406 Deeply connected to her work in Africa and in France, Diasse serves her community 
in many capacities (businesswoman, politician, and humanitarian). When reflecting on her 
dreams for the future, she returns to the reason why she moved to France.  
I wanted to be pilot. I wanted to be the first African woman to fly planes but instead I got 
a metaphorical airplane. I thought I was going to be a pilot for big airline company, but my 
airplane is what I’m doing now. Everyone I help comes on my plane. What I am doing now 
is helping people to travel. Without education, you cannot accomplish much. I am helping 
build schools, I am helping empower and nurture women. I take young people from Paris 
to Africa. I did become a pilot. 
 
 Although her career as a businesswoman and “mother of the community” is far from complete, 
she concludes that “money doesn’t drive me. Humans do. I love humans especially the young and 
I want to help.”407  
 
                                                          
406When asked to explain the absence of men within the home in Senegal, Diasse is insistent that absentee 
fatherhood is a consequence of climate change and is not due to a familial breakdown instead she states, “our 
young men are at risk of being smuggled into Europe [for work] and many are losing their lives.  These things are 
having a strong impact on women’s lives because their husbands are leaving them alone and going to the cities to 
seek employment.” See Mildred Barasa, "Reportage sur l'Afrique à la COP21 #3: Les femmes ou le groupe le plus 
vulnérable." Fondation de l'Ecologie Politique. December 08, 2015. 
http://www.fondationecolo.org/blog/Reportage-sur-l-Afrique-a-la-COP21-3-Les-femmes-ou-le-groupe-le-plus-
vulnerable.   












Kady Mash was seven years old when he arrived in Paris. Born the son of a political 
activist, his family came to France under political asylum. Their escape from persecution in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was met with hope for a better life in Paris. Fleeing the 
totalitarian regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko, the Mash family was unsure if they would 
ever return home.408 Proud of his Congolese roots, Kady became a naturalized French citizen ten 
years ago. He states, 
                                                          
408In 1960, Mubotu Sese Seko staged a coup d’état with Belgian support against the sitting Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba. After Lumumba was assassinated, Seko became the head of the Congolese military before a second 
coup that facilitated his rise to presidency in 1965. Serving as the president for thirty-two years, Seko was 
sanctioned by the United Nations for human rights violations and frequently used the military to silence any 
opposition from citizens. See Daron Acemoglu James Robinson, and Thierry Verdier, "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-
Rule: A Model of Personal Rule." Journal of the European Economic Association (2–3) (2003): 162-92; "Enfants de 
Mobutu." Jeune Afrique, September 10, 2007. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/118913/archives-
thematique/enfants-de-mobutu/; Jeanne M. Haskin, The tragic state of the Congo: from decolonization to 
dictatorship. New York: Algora, 2005; Who Killed Lumumba? : Audio Transcript. 2000. BBC, London. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/correspondent/transcripts/974745.txt.  




I am French. I studied in France. I worked in France. I grew up in Paris and in the 
suburbs of Seine-Saint-Denis.  I am Congolese but French at the same time. It’s like ‘le 
cul est entre deux chaises.’409 I am French because I was naturalized but then in France, 
people consider me African because of the color of my skin. Okay, you are French, but 
then they ask, ‘What are your origins?’ Here in France, you could be French but they say, 
‘You come from someplace else, those are your origins.’ I never went back to Congo. It 
is impossible for me to separate the two [Africa and France]. France gave me everything. 
But I am African, I cannot hide that, but at the same time I am French.”410   
 
Three years ago, Kady quit his job as a promoter/event organizer for parties and concerts 
to start his business. Naming the company Mwanamaille Clothing, this moniker reasserts his 
African and French identities. The name Mwanamaille is a mixture of Lingala (a provincial 
Bantu language spoken throughout the northwestern part of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) and French. In Lingala, “mwana” means child. The French word “maille” has multiple 
meanings: money, the stitching of fabric or to link.  Fond of word play, Kady wanted his 
business to have multiple interpretations but a simple concept, “Mwanamaille could mean a child 
of business, a child of the cloth or a child linked to both Africa and France. It’s a movement.”411 
The start of his company began as a movement propelled by other Afro-French people. During 
his time as an event organizer, he became popular for wearing ties that were made of traditional 
                                                          
409 The literal translation of ‘il est assiss le cul entre deux chaises,’ means to be caught between two chairs. 
However, in this reference Kady is explaining that he feels caught in between two identities and often confronts 
the socio-cultural burdens of navigating this dual identity that are often perceived to be separate by others. 
However, he identifies as both African and French.  
410 Kady Mash, in discussion with the author. March 30, 2017. 
411 "Interview Mwanamaille Clothing: «Je suis congolais, j'ai toujours aimé m'habiller»." African Moove. August 04, 
2015. http://www.africanmoove.com/afrotendance/interview-mwanamaille-clothing-je-suis-congolais-jai-
toujours-aime-mhabiller/ and Kady Mash, in discussion with the author. March 30, 2017.  
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wax tissue. His growing notoriety for his seemingly never-ending assortment of wax ties helped 
as customers and clients began to place orders for replicas of the ties he wore to various events.   
His flair for fashion finds its origins in the Congolese-derived Sappeur Culture. This 
social and cultural phenomenon began in Kinshasa and Brazzaville during the colonial period. 
Congolese men repurposed the hand-me-downs of colonial administrators to make them their 
own. As anti-colonial sentiments began to build in the 1950’s, sappeurs were represented by 
both the working class and the upper-class intelligentsia. Canonized in music by Congolese 
singer and musician Papa Wemba, sappeurs used fashion to spurn former French colonial 
notions of inferiority in their choice of dress. Altering and layering French designer brands with 
bright colors, patterns and fabrics, sappeurs celebrate their political freedom and individuality 
through their clothing.412 Despite being inspired by the bold fashion choices of Sappeur culture, 
Kady believes this style of dress has its limits and the international acclaim brought to La Sape 
has made it “cliché” and overstated. He uses his clothing line as a return to “simple elegance.”  
Mixing classic French clothes and streetwear with touches of African wax fabric is his solution. 
This Afro-French style grew out of childhood experiences. He reflects, “My mother was a 
seamstress. She made our clothes.  When I arrived in France from Kinshasa…I wanted to 
                                                          
412 For more information about La Sape or Sappeur Culture (Society for Ambiencers and Persons of Elegance) see 
Françoise Alexander, "Sapeurs sachant saper." Le Monde. May 13, 2016. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/05/12/sapeurs-sachant-saper_4918367_3232.html; Charles Didier 
Gondola, “La sape exposed! high fashion among lower-class Congolese youth: from colonial modernity to global 
cosmopolitanism.” In Contemporary African fashion, edited by Kristine Loughran and Suzanne Gott (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), 156-173 and 225-226; Laureline Savoye, "La sape ivoirienne: un art de vivre en 
couleurs." Le Monde Afrique. February 09, 2017. http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2017/02/09/la-sape-
ivoirienne-un-art-de-vivre-en-couleurs_5077095_3212.html; Dominic Richard David Thomas, "Fashion Matters: La 
Sape and Vestimentary Codes in Transnational Contexts and Urban Diasporas." Johns Hopkins University Press118, 
no. 4 (September 2003): 947-73.  
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integrate quickly and look European. Growing up, I was ashamed of wearing wax. Now that I’m 
older I have realized the beauty in wax tissue.”413 
The beauty of wax tissue and African aesthetics is not only shared by Kady Mash but also 
several haute couture fashion houses.414 Within the past ten years all of these fashion labels have 
used African prints in their work often without offering recognition or monetary compensation to 
the original African designers.415 The transition of African fashion to the mainstream has had 
both a negative and positive impact on Mash’s business. He states, “You can see it in the big 
stores that are all using African prints.”416 This intra-industrial competition has largely impacted 
his pricing. Mash explains, “I make t-shirts for 35 euro. Some people say, ‘Oh that’s expensive, 
I’ll go shop somewhere else.’ But I charge that much because I can ensure the quality.” Beyond 
                                                          
413 "Interview Mwanamaille Clothing: «Je suis congolais, j'ai toujours aimé m'habiller»." African Moove.  
414 The following fashion houses have used African prints in their Spring or Fall collections: Marc Jacobs, Louis 
Vuitton, Céline, Valentino, Stella McCartney, Burberry, and Matthew Williamson.  
415 For more information on haute couture houses and their use of African traditional prints and designs, see 
Marysa Greenawalt, "Behind the Photos: Steve McCurry's Ad Campaign for Valentino." Time. February 16, 2016. 
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designs." The Independent. December 09, 2007. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/anger-over-
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urbaine-conseils-sape-equilibre-exclu/ and Mfonobong Nsehe, "Meet The Woman Disrupting The African Fashion 





the overhead costs of buying the fabric and paying a tailor to customize a t-shirt, Mash often has 
difficulty funding the expansion of his company. He states  
The taxation system here [in France] is very complicated and prohibits people from 
maintaining their businesses. There is so much talent in France, but the system is hard to 
navigate. The taxes are high and the banks make it difficult to get a loan. It is very hard. 
The system must change because it’s too hard. It’s sad because France is losing its talent 
because the system is very complicated and too expensive. For the instant, I work with an 
association that helps me with my taxes.417  
 
Despite the challenges of making quality clothes affordable as a small business owner, 
Kady believes there is room for everyone. Much of his success is derived from his work as a 
former event organizer.  Using his contacts from the entertainment business, he has dressed some 
of France’s most popular entertainers including: Maître Gims, Youssoupha and BANA C4. The 
visibility of his clothing in music videos, magazine covers and press releases has bolstered his 
business. This symbiotic relationship between music and fashion is summarized by Kady in this 
statement, “I made my clothing for a long time but not many people noticed. But when 
Youssoupha wears it, everyone notices and wants to get clothing like his that I made. In their 
music videos, these rappers [Maître Gims, Youssoupha and BANA C4] want to be well-dressed. 
The reality is that they need me and I need them.”418  
His growing success caused him to seriously consider becoming a full-time business 
owner. In addition to running his own business since 2012, he works a full-time job. His current 
position as a boutique manager helps supplement his income. Employed by an auxiliary car 
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service similar to Uber or Lyft, Kady sizes and dresses all the chauffeurs that work for the car 
service. He uses managing the boutique showroom as an opportunity to showcase his own work 
and advertise his collection of suits, ties and jackets to the clients. Inspired by his current boss 
and small business owner, who is a Haitian immigrant, Kady acknowledges that being employed 
by a Black male entrepreneur has caused him to pursue his own brand more intently. 
My dream is to simply make sure my company is known throughout the world. My 
dream is that my brand will be known in Africa, France and the United States. My dream 
is to focus completely on my company, to make clothing full-time, to do fashion shows 
and travel. For the past two years, I have focused very seriously on my brand. The future 
is bright. My business is something God-given, I did not study for this. I started my 
business with ties. People saw them and liked them so I started making more. Now I 
make t-shirts, suits, and clothing for women, men and children. I have three lines. Now I 
want to travel to Africa. The people there inspire me, I want to bring that back to France. 
I see what’s in style there and I customize it with a touch of Africa. I use wax fabric in 
everything I create.419 
 
Making his dreams a reality, he teamed with the Afro-French designer Lys-Alexandra in 2013 to 
found a quarterly event called La Braderie des Créateurs. 420 Hosted on a Parisian cruise ship 
along the Seine, Kady re-connected with his former employer and owner of the L'Alizée cruise 
ship to rent the boat. At each event, upwards of twenty Afropean designers sell their products 
and organize a fashion show. Once boasting free entry, these events are now ticketed and 
catered. Four years later, Kady is most proud of the fact that his clothing is worn by “all—Black, 
White, Asian and Arab.” He credits the event in helping him develop a slogan that represents his 
                                                          
419  Kady Mash, in discussion with the author. March 30, 2017.  




collections as “an ethnic world tour of fabric in the service of elegance and originality.”421 
Empowered by the fact that he does not have to choose a specific clientele, Kady smiles and 
says, “It’s a little selfish but I really created everything in my image. I’m Congolese, I like to 
dress and be presentable. Now everyone else will do the same in France and soon throughout the 
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Patricia Lubelo was born in 1988 in the 19th arrondissement of Paris. She was raised by 
her Angolan mother and Congolese father. In hopes of becoming an actress, Patricia studied Art 
du spectacle at Université Paris 3-Sorbonne Nouvelle and graduated in 2009. After completing 
her college studies, she worked at France Television as an audio-visual production assistant. In 
addition to this work, she also played for the all-women’s football team Flash féminin de La 
Courneuve.423 When her fiancé proposed in 2013, Patricia’s life and career path was destined to 
change. 
Lubelo learned many lessons in the two years it took to plan her wedding. She states, 
When I got married, I realized how expensive it was to decorate. The hall, the place 
settings, the cake, the party favors, the church, all of it had to be decorated. I had so many 
                                                          
423 "Année: 2015." Flash de La Courneuve. December 7, 2015. http://www.flashfootball.org/2015/; "FÉMININES." 
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Figure 14. Patricia Lubelo pictured gathering materials for one of her events.  
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ideas and the decorators I met with were so expensive. So, I did everything myself. I 
bought all of the decorations and prepared everything myself and I kept everything. Then 
when my friends and family had an event, they called me to decorate for them. Every 
time I did an event, I got great reviews and compliments. People would say, “Wow, this 
is beautiful and everything I wanted.424  
 
After almost three years of decorating family events that included baby showers, baptisms, 
weddings and birthdays parties for free, Patricia decided it was time to open her decorating 
business. In May 2016, Patricia created O’ Décor Events. Wanting her company to reflect her 
“next-level” ideas and concepts, O’ Décor is derived from the word hauteur, meaning elevated 
height or loftiness. Her business strategy is built on offering prices lower than other stores or 
decorators by working within fixed budgets. 
Although Patricia is the head of the company, her small business is upheld by familial 
support.425 Patricia emphasizes that her business would not function without her family. She 
states,  
My family is very supportive. If I’m not available for an appointment. I call my mother 
and say, ‘Mom, I have a client who is coming to pick up this, this and this.’ My mother 
gathers the materials for me, makes the transaction with the client and takes care of the 
money for me. For now, I store things at my house and my mother’s house but in the 
future I will have to purchase a small storage space to hold my materials.426 
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Patricia enjoys being in a woman-dominated industry. She believes her gendered interactions 
have both advantages and disadvantages. In three years of business, most of her interactions are 
with women. Often clients will attempt to negotiate the price lower and use tropes of sisterhood 
as the basis of negotiation. She responds to these challenges by saying,  
I analyze the prices offered by other places before setting my price. My clients know that 
I am cheapest that’s why they contact me. But they always try to negotiate. For them, it’s 
just an estimate. For me that is my final bill, I never go lower than my set price…Ninety 
percent of my business is with women, because they are the ones organizing the event. 
Mothers throwing birthday parties for their children will say “I don’t have much money, I 
only have “this amount.” I say, ‘If you find someone cheaper, call me and we can work 
something out.’ And they never do. I refuse to negotiate, there is no pity, there can be no 
emotions in business. I did many events for free in the past but not anymore. If I let my 
emotions get the best of me, my business is over. I will not progress. I set my price and 
they are not negotiable.427  
 
Since creating her business, Patricia’s biggest struggle is attracting new clients. Experimenting 
with word of mouth references, fliers and advertisements in local newspapers, she has found 
success in using social media to gain new clients. Lubelo created Facebook, Instagram and 
Snapchat profiles for her business. Over the years she learned various strategies to maximize her 
audience reach. In a business, where “people want to see everything,” Patricia uses these various 
platforms so that, “people can follow me directly to see my presentations and can verify my 
work.” 428 She explains,  
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I have a website too. I have learned after doing my research that with all of these social 
media platforms, you do not attract the same audience. Different people use different 
applications. There are people who use Snapchat and not Facebook and vice versa. The 
same is true with Facebook and Instagram. For bigger institutions and businesses, they 
prefer to see my website. Me being on all these social media platforms has really helped 
grow my client base. My business is still very small so I have to do everything. I am the 
head decorator, the buyer, and I am in charge of social media. I try to set myself apart 
from my competition.  I see what others are doing, they just post a picture. I don’t do that. 
Me, I think about what I’m going to post. I take time to come up with captions and 
different names for my post. Thanks to my brother, I can also include pictures and video 
montages.429  
 
Due to her growing social media following, Patricia attracted two of her largest clients to date. 
The first was a collaborative event organized by Africa Montmartre. Hosted by a collective of 
Afropean women, they hired Patricia to decorate their 2016 edition of “When Africa meets 
Montmartre.”430 Referred to the collective by the event’s caterer, Patricia was responsible for 
creating an African aesthetic theme.  She used decorations from various locations in Africa to 
help bring Africa to Paris. Attracting hundreds of women over the thirteen-day period, Patricia’s 
talents did not go unnoticed. Later that year, she decorated her largest wedding ever. A 
Congolese couple asked her to decorate a venue for 350 people. Drawing inspiration from her 
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own wedding which included a wax-covered cake, monogrammed plates and M & M’s, Patricia 
added a new spin to this African wedding including wax fabric and customized furniture.431 
Based on this wedding, she received an offer to do another wedding in Congo. As her business 
expands, she continues to plan for the future. Patricia says,  
I think it’s time to get an office. But with what I make, I am not sure. On my site, people 
pay me directly. When I called the bank to see what I could do, they said, ‘Yes it’s 
possible but your taxes will be very high.’ So, for now, I wait. When I do decide to get an 
office, it must be located in Paris, not in the banlieue where I live. Because there are not 
enough people here and it is too far from the center of business. But the rent for an office 
in Paris can range between 600-700 euro a month. And I have periods where I do not get 
much business. After March, business slows down between October and March. Business 
is very slow. From April to August is my busiest period for business. In the future, I do 
want to have an office and decorate a movie premiere or even a Gala. I envision 
something classy and glamorous with chandeliers. It would be beautiful.432 
 
With over fifty events completed in a single year, Patricia looks forward to the day that she can 
pursue her business full-time. Currently, she works a full-time job as a receptionist at a television 
company and organizes events during the weekends. With her family’s help and the glowing 
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Christian Joao was born in 1985 and grew up in the Parisian suburbs. Originally from 
Angola, his parents moved to Congo during the Angolan Civil War.433 After several years of 
living on the border between Angola and Congo, they were given asylum by France for political 
reasons. He was raised in Nanterre along with his older sister and younger brother. Christian 
completed his secondary education in 2001.  Originally intent on becoming a cardiologist, he 
changed direction to pursue a career in business. He states, “To me it’s the best job in the world. 
It’s better to be a businessman than a president. Because if you really look at how business 
                                                          
433 For a detailed explanation of the cause of the Angolan Civil War and the exodus of Angolans to Congo see 
Fernando Andresen Guimaraes, The origins of the Angolan Civil War: foreign intervention and domestic political 
conflict, 1961-76 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
Figure 15. Christian Joao pictured before a business meeting.  
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works, you really can manage and supervise the world.”434 Joao attended business school in La 
Defense and earned a Master’s degree in Marketing and Business Development.   
In 2009, Christian moved to Atlanta, Georgia after accepting an internship for Enomatic 
wine dispensary. His clients included restaurant owners, theaters, wine bars, hotels and stadiums. 
When reflecting on his decision to move to America, he says, “I wanted to learn the business in 
an American environment. It’s so different than Europe. Americans are the best business men in 
the world. But what I really wanted was to have a piece of the American Dream. I wanted to be 
in the country where the first black president was elected. That was the dream for me.”435 In the 
year after he completed the internship, Joao applied for several employment opportunities but 
was unable to find one that would sponsor his visa. Thus, when his visa expired in 2011, he 
moved back to Paris.  
Upon return to Paris, Joao worked for two companies: an advertisement agency and the 
supermarket, Lidl. As their regional manager, he was in charge of five stores in Paris. This job 
sparked his interest in entrepreneurship due to disagreements with Lidl’s management style. He 
states,  
In the month before I quit. I fixed what I could. 90% of my staff were mostly Black and 
Arab women. They are not French, so they are considered foreigners. My company puts 
pressure on these women and I wanted to help. I had a Black woman employee. Lidl kept 
giving her temporary contracts. One day, she came to my office crying and said, 
‘Because of these temporary contracts. I cannot get an apartment. I need a permanent 
contract.’ Before my last day with my company, I arranged for her to get a permanent 
contract.436  
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The turning point was when the corporate office forced him to fire an employee because she was 
“too fat.” He decided to give up comfortable earnings and the company Audi that day. In his last 
thirty days as manager, Christian attempted to change the company culture of fear and 
patriarchy. 
Christian’s first business was selling hair weaves. Named after his business partner’s 
oldest daughter, Nyella was established in 2011. He explains, “It was hard due to the structure of 
the business. Basically, anyone who has 500 euros can start a hair weave business. There was so 
much competition.”437 Despite efforts to expand its online presence through websites, 
photoshoots and YouTube tutorials, the business struggled. The main problem was pricing,  
In terms of figures, it’s a good business, you can make $400-$500 from one transaction. 
But the average French customer did not want to pay the price for quality hair. So, we 
switched our focus to professional customers. One in Switzerland, one in Bordeaux. Then 
in 2014, when we lost our two main customers, one went bankrupt and the second one 
terminated their contract with us. Our hair supplier glued instead of stitching the hair and 
we did not know. So, we sold the hair and it was ruined during installation. We learned 
the hard way. We tried website sales and those were even worse. Then we switched to 
selling “Nappy” products. We sold Mixed Chicks, Carol’s Daughter and Curls and those 
sales were better than selling the weaves. Plus, we cut costs because everything could be 
done on a website. But then, the shipping got too expensive and we lost more than we 
were bringing in. So, in total the hair business lasted three years.438 
 
Despite this initial failure, Christian refused to become an employee again. In 2014, after 
reading an article in Entrepreneur magazine about foldable ballet shoes, he decided to try his 
luck with this business venture. Naming the new company, Mes Ballerinettes, he decided to sell 
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the shoes for 15 euro per pair. Manufactured in China, these shoes could fold into a small purse 
and came with a bag to store worn heels. Within 48 hours, the new company website was 
running and he placed his initial order for several hundred pairs. Reflecting on the haste in which 
he created the new company he says, “I just started. No survey, no market study, nothing. To 
make it popular, I made it a deal on Groupon. I made between 6,000-7,000 euros in a week.”439 
Pleased with the results, he wanted to expand and sell the shoes to stores. Christian arranged 
meetings with two French department stores, Galleries Lafayette and Printemps, as well as the 
Parisian airports and the Dubai Mall. To promote the business, he did a breast cancer campaign 
in Dubai and gave away roses with Mes Ballerinettes business cards wrapped inside. Galeries 
Lafayette agreed to sell the shoes in Marseille and Printemps agreed to sell his product if he 
developed a leather prototype. All of these positive developments were thwarted when he 
received a call from Customs in May 2015. When the package arrived in France from a Chinese 
ship, a Customs officer called and delivered heartbreaking news. He informed Christian that the 
shoes did not have a “Made in China label” and therefore the products were illegal to sell. Joao 
recalls,   
I had 5,000 shoes on that boat. I realized that it would be too much money and take too 
much time to send all the shoes back to China…It would cost more money to correct the 
issue than to start all over. So [customs] destroyed all 5,000 pairs. Mes Ballerinettes 
ended that day. It was another failure and I was back to square one. I had nothing.440  
 
To supplement his income, Christian started selling clothing on Groupon. Arranging 
deals between clothing suppliers such as Diesel and Levi, he bought the items in bulk and called 
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this new company Genius Trading. He sold his products on GroupOn France, United Kingdom 
Germany and Canada. However, shipping these items was expensive and it took several weeks to 
obtain new merchandise. Thus, in order to cut shipping costs and increase his net revenue, Joao 
began selling smartphones on Groupon. Averaging only two or three sales a month, his net 
income was 10,000 euro. When considering new ways to increase his revenue, Christian 
remembered a 2011 meeting with hairweave suppliers next to a leather company.  
This meeting inspired his newest business venture begun in 2015. This clothing 
manufacturing company was named Group CJ in a tribute to his name. In the first year of 
business, Group CJ netted zero euro in revenue. Thus, he was forced to continue his Groupon 
sales to make ends meet. In January 2016, after a year of emails and calls, Christian received an 
email from Guess agreeing to a manufacturing contract. Shortly after, he signed a second 
contract with Guess’ sister brand, Marciano. After acquiring these two contracts, Christian 
realized that he had overcome his biggest struggle to date. 
As a business owner, my biggest challenge in the textile industry is to have big brands 
give me a chance. I never met any representative for Guess in person. Our only 
interactions were through email and phone. To make it to that level through emails and 
calls and to get the clothing company Guess, to trust me and my company was my 
biggest challenge. I had to give an image that we are big company. But when I first 
started, I was the only one in the company. I was living in Paris in my mother’s house 
and conducting my business in my bedroom. That was my multi-national company, the 
headquarters was my bed. I struggled but I had to convince myself that I could do it. I 
used to talk to the manager of Guess, who living in Los Angeles making tons of money 
every year. And I was just beginning. But I convinced them.441  
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In his second year as C.E.O. of Group CJ, he taught himself the business. He admits, 
“When I began, I knew nothing about leather or fashion. I was discovering new things in every 
email. For example, they would say, ‘send us the T.O.P.’ I had to use Google and learn.”442  The 
following year, he acquired two more contracts from Pepe Jeans and Diesel in June and 
September of 2017. As he plows forward, he is scheduling meetings with Mango and Zara. 
Courting their attention has required almost three years of quality and prototype samples and 
several meetings in Barcelona. Reflecting on his longest and most successful entrepreneurial 
venture to date, he states that he has not found too many French role models in his business. 
Besides business-partner and childhood friend Franck, Christian looks beyond France for 
inspiration, “I have no French role models. When you see the richest men in France, they were 
all born rich. They don’t look like me. I needed someone who had nothing and now they’re at the 
top. Those are the guys I look to: Diddy, Michael Jordan and Robert Smith. They are in the 
music industry, business, and sports.”443  
Although Christian is based in France, he owns two clothing manufacturing factories in 
India. One is in New Delhi and the other is in Bangalore. He oversees a team in India composed 
of five people that manage the day-to-day activities of quality control and producing new 
prototypes for his suppliers. Each morning, he holds virtual meetings with the management team 
that oversees a total of 300 workers. In these meetings, they create new ways to reach their goal 
of increasing the volume of products manufactured in the factory in order to gain a percentage 
back for the company. In addition to the manufacturing business, Christian created a second 
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company. After his early morning Skype meetings, Christian acts as a headhunter for his new 
consulting business. He cites the need for this second venture due to the fact that he often does 
not see profit from his textile business for up to a year, whereas as a head hunter, he receives 
monthly compensation. The consulting business is based on recruitment for banking companies 
such as Créteil, Société Générale, and Caceis based in Dublin. Teaming with his longtime 
business partner and friend Franck, whose primary occupation is an actuary, they work together 
in the banking and insurance industries. 444 Franck is primarily responsible for lining up potential 
clients and Christian arranges and conducts the meetings to hire new employees.  
In the upcoming year, Christian plans to relocate to Dubai to continue the expansion of 
his business. In order to escape the French taxation system, he is certain that Dubai is the better 
option due to the fact that the United Arab Emirates has differing taxes for corporations and 
individuals. Relocating to Dubai would also facilitate the management of his small team of five 
people in the business development department. Although he looks forward to the move, 
Christian asserts that he must also keep a home in France. He states, “I have to always have a 
place here. Most of my family lives in Paris and most of the clients are based in Europe. In order 
to set up meetings with companies and arrange new contracts they will not agree to Dubai. It’s 
always in Europe. Pepe Jeans is based in Italy, Mango is based in Madrid, and I still have to take 
meetings in France.”445  With the opportunity to have a multi-national company with the next 
few years, Christian aims to have a total of six major brands for his textile company and to 
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continue growing his consulting business to net 300,000 euro. More importantly he wants to 
invest in other companies. He wants to “lift as he climbs,” Christian states, “Although I cannot 
afford yet to invest a lot of money in other companies, I want to. I would like to be like a “Mark 
Cuban” investment angel and give someone an opportunity. There are many people like me in 
Paris. I didn’t have someone to help me, but I can do it for another Black man or woman. That’s 
where I want to be. That’s when you’re really a boss.”446 
Analyzing the Narratives of Black French entrepreneurs 
 The decision to keep the proceeding oral histories in a narrative form is a strategic 
choice that maps with scholarly conventions followed within the field.447 These methodical 
practices are critical to inserting individual subjectivity as a tool to reframe dominant narratives. 
This approach is influenced by a collaborative interviewee and interviewer relationship. Both 
parties work to capture the nuance of a singular experience but strive to understand these 
experiences as emblematic of a larger story. Although the pendulum of power swings heavily in 
the direction of the interviewee and dependence on memory, the study of these narratives is a 
key responsibility of the interviewer. The following section incorporates the approaches of an 
oral history including coding and theme selection to interpret and analyze findings. In its 
consideration of these individual stories, this segment examines overlapping and contrasting 
experiences to develop a community narrative. Five themes connect the accounts of Kady Mash, 
Kahi Lumumba, Oumou Diasse, Christian Joao and Patricia Lubelo: experiences of socio-
economic limitation; transnational movement; a connection to Africa through inheritance, 
                                                          
446 Christian Joao, in discussion with the author. January 3, 2018. 
447 For more detail on oral history methodology and literature, see Introduction.   
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politics and identity; a duty and responsibility to their individual families and larger ethnic 
community; and the use of the digital and print media to raise the visibility of their economic 
profiles. As a point of entry, the entrepreneurial ventures of each business man and woman must 
be contextualized within the countervailing forces of socio-political and economic migration. 
Their differing experiences and proximity to immigration (whether first or second-generation 
African migrants) shape their notions of economic uplift and its impact on a heterogeneous Afro-
French community. Despite these differences, read together their stories offer a window into a 
particular mentalité or vision of economic empowerment rooted in a multi-layered identity 
composed of race, gender, religion, ethnicity, class, family and employment.   
 These experiences of differing employment statuses represent the first theme, 
socioeconomic limitations and participants’ various journeys toward entrepreneurship. Both Kahi 
and Christian contended with restrictions in corporate mobility. Employed at two Entreprises 
CAC 40 companies in France, these spaces served as key sites of frustration but also knowledge 
building and social capital that was later used in the creation of their own businesses. Kahi 
defined his experience of “feeling out of place” at Gaz de France but also noted that it was a 
dream to work for such a “big group.” These conflicting experiences served a motivating factor 
for him to create his own business. His frustration with feeling different from his peers 
overlapped with beliefs about community outreach. Thus, Kahi’s entrepreneurial venture sought 
to combine his professionalization in information technology with a commitment to a more 
communal workplace environment. In a similar way, Christian’s employment experiences 
overlap with that of Kahi.  As a manager for the supermarket Lidl, Christian confronted a similar 
standoff between upper management and his own position as a regional manager. His 
sympathetic treatment of Black and Arab women employees that “could have been his mother” 
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was a key source of disagreement between Christian and Lidl executives.448 Using his position as 
a regional manager, he attempted to resolve some of the tensions between his mostly female, 
immigrant and non-white workforce. Ultimately, his inability to change these power dynamics 
was a key catalyst in a turn towards entrepreneurship. Based upon these experiences, Joao 
viewed entrepreneurship as a means of creating a more horizontal career trajectory between 
employer and employees. Though in practice, this idealistic vision was difficult to implement.  
 Another key theme that emerged from these stories was the role and use of digital/print 
media to raise the visibility of their economic profiles. Although each participant maintains an 
online presence and several press articles were used to add context to their narrative, Kady, 
Patricia and Kahi’s interviews offered the most concrete evidence of their business model being 
intimately connected to the digital sphere.  Within his explanation of challenges that he faced as 
a small-business owner, Kady did not explicitly mention the use of social media. However, he 
did discuss several entertainers that wear his clothing such as: Maître Gims, Youssoupha and 
BANA C4. A deeper examination of Kady’s business website and Instagram page revealed that a 
key strategy for his social media presence was picturing himself with these celebrities or 
reposting photos of the celebrities wearing his designs. Although Kady’s personal Instagram 
page only has 3,785 followers, just ten of the celebrities pictured on his account maintain a 
collective following of 4,895,400 people.449  This clear choice to link himself to such a massive 
following speaks to the monetization of social media and his continued desire to style people that 
                                                          
448 Christian Joao, in discussion with the author. October 13, 2016. 
449 Musical artists: Maître Gims (1.8 million followers) , Youssoupha (249,000 followers),Hiro (740,000 followers), 
Keblack (823,000 followers) BANA C4 (41,100 followers), Dycosh (86,200 followers), Jaymaxvi (859,000 followers), 
Mokobe Traore (214,000 followers), New Orleans Pelicans basketball player, Cheick Diallo (51,100 people) and 
journalist-activist, Rokhaya Diallo (32,100 followers)  
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can increase the visibility of his brand. A critical component of his networking ability is years of 
experience and recognition as a club and party promoter in Paris.  
Contrasting these previously cultivated relationships, Patricia initially struggled with 
developing a clientele base. Her earliest attempts to increase the visibility of her business were 
centered on word of mouth references, fliers and advertisements.  These early experiments failed 
to build a sustainable and growing customer network. She turned to Facebook, Snapchat, 
Instagram platforms to maximize her reach. Over a two year period, Patricia learned to 
customize her profile on these social media platforms for a particular audience. Bigger 
businesses prefer to see her work on a website in comparison to mid-20’s-30’s aged women, who 
primarily contact her through Facebook and Instagram. In recent months, Patricia stopped used 
Snapchat to advertise for her business due to a decline in following.450 Finally, Kahi’s use of 
social media differs from both Patricia and Kady. Although, Kahi maintains his own social 
media profiles on Twitter and Instagram, his preferred method for maximum business impact is 
leveraging digital influencer followings through a conference. The creation of ADICOM 
(African Digital Communication) days gathers 400 of the most recognizable and significant 
social media influencers from both Africa and France during a two day conference. Incentivizing 
their attendance with an award ceremony, Kahi benefits from both their social media followings 
and increased exposure in print media.451    
                                                          
450 Patricia Lubelo, in discussion with the author. April 7, 2017. Her current social media following is 109 followers 
and on Facebook 200 followers.  
451 The success of this type of social media strategy is seen in the following press articles: "ADICOM DAYS 2019 - 
Africa Digital Communication." ADICOMDAYS. https://adicomdays.com/; Partnerships with Google, Facebook and 
Twitter and the inclusion of the following speakers: David Steinacker, Sub-Saharan Africa Senior Partner Manager 
for Google, Jocelyne Muhutu-Remy, Strategic Media Partnerships Manager Africa for Facebook, Adrian Ciesielski, 
Head of Twitter Sales for Ad Dynamo - Greater Africa. As well as appearances from social media influencers such as 
Sarah Yakan whose women’s empowerment Instagram page boasts 588,000 followers and on Facebook 1.3 million 
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A third theme includes transnational movement as a key practice informing Black French 
businesses. After living in France for twenty years, Oumou considered relocating to the United 
States. During her travels in Harlem, New York, she met with other African hair stylists 
maintaining businesses along 125th street. In the course of these experiences, Oumou decided 
first that New York would not be a good fit for her. Secondly, after visiting these salons that she 
wanted to change directions from being a businesswoman to more humanitarian work. It is 
important to note that she never sold her hair salon in Créteil, which remains a critical source of 
income given the fundraising challenges that she encountered in NGO work. Through her NGO, 
Oumou facilitates transnational movement for “at-risk [Parisian] youth” from France to Africa. 
In their work rebuilding schools in her native Senegal, Oumou facilitates a new type of migration 
for Afro-French youth. This return to Africa and connections to migrants’ native African nation-
state resonates with Kady. During his 2017 interview, he admitted that he never returned to 
Congo after leaving at the age of seven.  In a follow-up interview, Kady announced a trip back to 
Congo. After spending two months in Kinshasa, Kady inferred that he would like to return more 
often and that his trip inspired new designs and products for his business.452 In comparison to 
Kady and Oumou’s focus on returning to Africa for greater social impact in France, Kahi 
relocated to Abidjan to establish a central base for his business. During a six-year period, Kahi 
decided that returning to Africa was a better fit for his business model, which centered on 
cultivating African media creatives. Though he maintains a small office in Paris and “a foot in 
France,” Kahi saw a significant expansion in his business upon relocation. This movement away 
                                                          
subscribers; Digital influencer and comedian, Ebene that includes 1.1 million followers and Lee Litumbe, travel 
influencer with 137,000 followers. 
452 Kady Mash, in discussion with the author. January 4, 2018. 
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from France is similarly expressed by Christian, who planned to move to Dubai. Part of his 
rationale for moving to Dubai was to avoid the harsh French tax system, which Kady and 
Patricia also mentioned as a roadblock in the expansion of their businesses. Leaving France 
would help Christian better manage his team given the factory locations in New Delhi and 
Bangalore. Much like Kahi, Christian voiced a need to retain “a place in Paris” due to client 
offices and family.   
These connections between transnational movement and the future of their businesses can 
be further analyzed by the centrality of Africa. In Oumou, Kady and Kahi’s interviews, each of 
the participants drew a concrete connection between Africa and monetization of their businesses. 
The three examples establish a generational fault line on the production of wealth. Oumou 
belongs to an older generation and self-consciously conceives of her African humanitarian work 
within principles of community service and social uplift. Her work is distinctly not monetized. 
While Kady and Kahi, both of the younger generation, conceptualize social uplift in terms of 
wealth production.  This generational gap is particularly striking given the legacies of Kady and 
Kahi’s family lineage. Both participants are the children or grandchildren of African political 
activists and conceive of the connections between work and communal responsibility in terms of 
economic activism. This generational transition is further pronounced in terms of their 
definitions of success. Oumou defines success by the social and political impact she can have on 
youth and women in Africa and France. She supports this philanthropic motivation with the 
statement, “money doesn’t drive me. Humans do. I love humans especially the youth and I want 
to help.” In stark contrast, Kady asserts, “my dream is that my brand will be known in Africa, 
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France and the United States.” Kahi stated that one of his heroes is “P.Diddy” and he is 
committed to helping “African creatives monetize their gifts.”453     
Finally, each of the participants discussed the role of family and a strong connection to 
Afro-French populations in their businesses. For Patricia, her family functions as her employees. 
Her mother, brother, sister and husband each serve various roles in the business. Ranging from 
company photographer to set-up and breakdown crews, Patricia’s family actively participate in 
the business, though she maintains creative and financial control. Their work is often unpaid and 
her business has not developed enough to afford a standing staff. Familial commitment to 
Patricia’s vision and the day-to-day production of the business is an invaluable source of support 
and labor. Both Kahi and Oumou expressed a sense of duty to the African community in their 
entrepreneurial endeavors. Though they differ on the question of monetization, Kahi and Oumou 
focus on African youths as a source of inspiration for their efforts of communal uplift and 
empowerment. Kady’s commitment to creating a “movement” is situated in the cultural legacies 
of fashion in the Congo. His dream to reproduce Congolese imagery worldwide represents a 
clear example of physically transmitting African culture through clothing. His choice to capture 
particularly celebrities of African-descent in his clothing is visible representation of this 
commitment. Finally, Christian noted that his experiences as a businessman was shaped by a lack 
of Black French role models. During the course of several interviews, he listed several American 
entrepreneurs including Mark Cuban, Diddy, Michael Jordan and Robert Smith. His dream is 
rooted in the opportunity to give back. His desire to help “another Black man or woman” is 
linked to a definition of success.     
                                                          




Shades of Gray: The Silences in Narratives of Black French entrepreneurs 
In these narratives of hope and economic uplift, each participant offered inspirational 
stories of overcoming struggles and systematic barriers to success. This final section considers 
the silences within these narratives. Theorized by historian Daniel James, the silences found in 
oral histories account for omissions and gaps within participant stories. Moving beyond 
romanticizing narratives of triumph, considering these silences or points of tension are critical to 
an interpretive analysis that accounts for human hubris in these sources.454   In re-examining the 
participant transcripts there were several gaps that if addressed would indelibly change the 
narrative.  
Despite briefly addressing the legacy of his grandfather, Kahi benefits from both political 
and social capital in various circles. The name and the historical memory of Patrice Lumumba 
has undoubtedly influenced the nature of his business relations especially in Africa but also 
among Black people living in France. Though very costly, this inheritance shapes the arc of his 
business but also interpersonal relations. In her humanitarian and business efforts, Oumy 
marshalled the support of local politicians. She also serves as a city counselor. This political 
support and power is critical to the success of her efforts. Given the financial backing that NGO 
work requires, funding is a critical component to executing volunteer projects.  In his refusal to 
become an employee, Christian established a business that employs workers mainly in India. In 
this geopolitical context, employee conditions are not subject to the same legislative governing 
as in the West.  The pendulum of power swings heavily in the direction of owner/employer. His 
                                                          
454 Daniel James, Doña María's story, 157-212.  
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desire to acquire increasing capital and monetary wealth to “help” Black people may come at the 
cost of underpaying Indian workers. Patricia’s dependency on her family as her staff is 
complicated. The reality that she cannot always pay them but expects their help undoubtedly led 
to disagreements or the “inability” to help out. Though it is her desire to have a staff that she can 
pay and set stricter requirements for their time and energy until her business grows, she is limited 
in access to these resources.  Finally, Kady’s reliance on tailors that are ubiquitous throughout 
the neighborhood of Goutte d'Or is particularly interesting. Though he designs clothes, he does 
not know how to sew. Thus, he depends upon tailors that are willing to replicate his designs and 
stitch his logo over their craftsmanship. The erasure of their intensive labor and the high costs of 
their work are important to consider as his business grows and may require larger distribution 
and manufacturing.  In the consideration of these silences, it is important to emphasize that these 
gaps do not detract from their entrepreneurial endeavors nor from their commitment to uplift in 
the Afro-French community.  
 
Afropean Entrepreneurs & Black Capitalism  
The rise of the entrepreneur is an economic trend that continues to grow in many Western 
countries. Employees that are dissatisfied with the working conditions offered by large 
corporations, or men and women who have a different vision of what the workplace should look 
like are now venturing to create their own small and mid-size businesses. This positive uptick in 
entrepreneurial ventures can be seen as a both as response to stagnant unemployment rates and a 
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new trend in “gig” job opportunities that both supplement full-time work or may serve as the 
main source of income.455  
This development in entrepreneurial endeavors by French citizens has had both a positive 
and negative impact on Afro-French communities. Considerable discrimination within the 
French employment sphere propels this entrepreneurial spirit. Often ignored or passed over for 
jobs, many Black French men and women have turned to becoming entrepreneurs. Given their 
university education and limited opportunities for promotion, migrant workers establish 
businesses.456 Met with a mixed bag of results, most participants note that funding is that largest 
hurdle in maintaining their businesses.457 They cite rejection by banks for small loans and the 
ebb and flow of the French economy as major factors in the life of their businesses. In order to 
understand how these micro level changes fit within a larger understanding of the French 
                                                          
455"Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2017.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2017. 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/entrepreneurship-at-a-glance-
2017_entrepreneur_aag-2017-en#page3.  
456 In a 2011 OECD study, scholars discovered that, “migrant self-employment appears as a way to overcome 
discrimination or occupational downgrading in salaried work….that highly educated migrants in Spain and France 
are relatively more likely than their native-born counterparts to engage in entrepreneurship activities may point to 
a lack of appropriate opportunities in wage employment (compared with natives)… Not all migration countries 
within the OECD have public policy support measures directly targeting entrepreneurs of immigrant background. In 
France, specific programmes to enhance business development tend to target economically depressed areas – and 
all the potential as well as established entrepreneurs resident in those areas – rather than migrant entrepreneurs 
as a special group. However, since immigrants tend to be overrepresented in those areas, they appear to be an 
indirect target of those programmes. The same generally holds true for measures promoting entrepreneurship 
among vulnerable or socially disadvantaged groups…” See Joseph Mestres-Domènech and Maria Vincenza 
Desiderio. "Migrant Entrepreneurship in OECD Countries." 139-203. OECD, 2011. 
https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Part%20II_Entrepreneurs_engl.pdf 
457 In a 2008 study, researchers note that immigrant entrepreneurship is comprised of mainly small businesses. 
Companies led by immigrants with “at least ten employees on payroll is increasing…at a 3.8% rate.” Where the 
overall category of small businesses employing a minimum of ten employees is decreasing by 2.1%. Most 
importantly, the “most pronounced increase is the Sub-Saharan African group at 87.3%.” See Bernard Dihn and 
Emmanuel Ma Mung, “French migratory policy and immigrant entrepreneurship”, in OLIVEIRA, Catarina Reis and 




economy and the daily lives of these entrepreneurs, this chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
financial system through the lens of Black Capitalism.  
Best articulated by American economic scholars and historians, “Black Capitalism” is a 
strategic movement. Black communities deploying this model endeavor to attain a stronger 
presence within the larger economy. A critical component of this business development is equity 
ownership. Scholars contend that increased access to capital by Black people within lower-class 
communities can result in more businesses in these areas and change the tide of national 
economic trends.458 Although these ideas originate within the American context, the principles of 
Black Capitalism are translated within the French context. Namely, increasing Black businesses 
within geographic areas with high concentrations of Afropean populations has produced a 
movement to gain more access to both national and international economic trends as well as 
provide employment opportunities for their community.459 As these Afropean entrepreneurs 
                                                          
458 Within this scholarly discourse two threads shape their investigation: individual or group success. In their 
differing analysis both approaches present limitations. Another faction of scholars disavow Black Capitalism as 
antithetical to notions of communal uplift. Instead, their work critiques capitalism as model for Black economic 
success given its subjugation of African peoples. For literature that outlines the theoretical contours and goals on 
Black Capitalism, see Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig, The Business of Black Power: Community Development, 
Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012); 
Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard Univ. Press, 1982); Theodore 
Cross, Black Capitalism: Strategy for Business in the Ghetto (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1969); Manning Marable 
and Leith Mullings, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America Problems in Race, Political Economy, and 
Society (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015); Earl Ofari, The Myth of Black Capitalism (Monthly Review Press, 1970); 
Alisha R. Winn, "Black Entrepreneurship: Contradictions, Class, and Capitalism." Journal of Business Anthropology3, 
no. 1 (2014): 79-108; Mehrsa Baradaran, Color of Month: Black Banks and the Racial Wealth Gap (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2017) and Zulema Valdez, The New Entrepreneurs: How Race, Class, and Gender Shape 
American Enterprise (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
459 The impact of employment discrimination upon African immigrant communities especially among second and 
third generation youth with advanced education were examined in a series of interviews that span a 12 year 
period. High school teacher Awaz Dehkani expresses her frustration with the French system in the statement, “[My 
students] feel that you play the game, you go to school, you do everything that, you know, that society and 
everybody wants you to do, and in the end, even with many degrees, they don't want you. We have no real laws to 
protect people from discrimination.” See Vikki Valentine, "Economic Despair, Racism Drive French Riots." NPR. 
November 08, 2005. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5004897. This sentiment is echoed 
by Rashida, mother of a nineteen-year-old daughter, she states, "There's a lot of geographical discrimination…If 
your CV says Clichy-sous-Bois, you will be rejected even if you have a master's degree." Rashida’s daughter, 
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developed and expanded their businesses, they created networks to support each other both 
economically and culturally.  
  Ultimately, the conditions that propelled the postcolonial movement of African migrants 
to France grew out of a need for a proletarian workforce but also transformed Europe. This 
transformation can be seen most clearly in France as the nation struggles to “absorb” its 
immigrant population.460 The connection to national economic trends and the growing need for 
global capital is essential to understanding how labor, migration and industrialization are part 
and parcel of the larger economic system known as capitalism.461 This system maintains a 
historical timeline. The trans-Atlantic system was foundational in generating wealth but also 
establishing identities. As the economic system transitioned from slavery to capitalism, black 
labor (African slaves to African workers) helped create the modern world.462  The progression to 
industrialization in the years between colonization and decolonization served as a catalyst for 
African migration to France. These labor migrations were crucial to the re-building of Paris after 
                                                          
Soukaina adds, "There's a lot of solidarity here… We're underestimated. There are negative perceptions of Clichy-
sous-Bois and our real value is not recognized." For more narratives on French hiring practices and discriminatory 
employment see Anealla Safdar, "Clichy-sous-Bois: A suburb scarred by 2005 French riots." Al Jazeera. June 12, 
2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/clichy-sous-bois-suburb-scarred-2005-french-riots-
170606105958832.html. 
460 The use of absorb in this sentence refers to the insistence of the French that migrants adopt French practices 
and relinquish their identification with their country of origin. See Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France; 
Noiriel, The French Melting Pot; Todorov, On Human Diversity and Weil and Porter, How to Be French.  
461 Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley, "Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on the African Diaspora and 
the Making of the Modern World." African Studies Review 43, no. 1 (2000): 11-45.  
462 For works chronicling the historical development of African populations as the drivers of capitalism, see Edward 
E. Baptist, The half has never been told: slavery and the making of American capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 
2016); W. E. B. Du Bois, Black reconstruction in America: an essay toward a history of the part which Black folk 
played in the attempt to reconstruct democracy in America, 1860-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Paul Gilroy, The black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness (London: Verso, 2007); Walter Rodney, How 
Europe underdeveloped Africa (Capetown: Pambazuka Press, 2012); Eric Williams, Capitalism & slavery (Raleigh: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994). 
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the devastation of World War II. As the Parisian industrial belt “rusted” in the late 1970s and 
1980s, African migrations continued and increased even as the wage labor market decreased.463 
The closed system operation of the French economy coincided with state sponsored efforts for 
increased police vigilance in African-dominated communities. These oppressive measures were 
met with resistance from Afropeans. This resistance took the shape of two movements, one in the 
form of urban uprisings and a second response in the form of entrepreneurship.   
Using Black Capitalism as a metric for restorative justice does present several limitations. 
Although these businesses offer greater racial representation within the French economy, the 
system of capitalism is fundamentally flawed. Many of the participants’ reflections about 
restricted access to funding, swelling taxation costs and limited access to bank loans contend 
with these structural barriers.  The problems Black French entrepreneurs experience are 
emblematic of how the institutional makeup of the economy is designed to limit the growth of 
small-businesses. 
 The communal resistance to repression and economic limitations is part of a circular 
narrative. This chapter ends where it began with a consideration of the relationship between 
uprisings and economic stagnation. Historians, economists and the press have all offered 
explanations for why the 2005 uprisings occurred. The corollary relationship between uprisings 
and limited economic opportunity maintains a historical continuity that began much earlier than 
the age of globalization and transnational economic markets. Though technology and the pace in 
which change occurs has increased its frequency, the capitalist systems that maintain the ebb and 
flow of monetary resources remains unchanged. Constructed as a response to the constraints of 
                                                          
463Tyler Edward Stovall, The rise of the Paris red belt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
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racialism capitalism, black radicalism has many forms. Uprisings often serve as an ethno-racial 
response to political and economic oppression.464 Most recently explained by political economist 
Joshua Clover, the 2005 uprisings were a result of “idled capacities, with the surpluses generated 
by the production of non- production.”465  
This examination of the relationship between uprisings and labor-based strikes contends 
that an uprising is “a form not just of collective action but of class struggle, when racialization 
seems to be a core characteristic.”466  The racial nature of urban uprisings is a direct response to 
class restrictions.467 The historical origins of these French millennial uprisings finds its genesis 
in decolonization. In his groundbreaking 1961 work, Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon 
foreshadowed that “the formation of a lumpenproletariat is a phenomenon which is governed by 
its own logic… decrees from the central authorities can [not] check its growth…it is among these 
masses, in the people of the shanty towns and in the lumpenproleteriat that the insurrection will 
find its urban spearhead.”468 Fanon’s conception of colonial subjects’ rejection of metropole rule 
found a refurbished home within postcolonial migrants’ rejection of peripheral containment on 
the outskirts of the Parisian metropolis. The concentration of colonial legacies and post-colonial 
                                                          
464 For detailed explanation of Black radicalism see, Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: the making of the Black 
radical tradition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). His analysis of the use of uprisings and 
revolutionary activity is based on the important work, The Black Jacobins written by C. L. R. James.   
465 Joshua Clover, Riot. Strike. Riot: the new era of uprisings (New York: Verso, 2016). Clover’s use of the term 
“riots” is not deployed in this dissertation. Instead I use the term “uprisings.”  
466 Clover, Riot, 159-160. The rise of urban uprisings is a phenomenon seen throughout many Western countries 
including: the United States, England, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy.  
467 Stuart Hall, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978), 394.  
468 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Atlantic Press, 2005), 81. 
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economic limitations bred a growing discontent for the hypocrisy of French republican ideals. 
Clover explains,  
Given that the colonized can be absorbed neither into the state as free citizens nor into the 
economy as free labor…The relationship between race and capital and its historical 
connection to colonialism and post-colonial migrations [continues]…The shift from the 
use of mechanized labor to the deindustrialization of the west [accounts for the fact that] 
the great class recomposition and the abstraction of the economy are one and the same. 
Price-setting even in its contemporary form proves the most transient of palliatives. The 
public whose modality is an uprising must eventually encounter the need to pursue 
reproduction not just beyond the wage but beyond the marketplace.469 
His analysis contextualizes the historical impact of decolonization and the roots of employment 
restriction for African migrants in Paris. Moreover, his analysis of the relationship between race 
and capital led him to the conclusion that Afropeans must seek opportunities beyond the 
marketplace.  
This chapter suggests that African populations in Paris continue to create new 
employment opportunities for themselves and their community beyond the sphere of the 
corporate marketplace. As Afro-French entrepreneurs continue to develop businesses in various 
industries, they are keen on employing other Black people and actively seek opportunities to 
bring revenue and promote business models that have an impact on Africa. This transnational 
platform is rooted both in the historical fabric of the African diaspora but also in the cultural 
principles of cooperative economics and communal responsibility.470 Their collective fight 
                                                          
469 Clover, Riot, 164-165 and 172-173. (Emphasis added by author) 
470 These cultural principles reaffirm the connective tissue of the African diaspora as seen by the creation of the US 
holiday Kwanzaa as a response to the Watts urban uprisings in 1965. Based upon Swahili cultural practice, Dr. 
Maulana Karenga borrowed from African history to develop seven principles for the social, cultural and economic 
uplift of African American communities. This reference to communal economic policy is codified in the Swahili 
word “Ujamaa,” and in Bantu derived word “Ubuntu.”   
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against economic exploitation in France affirms that Afro-French populations contend with other 
mechanisms for socio-economic justice beyond the realm of violence. In this work, Afropeans 
act as agents of change instead of victims of the system. Embodied in the triumphs and 
challenges of Afro-French entrepreneurs, they are responding to the fluctuations of the French 
economy with ingenuity and an optimism that asserts both an African radical revolutionary spirit 
and a French republican egalitarian sensibility.471 Furthermore, as these businesses continue to 
gain value, the French economy will be forced to contend with the politics, social capital and 
cultural significance of Afro-French businesses; in addition to the potential of these companies to 
call attention to the visibility of Black French CEOs, European stakeholders and the rise of the 
“Black Euro.”472 In the years to come, these businesses hold the power to restructure how future 
students, prospective employees and the larger Parisian society think about employment 
opportunities. More importantly, their increased visibility reveals that though Black French 
business owners indeed achieve varying levels of socioeconomic success, their visions of success 
remain partly incomplete.  
Unequal outcomes between the middle and lower classes, men and women…substantiate 
the constraints of individual agency within [the French] social structure. The intersection 
of class, gender, race and ethnicity reproduces structural inequality [in France] through 
systems of oppression rooted in capitalism, patriarchy and White supremacy, even as they 
provide the basis for individual and collective agency. It is this interdependence of 
                                                          
471 "Constitution de la Republique Francaise." Assemble Nationale. http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp; Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism, 5.  
472 For an example of the potential for growth, see "Dirigeant de société "Upgrade." BFMBusiness. 
https://dirigeants.bfmtv.com/Elikya-PITHER-5941765/. Over a two-year period “UPGRADE” maintained a 2,083 € 
increase in the social capital of the company (2 000 € in 2012 to 4 083 € in 2014). Established by Afropean CEO, 
Elikya Pither in 2011, the company’s turnover was approximately 293 628 € in 2014 amounting in an increase of 
6,775 € from the 286,853€ garnered in 2012. Elikya Pither, (mid-30’s of Gabonese descent) in discussion with 
author. February 24, 2017.  
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structure and agency that shapes and reproduces the entrepreneurial life of [Black French 
peoples].473   
In their attempts to work within systems of oppression and call attention to the nature of 
inequality embedded in these systems, Afropean business owners navigate socioeconomic and 
political strata that impact their professional and personal lives.  Their individual activities are 
limited but increasingly these businesses are developing communal collaborations that both 
generate income but also serve as call to action to defy systems of inequality.   The desire of 
Black French populations to dismantle discriminatory practices and build stronger connections 
between Africa and France continues beyond the economic sphere and are increasingly visible in 








                                                          
473 (Emphasis added by author) Valdez, The New Entrepreneurs, 21. 
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Chapter Four: Le Pouvoir Noir: The Politics of Identity, Pan-Africanism and Social Justice 
 
Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner…The names of these 
African Americans, victims of police violence, have been widely reported in 
recent months in the French media…[In France] the deaths [of Black French boys 
and men] during or following an arrest are often treated as miscellaneous, a non-
event in the news, and the racial dimension widely silenced…In the mirror we 
hold to Ferguson, France should recognize its unsettling silhouette.474  
 
 
In the 2015 documentary, From Paris to Ferguson: Guilty of being Black, Afro-French 
journalist, activist and filmmaker Rokhaya Diallo interrogated the linkages and disjunction 
between police brutality and the movements that call attention to the racial component of these 
events in the United States and France. The film juxtaposed the success of African American 
activists garnering international media attention to racially motivated crimes by American police 
with the lack of French media attention on Black French victims of police brutality. Diallo 
unpacked the reality that both America and France contend with racially motivated incidents 
between police forces and Black residents. However, the United States has been more effective 
in mobilizing national and international media focus due to its ability to use race as a marker of 
identity that incites violent police interactions.  France lacks the legal lexicon to call attention to 
racial difference. Struck from the French constitution, “race” is no longer a component of 
identity recognized as a legal category.475 Thus in a “raceless” society, Black residents struggle 
                                                          
474 Juliette Deborde and Libé Labo, "Violences Policières: De Paris à Ferguson, Qui Sont Les Michael Brown 
Français?" Libération. March 23, 2016. Translated by Beti Ellerson. 
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/03/23/violences-policieres-de-paris-a-ferguson-qui-sont-les-michael-brown-
francais_1441425.  
475 “Race” was added to the 1946 iteration of the French constitution in the wake of World War II. In response to 
the racially-charged crimes of German Nazis and the Vichy regime, France used the term “race” to position itself 
against racism. The first article of the 1946 constitution read, “All citizens are equal before the law ‘regardless of 
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to garner attention to the racial element of these violent altercations because an acknowledgment 
of race is deemed antithetical to French republican ideals.  In an effort to inspire French activists, 
Diallo chronicles how activists in America foment and sustain these racial justice movements. 
Unifying her two roles as journalist and activist, she used film as a medium to tie together the 
function of media and the interrogation of police violence.  
Born to Senegalese parents in Paris, Rokhaya Diallo grew up in the Parisian banlieue of 
La Courneuve.  A year after the 2005 uprisings, she formed an organization called The 
Indivisibles. Dedicated to combating stereotypes and empowering Black French youth, Diallo’s 
activism began when she reflected upon her own upbringing. For many years, she did not see 
herself as “Black.” Relentless questions from white-French people prompted her identity crisis. 
She remembers, “when we were young, my brother and I had never asked ourselves, ‘where do 
we come from,’ until we were asked by others."476 
                                                          
origin, race or religion.’” Former President François Hollande campaigned on the promise to remove “race” from 
the Constitution arguing that there “are not different races” and that race “has no place in the Republic.” 
Lawmakers agreed to remove the term “race” and replace it with “gender.” The current first article of the 
constitution reads, “All citizens are equal before the law ‘regardless of gender, origin or religion.’”   For more 
information on the removal of race from the French constitution see Etienne Balibar, "Le Mot "race" N'est Pas « De 
Trop » Dans La Constitution Française." Mediapart. October 5, 2015. https://blogs.mediapart.fr/etienne-
balibar/blog/051015/le-mot-race-nest-pas-de-trop-dans-la-constitution-
francaise?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=Sharing&xtor=CS3-66; Rokhaya Diallo, 
"France's Dangerous Move to Remove 'race' from Its Constitution." The Washington Post. July 13, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/07/13/frances-dangerous-move-to-remove-
race-from-its-constitution/?utm_term=.50e4c7e46328; "'Race' Out, Gender Equality in as France Updates 
Constitution." France 24. June 28, 2018. https://www.france24.com/en/20180628-race-out-gender-equality-
france-updates-constitution.  
476 Didier Arnaud and Charlotte Rotman, "Humour Noir." Libération. March 17, 2009. 
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2009/03/17/humour-noir_546579. For more information about Diallo’s 
organization, The Indivisibles and its public reception, see Raphaëlle Bacqué, "Rokhaya Diallo, L'antiraciste Qui 
Divise." Le Monde. January 16, 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/m-actu/article/2018/01/12/rokhaya-diallo-l-
antiraciste-qui-divise_5240701_4497186.html; L.C. "Qui Est Rokhaya Diallo, La Militante Antiraciste Sur La Sellette 
Au Conseil National Du Numérique?" 20 Minutes. December 14, 2017. 
https://www.20minutes.fr/politique/2187943-20171214-rokhaya-diallo-militante-antiraciste-sellette-conseil-
national-numerique and Bernard Maro, "Les Y'a Bon Awards Ou L'antiracisme Sélectif Des "Je ne suis pas Charlie"." 
Huffington Post. October 05, 2016. https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/bernard-maro/les-ya-bon-awards-
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After years of being told that she was “different” from white-French people, she began a 
journey toward embracing her Blackness and challenging the internalized racism of France. The 
organization’s mission is to “put a stop to a partition of French citizenship” based upon physical 
appearance, geographical origin and religion.477 As Diallo’s public campaign against anti-racism 
grew in notoriety so did her journalism career. For a four-year period, from 2009-2013, Diallo 
was a regular commentator for the show La Matinale on Canal +. She held this position in 
addition to hosting two other nationally syndicated shows on RTL and “Fresh Cultures” on Mouv 
radio station.478 Her media career catapulted to new heights when Diallo accepted an 
appointment as a host for the newly minted BET-France network. In addition to her roles as 
television and radio talent, she directed and produced a series of documentaries.479 Diallo’s work 
                                                          
2015_b_7584750.html. Diallo is often regarded by white-French people as a polemic figure that emphasizes 
notions of difference or division by encouraging racial pride.  
477 This phrase “physical appearance, geographical origin and religion,” can be read as a reference to race, 
residence in the suburbs and the practice of Islam.  For more on Diallo’s organization, see Habibou, Bangré, "« Les 
Indivisibles » Face Aux Préjugés." Afrik. May 21, 2007. http://www.afrik.com/article11773.html. 
478 Bernard Poirette, "Face à Face: Anne Fulda - Rokhaya Diallo." RTL. July 10, 2011. http://www.rtl.fr/actu/justice-
faits-divers/face-a-face-anne-fulda-rokhaya-diallo10-7701388202.  
479 Steps to Liberty (2013) was written, directed and produced by Rokhaya Diallo for France Ô. The film reflects on 
the thirty-year anniversary of the March for Equality and Against Racism. Exploring the international connections 
between America and France, Diallo shares the journey toward a better understanding of identity. See "Rokhaya 
Diallo Présente Son Documentaire « Les Marches De La Liberté »." Le Parisien. December 2, 2013. 
http://www.leparisien.fr/tv/video-rokhaya-diallo-presente-son-documentaire-les-marches-de-la-liberte-02-12-
2013-3370543.php. Networks of Hate (2014) was written and directed by Rokhaya Diallo and Mélanie Gallard for 
LCP and France 3. The film examines the role of free speech on social media platforms and the internet. The 
documentary considers hate speech, anonymity, and bullying.  See Olivier Couvreur, "BONUS - Les Réseaux De La 
Haine: L'interview De Rokhaya Diallo - France 3 Paris Ile-de-France." France 3. June 05, 2014. https://france3-
regions.francetvinfo.fr/paris-ile-de-france/emissions/doc-24-paris-ile-de-france/actu/rokhaya-diallo.html-0. Not Yo 
Mama's Movement (2016) was written, directed and produced by Rokhaya Diallo for TV5Monde and France 
Ô. This film chronicles her evolution as a Black French activist and the connections between her work and the new 
rise of activism within the United States in response to Ferguson, Missouri. See "Not Yo Mama’s Movement (U.S. 





is representative of a host of Black French individual and collective activities.  Using various 
digital, visual and print media, they bring increased attention to the racialized experiences of 
African migrants and citizens. Ultimately, activists challenging the idea of “racelessness” assert 
the existence of race in France and the fundamental underlying inequalities that shape French 
society in this intervening period. Through the creation of grassroots movements, Afro-French 
activists promote visions of transnational Blackness that are empowering and counteract the 
disaggregating power of French colorblindness. Tying together two focal points of activist 
energy: policing and performance, this chapter argues that the navigation and negotiation of 
“racelessness” has constrained and severely limited Black French movements. 
This chapter focuses on Black French protest efforts against racism and discrimination. 
Using two case studies in media and police brutality, it considers how activists grapple with 
calling attention to the lack of mainstream Black French representation and the underpinnings of 
inequality fostered by this invisibility.  The first case study examines advocacy for greater Black 
representation in media. Subsequently, activists transitioned their efforts towards the types of 
Black depictions in both fictional and news media. The second case study analyzes Afro-French 
responses to over-policing and police violence by highlighting a series of incidents from the 
post-2005 era that sparked a new wave of protests. The infrastructure of demanding recognition 
and challenging the contradictions of the French state are a result of intensive campaigns for 
media representation. However, when these campaigns push beyond matters of representation to 
addressing racial inequality it encounters even more resistance. 
The Black French community continues to experiment with a variety of tactics to vie for 
equality within France. The 2005 uprisings fundamentally changed the international visibility of 
their struggle for inclusion. The protests of second-generation youth infused activist efforts with 
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renewed urgency and rationale to contest their exclusion from universal rights guaranteed by the 
nation-state. Stemming from a longer history of dreams deferred, the Black community continues 
to challenge France’s “racial aphasia” in their demands for multiculturalism.480 These efforts 
reveal the irreconcilable differences between the specific racialized experiences of Black 
immigrant populations in France and the universalism of the national motto “Liberté égalité et 
fraternité.” The current French model makes it virtually impossible to bring together race and 
universalism. In this space, race functions as an evolving category of socio-cultural identification 
rather than political classification.  Thus, this forced vision of racelessness leaves activists 
without the avenues to raise racial inequality within formal political channels. For Black French 
people “the personal is political,” and their experiences reveal that conversations about race are 
finally beginning instead of reaching an ending point.   In a nation that rhetorically claims 
universal equality for all of its citizens, Black people are fundamentally denied these rights by 
the state.  These case studies address the ways in which activists have tied together refusal to 
acknowledge race with the subsequent perpetuation of substantive inequality for Black people 
within French society.  
Collectif Égalité & Black French Representation in the Media  
 Tropes of visibility and invisibility permeate Afro-French representation in media. The 
invisibility of Black people and their experiences of inequality are at the center of activists’ 
campaigns. In reckoning with the French state, activists focused first on recognition and 
                                                          
480 Most clearly articulated by distinguished scholar Ann Laura Stoler, “colonial aphasia” engendered an increasing 
level of resentment for migrants once they arrived in the metropole. She states that the “’sordidly racist’ and 
‘systematic’ compartmentalized violence that colonialism animated, the ‘lines of force’ it created, and the 
‘degradations’ it instilled in the colonies and in Europe---among both colonizer and colonized.” See Ann Laura 
Stoler, “Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in France." Public Culture 23, no. 1 (2011): 121-56. 
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acceptance of Black individuals.  One of the key areas of emphasis was the push for 
representation in mainstream media. The next stage of this movement centered on why being 
seen mattered politically, socially, economically.  Calling for character portrayals that moved 
beyond depictions of Black French people as criminals and vagrants, activists maintained that 
these destructive portrayals mapped with French society’s iconography of Black people. 
Accordingly, Afro-French media personalities used their public platforms to call attention to and 
wrestle with these inequalities.  
 A critical catalyst in the demand for greater representation in media occurred during the 
2000 César Awards. In the wake of the public celebration of French diversity as a result of 1998 
World Cup win, the César Awards provided a stark counterpoint to the ways in which French 
media failed to live up to these grandiose visions of an egalitarian society. On February 19, 2000, 
Canal + broadcast the 25th anniversary of the César Awards.481 Throughout the evening, France 
honored the year’s most celebrated actors, directors and films. Midway through the ceremony, 
Djibouti-born actor Luc Saint-Éloy and renowned Cameroonian author Calixthe Beyala surprised 
the audience with an unscripted appearance on the stage. Decrying the invisibility of Black men 
and women, Luc Saint-Éloy offered the following commentary:  
On behalf of the 8 to 10 million [non-white] French citizens…we want to tell you that the 
situation we have suffered for too long violates any concept of human dignity. Just 
imagine! Imagine in this country, a television that transmits exclusively black images. 
Imagine in this country, all the cinemas screens would project stories exclusively 
between blacks for blacks to the exclusion of any other color…And you dear compatriots, 
imagine, you are absent, invisible. Just imagine!...But this is not fiction, only our harsh 
                                                          
481 The César Awards are the French equivalent of the Oscars. 
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reality in a white [French] world that excludes all other parts of the population, whose 
only fault is to be Black or Yellow.482  
 
Adding to Saint-Éloy’s commentary, Calixthe Beyala offered her own observations about the 
lack of Black visibility in French cinema. She stated, “We are here to tell you and believe that 
the French cinema should draw upon this country’s multiculturalism.”483 They concluded their 
five-minute speech by publicizing the Collectif égalité (Equality Collective), a group of actors, 
creatives and activists dedicated to calling attention to the need for diversity in French media.484  
 In the moments preceding their speeches, Saint-Éloy and Beyala descended from their 
balcony seats and proceeded toward the podium. Bypassing security, they seized the stage and 
interrupted the ceremony. Neither Saint-Éloy nor Beyala were scheduled to deliver remarks that 
night. Yet, they used the opportunity to address both audience viewers and the cabinet ministers 
seated in the theater that night. Their seemingly unscripted and impromptu speeches were 
planned.  In addition to securing seats to attend the award show, they also drafted their remarks 
the evening before.485 Saint-Éloy’s comments were a response to his experiences as both an actor 
and director in the French entertainment industry. Beyala directed her statement toward the 
Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann. In 1999, she wrote a letter to Trautmann condemning 
                                                          
482 This moment in French television history can be viewed at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5ch_7idjAk. 
The full transcript was translated by Astrid Siwsanker. This transcript has been edited by the author. 
483 This moment in French television history can be viewed at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5ch_7idjAk. 
The full transcript was translated by Astrid Siwsanker. This transcript has been edited by the author. 
484 This committee works for a better integration of visible minorities in the French audiovisual and 
cinematographic landscape, for more information, see the biography written about Luc Saint-Éloy by Stéphanie 
Bérard, "Luc Saint-Éloy." November 27, 2015. http://ile-en-ile.org/saint-eloy/. 
485 Panel Discussion with Luc Saint-Éloy and Calixthe Beyala. June 21, 2017. 
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the “deficit of representation of Blacks on [TV] and threatened to sue the state.”486  Moving 
beyond a letter writing campaign, Beyala used this televised moment to address Trautmann face 
to face and challenge the minister’s silence in response to her letter. The live broadcast captured 
Saint-Éloy and Beyala insistence that politicians be held accountable for addressing the concerns 
of citizens. Moreover, this high stakes moment represented an opportunity to nationally publicize 
the experiences of Black people on a platform that continually rendered them invisible. As they 
began to read their manifesto, neither activist knew how long they had before security would 
escort them out of the theater. In the end, they were not interrupted during the reading of their 








However, the television director undercut their message by using two camera techniques 
to contradict their statements. First, the director panned the camera back and forth between the 
                                                          
486 Abdoulaye Gueye, “Manufacturing Blackness,” in Becoming Minority: How Discourses and Policies Produce 
Minorities in Europe and India. Edited by Tripathy, Jyotirmaya, and Sudarsan Padmanabhan (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2014), 76.  
Figure 16. Luc Saint-Éloy and Calixthe Beyala pictured during the 2000 César Awards. 
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audience and the speakers in an effort to capture the shock and disdain of the audience. Next, the 
camera zoomed in on the few non-white actors seated in the audience during moments when 
Beyala and Saint- Éloy noted the shortage of Black actors within the industry. This cinematic 
maneuver subliminally suggested that they made false claims countered by the Black faces in the 
audience.487 These two camera movements failed to undermine a key statement made by 
Calixthe Beyala. Despite their diminutive representation in the film industry, no major César 
award was ever awarded to a Sub-Saharan African man or woman. This flashpoint unearthed the 
“unsettling parody of the situation the Collectif describe: even when two black people take center 
stage in a French TV program (albeit illegitimately), they are marginalized and undermined by 
the director’s – and the spectator’s – gaze.”488 This constant undermining was exacerbated by the 
popular press. The Equality Collective’s pointedly political stance in the artistic world drew 
polemical responses from popular commentators and artists at the time. The press condemned 
Beyala and Saint-Éloy. They framed their call for diversity as an “attack” and a “divisive” 
plea.489 
In their first public appearance after the Césars, the Equality Collective organized a 
demonstration in May 2000 called the “National March of Black People for Honor and Respect.” 
Amassing a crowd of a little less than one thousand people, Liberation magazine deemed the 
                                                          
487 Nicki Hitchcott, "Calixthe Beyala: Black face(s) on French TV." Modern & Contemporary France12, no. 4 (2004): 
473-482. 
488 Hitchcott, "Calixthe Beyala: Black face(s) on French TV," 473-482.  
489 In Le Monde (22/02/2000), “Tonie Marshall triomphe aux Césars,” 30; “Cérémonie des Césars: pladoyer pour les 
comédiens  noirs” in France Antilles culture société (Fev. 2000) ; In L’Express, “La tentation des quotas après les 
femmes en politique, les noirs à la télévision, le Collectif Égalité passe à l'attaque,”96 l'Express 24/02/2000 ; 





event a failure. Unable to build collaborations with the country’s major anti-racist organizations, 
the report argued that the Collective was “overconfident in its ability to mobilize [the 
community].”490 Despite the small scale of the march, the Collective boasted at least one high-
profile media personality. Among the attendees for the march was the Collective’s co-founder, 
Franco-Cameroonian comedian Dieudonné M'bala. His presence in their march offered an 
increased sense of visibility to their cause.491  
The Equality Collective organized two additional marches that year, but each failed to 
mobilize further demonstrations. Still, their efforts garnered the attention of the Conseil 
supérieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA). The group met with the CSA to further “rehabilitate the image 
of the African community in the media.”492 Later that year, media sociologist and Professor of 
Information Sciences and Communication Dr. Marie-France Malonga shared her findings with 
CSA in the landmark study, “Presence and Representation of Visible Minorities on French 
                                                          
490 Stéphanie Binet, "Contre la télé en blanc et blanc. Le collectif Egalité manifeste contre l'absence des Noirs du 
petit écran." Libération. May 22, 2000. http://www.liberation.fr/medias/2000/05/22/contre-la-tele-en-blanc-et-
blanc-le-collectif-egalite-manifeste-contre-l-absence-des-noirs-du-petit-_325965.  
491 Dieudonné M'bala is a French actor, activist and comedian. Born in Fontenay-aux-Roses, France to a 
Cameroonian father and a white French mother, he rose to fame as a comedian whose jokes were based on race. 
Early on in his career, he aligned with the anti-racist left group “Les Utopistes” against the right-wing National 
Front. Only receiving 8% of the national vote, Les Utopistes advocated for legalizing sans-papiers migrants. 
Between the years 2000-2005, he collaborated with pan-African leaders as well as anti-racist organizations such as: 
Calixthe Beyala, CRAN and Claudy Siar. After becoming friends with right-wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2005, 
Dieudonné became increasing polemical to his French audience often inciting anti-Semitic jokes and terroristic 
activity. His entertainment career spiraled as he was refused entry to Belgium and Canada and was convicted of 
inciting racial hatred. 






Television.”493  Her research revealed that there was a “low level of representation of ‘visible 
minorities,’ particularly in the film and television industry.”494 The Equality Collective used 
Malonga’s findings to advocate for representation quotas in the media industry and used public 
forums to challenge the absence of Black French voices.495 Despite their initial advances, the 
group lost traction by 2002. On one hand, their efforts were subsumed by a national campaign to 
contest racial discrimination. Acting Prime Minister Lionel Jospin silenced the Equality 
Collective’s growing momentum by grouping efforts against racial discrimination within five 
major anti-racist/anti-Semitic organizations: French League of Education and Lifelong Learning, 
SOS Racism, International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA), Movement 
Against Racism and for the Friendship of Peoples (MRAP) and the League for Human Rights 
(LDH). Despite the longstanding existence of the aforementioned groups that had by the late 
twentieth century adopted a more race conscious approach, their activities were primarily rooted 
in the fight against anti-Semitism. Moreover, most of the groups were not explicitly concerned 
with putting Black French voices at the center of their public platform. Thus there was a clear 
                                                          
493 Marie-France Malonga, “Présence et représentation des minorités visibles à la télévision française.” A summary 
was published as “Présence et représentation des minorités visibles à la télévision française: une étude Conseil 
supérieur de l'audiovisuel,” La lettre du CSA 129, 2000, 12-14.  
494 CSA was “created by the law of January 17th, 1989,” with the role of guaranteeing the freedom of audio-visual 
communication in France. It succeeded the High-ranking authority of the audio-visual communication (1982-1986) 
and the National Commission of the communication and freedoms (1986-1989),” CSA. "Presentation of the 
Council." Presentation of the Council/the CSA. http://en.www.csa.fre05d.systranlinks.net/Le-CSA/Presentation-du-
Conseil. The findings presented by Dr. Malonga were first presented in a study by the Center for Information and 
Studies on International Migration, Presence and Representation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities on French 
Television, ARA Survey, Paris, CIEMI, 16- October 30, 1991, 92. This study formed the basis for her doctoral thesis 
entitled, “Ethnic minorities and French television: from representation to reception. The black populations face the 
small screen,” (PhD. University Paris II - Panthéon Assas, 2007). 
495 For more information on racial quotas in the media see Nayrac Magali, "La Question De La Représentation Des 
Minorités Dans Les Médias, Ou ..." Surveys and Perspectives Integrating Environment and Society. October 04, 
2011. https://journals.openedition.org/urmis/1054#bodyftn12.  
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difference between these mainstream anti-racist organizations and Black organizations like the 
Equality Collective that aimed to “naturalize both their existence as a distinctive [racial and 
ethnic] group in France and the Frenchness of this community.”496  By ignoring the Equality 
Collective in his public call to action, Jospin effectively muzzled the group from access to the 
French political system.497 A subset of public commentators suggested that the Prime Minister 
did not acknowledge the Equality Collective due to the fact that one of its key figures was mired 
in controversy.  Calixthe Beyala confronted claims that she plagiarized portions of her book, The 
Little Prince of Belleville.498 This scandal eroded the already minuscule white French public 
support for the group. However, within the Black community future media personalities and 
activists acknowledged the inroads paved by Equality Collective.  
The next battle would take shape over the anchor’s desk on the nightly news. In 2004 and 
in 2006, leading French news stations France 3 and TF1 hired their first Black news anchors. The 
hiring of Audrey Pulvar and Harry Roselmack grew directly out of demands from French 
                                                          
496 Gueye identifies five Black organizations that were established in this period, Equality Collective in December 
1998 in celebration of the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in France; Africagora led by Dogad Dogoui in 
1998, which organized Black entrepreneurs; Association pour Favoriser l’Integration Professionnelle (AFIP) in 2002; 
Cercle d’Action pour la Promotion de la Diversite (CAPDV) which gathered Black politicians, activists, and academics 
in 2004 and Representative Council of Black Associations (CRAN) in 2005, which was an attempt to consolidate 
these smaller  organizations into a singular unit.  See, Gueye, Abdoulaye. “Manufacturing Blackness,” in Becoming 
Minority: How Discourses and Policies Produce Minorities in Europe and India. Edited by Tripathy, Jyotirmaya, and 
Sudarsan Padmanabhan (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 69 and “The Labyrinth to Blackness: On 
Naming and Leadership in the Black Associative Space in French.” French Cultural Studies 24 (2): 196-207.   
497 "Le Collectif 'Egalité' Obtient Le Label De La 'Grande Cause Nationale' Pour 2002." Ligue Des Droits De L'Homme. 
February 4, 2002. https://www.ldh-france.org/Le-collectif-Egalite-obtient-le/. 
498 For more on the Beyala Plagiarism case, see Béatrice Gurrey, "Le Plagiat Sans Peine." Le Monde. September 22, 
2011. https://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2011/09/22/le-plagiat-sans-peine_1575879_3260.html; Nicki 
Hitchcott, "Calixthe Beyala: Prizes, Plagiarism, and "Authenticity"." Research in African Literatures37, no. 1 (2006): 





activists and pressure from French officials both before and after the 2005 uprisings and 
launched a new series of conversations about the significance and importance of Black media 
representation.  
Audrey Pulvar became the first Black national news anchor in 2004. Born the daughter of 
a political figure in Martinique, Pulvar carried the weight of her father’s dreams. In an interview, 
she reflected on her father’s desires.  She lamented, “[he] expects me to be the next Oprah. 
That’s not possible in this country; the French system does not allow that kind of 
opportunity.”499 Co-anchoring the evening news slot on the state-owned channel France 3, 
Pulvar was both a target of praise and criticism. Many social pundits disparaged her arrival to the 
national television as premature. Reflecting on her experiences, Pulvar asserted, “I had to prove 
myself continually, more than any white [person] in a similar position.”500  This process of 
“proving herself” led to an international career that spanned across a decade and on multiple 
platforms (print, visual and audio-visual programing) in France.501  In her book entitled, Free 
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501 After hosting the nightly news show “19/20” on France 3, she joined i>Télé for its nightly news program and 
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like them: Portraits of Singular Women, Pulvar wrote about twenty feminist figures who 
impacted her life and career. Her book is particularly useful to examine her positionality as a 
Black French woman. This text offers clear insight in her own voice to the particular challenges 
of the French media industry and simultaneously highlights the way in which she explicitly tries 
to minimize the impact of race and instead focuses on gender identity. Adopting “raceless” 
language characterized much of her public career and later subsequent relationship to anti-racist 
activism.502  In this work, she noted that “the press remains the most misogynist bastion” within 
French society.503  
As the first Black woman seen on national news, Pulvar was named a role model for 
Black youth.  She shied away from communal pressure to serve as a forerunner for “her race” for 
most of her career. Citing an experience of visiting a local school, she stated, “I…try to 
encourage young people. What I find most painful is when some Black people say I’m not Black 
enough, but I’m a Black girl.”  In the face of colorism and sexism, Pulvar left her career as a 
journalist to pursue a role as a feminist activist who lobbied for political reform. In her career as 
both a journalist and activist, Pulvar encountered constant criticism. Although she was the first 
Black person on national news, she did not want to be an anti-racist activist. However, being “the 
first” forced her into a political role due to lack of representation.  For many in the Black 
community, her reluctance to serve as a role model meant that she bought into notions of 
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“racelessness.” During the majority of her career, Pulvar rarely talked about race and its impact 
on her career trajectory. At the same time, she was at the helm of many feminist causes including 
confronting sexual harassment in the television world.504  Continuing within a longer tradition of 
Black women in political positions, their presence remains highly contested within and outside of 
their designated racial community. Black women remain controversial interlocutors. This 
intersection between race and gender granted Pulvar access to certain roles and positions but also 
made her subject to heightened criticism that differed from those who would follow.  
Two years after Pulvar began her career at France 3, news station TF1 hired the 
Martiniquan journalist Harry Roselmack. His hiring was more directly tied to the political 
urgencies of the 2005 urban uprisings. In the wake of the 2005 urban uprisings, President 
Jacques Chirac responded to claims by the international press that France lacked non-white faces 
on national television. 505 He reminded media companies that they had a responsibility to 
represent the inclusivity of French society. In his call for diversity, Chirac urged media outlets to 
hire men and women who would show both French citizens and the world that the country was 
committed to a more accurate portrayal of society.506 Chiraq’s pressure on media outlets 
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particularly private entities forced them to keep up with diversity initiatives undertaken by state-
owned channels.   
On July 17, 2006, Harry Roselmack began his career as the first Black news anchorman 
for Europe’s largest privately-owned television station. His temporary six-week summer 
assignment was a response to Chirac’s call for media diversity and to demands by Black French 
activists for more diverse faces on television. Amirouche Laidi, the president of a national media 
diversity organization, called  Roselmack’s hiring “a "huge advance…This is like a bombshell 
for us - a black man presenting the 8pm news on the biggest television station in France.”507 
Echoing these sentiments of triumph, Patrick Lozès, acting president of the Representative 
Council of Black Associations (CRAN), stated, “It’s very good news, not just for black people, 
but for France in general…It shows that black people can succeed somewhere other than sports 
and music.”508 Roselmack’s success as a journalist was cemented in history by drawing in an 
inaugural viewership of over eight million (three million more than the station’s nightly 
average).509 As a result of his overwhelming positive reception, Roselmack became a permanent 
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fixture for the TF1 channel. During his career as a journalist, he worked on three shows. In 
addition to his continuing role as anchor for the nightly news on “Sept à huit,” he also expanded 
his presence in the media world as a producer and screenwriter for television, documentaries and 
film. He credited much of his success to the early strivings of Luc Saint-Éloy and Calixthe 
Beyala at the 2000 César awards. He states, “[their] actions…helped make it possible for me.”510  
As Black French journalists made considerable in-roads with on and off-air production 
credits, similar developments occurred on big-screen. On February 24, 2012, Canal+ broadcast 
the annual César awards. Many of the same French film stars seated during the 2000 César 
awards were present. For the first time in the thirty-seven years of the award’s existence, the Best 
Actor award was given to a Black man. Omar Sy was the first Black man to be nominated for the 
award and the first to win it. Earlier that month, he took home the Lumière award (French 
equivalent of the Golden Globes) for Best Actor. Born to a Mauritanian mother and Senegalese 
father in the western Parisian banlieue of Trappes, Omar won both awards for his 
groundbreaking performance in the French blockbuster The Untouchables. Ranked one of the 
                                                          
Pressure." The Independent. April 01, 2009. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-gets-its-
first-black-tv-presenter-after-chirac-pressure-6107251.html.  
510 Lester Sloan, "The News From Paris." Ebony, August 2007, 95-96. Despite the early success of journalists Pulvar 
and Roselmack, quantitative studies found that French media was still not representative of the current 
demographics of society. The sitting president of the CSA, Michel Boyon stated, ““I would not say that these results 
are not satisfactory, I would say that they are unacceptable. They are intolerable in the France of 2008. Diversity is 
life. And unfortunately, our television today does not reflect what it should be expressing and representing 
today…You will see that compared to the study done in 1999, 9 years ago, progress is minimal. And it is not 
because there has been a slight progression, a very slight progression, that one has to imagine that the problem is 
about to be solved, far from it. This situation is not acceptable, it is not admissible, it is not tolerable, and everyone 
must draw the consequences.” In Médias et diversités, Ministère de la culture et de la communication, 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/104000287.pdf, 31. For a more detailed 
explanation of the composition of the committee and its propositions see, "Médias Et Diversités." Direction De 




highest grossing films in French cinematic history, it spent ten straight weeks as France’s 
number one film in the box office.511 
The film stars Omar Sy as Driss, a down-on-his-luck ex-convict living in the Parisian 
suburbs. Appearing for an interview as a live-in caregiver, Driss presumes he will not be hired 
and can begin receiving government assistance. As fate would have it, Driss is hired to care for a 
wealthy quadriplegic named Philippe. As their friendship blossoms, Philippe introduces Driss to 
the luxuries of upper-class life while Driss helps Philippe embrace a carpe-diem mentality and 
introduces him to elements of Black culture. Based on a true story, the film concludes with a 
closing shot of Philippe di Borgo and his French-Algerian caregiver named Abdel Sellou.512 The 
film received assorted views.  Some critics proclaimed the film as inspirational while others 
criticized the film for being situated within the cinematic trope of Driss as the “magical negro” 
and Philippe as a “savior” figure.513 Despite this mixed reception by film critics, 
Untouchables grossed $365.1 million worldwide becoming the second highest grossing film in 
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French box office history and the top grossing foreign film of the year within the United 
States.514 The success of the film resulted in invitations for the cast and crew to dine at the 
Élysée Palace with President Sarkozy. However, Omar Sy declined his invitation citing a hectic 
filming schedule.515 His decision not to attend the event was discussed in several media outlets 
as both a political rebuff and a thinly masked protest of Sarkozy’s treatment towards Black and 
immigrant populations.516 However, Sy’s historic win at the César’s called attention to both the 
mainstream invisibility of Black actors and the type of role that garnered Best Actor praise.  
Omar Sy’s portrayal of Driss fits within the tropes outlined by French sociologist Marie-
France Malonga. Her findings characterized “three reoccurring types of characters representing 
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‘visible minorities’: the victim, the delinquent and the savage.517 Malonga’s study contends that 
mere representation is not enough within French media. She argues that the next frontier of 
representation is qualitative progression instead of quantitative growth. Her work insists that an 
oversaturation of negative imagery portrayed by non-white French actors has a negative impact 
on the daily life of Black French people. This surplus of Black characters seen on television and 
film as the “delinquent” and the “savage” coalesce with generalizations made by the police about 
Black males as criminals. In a scene from The Untouchables, Driss takes Philippe on a high-
speed ride around Paris. When confronted by the police, Driss and Philippe are cornered by a 
swarm of cop cars. Police slam Driss’ body to the hood of the car and a gun is pointed at his 
head. The police’s assumption that Driss was both a criminal and “armed and dangerous” 
overlap with caricatures most vividly seen in the practice of identity checks.518  
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Black youths are routinely singled out by police forces in unwarranted contrôles. These 
interactions are often violent and can sometimes lead to death. Changing the narrative about 
Black males as violent and savage in fictional portrayals has the power to translate into daily life.  
Activists’ focus on “rehabilitating” the media image of the African community is critically 
linked to their efforts to confront violent police interactions and French society’s criminalization 
of their presence based upon race.  In a survey conducted in partnership with Slate magazine, 
only 33% of French society believed that Black people were represented positively in the media, 
whereas 65% of people polled believed that diversity in media was numerically well 
represented.519 This disjuncture between mere numerical representation and positive perception 
is at the core of Black French activists’ agenda. Often citing the presence of Harry Roselmack, 
activists draw a sharp line between fictional television and film representation and the French 
press. Roselmack’s reputation as a respected journalist and public figure in the press often stood 
in contrast to fictional television and film depictions of Black men as vagrants and criminals.   
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Figure 17. Omar Sy (pictured in his role as 
Driss) during the police chase scene.  
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Despite being “touted as the ‘ultimate symbol’ of ethnic diversity in France,” Roselmack 
offered a much more dismal response to this narrative of progress.520 In a 2017 interview with 
TéléObs, he remarked, “You could not imagine that putting a black guy on the 8 pm [news] was 
going to change everything."521 Countering activists’ praise of his mainstream success and 
embrace by French society, Roselmack recognizes that achieving “diversity” is far more 
complex than his singular presence on television. Broadly acclaimed as a “sex symbol,” he is 
often used as a foil to dominant narratives of Black males as “criminals” and “illegal.”522 This 
status as a “sex symbol” propelled white French anxieties about Black people as objects of 
desire. In the face of his success and positive reception by white French audiences, Roselmack 
still confronts the impact of racism. Race was a propelling factor in his recruitment to TF1 and 
the realities of both political and socioeconomic daily life in France. Penning an editorial within 
Le Monde entitled “Racist France is back,”  Roselmack discusses the weight of racism in his own 
life and self-identification, “I am first a man, a son, a brother, a husband and a father, a citizen, a 
journalist, a passionate [person] and yes, yes, it's true, I'm black. The Republic, its slogan and its 
laws manage, most of the time, to make me forget it.”523 His introspective musing of “forgetting” 
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that he is Black most of the time is countered later in the editorial with a list of examples in 
French politics, daily language, iconography and communal sentiments of racial segregation 
rooted in anti-blackness. Roselmack penned his thoughts about racism and daily life in response 
to an incident with the Minster of Defense, Christiane Taubira, a woman of Afro-Caribbean 
descent.  
In 2015, the right-wing magazine Minute published a photograph of Christiane Taubira 
with the caption, “Crafty as a monkey, Taubira gets her banana back.”524 She faced three public 
attacks that likened her to an animal throughout her political career. During a public protest, a 
young French white child threw a banana at her. In an interview on national television, a far-right 
candidate stated she would rather see Taubira "in a tree swinging from the branches rather than 
in government.”525 Public outcry against these racist attacks flooded social media. However, an 
outpouring of responses by her political colleagues remained alarmingly minuscule. This silence 
is starkly contrasted by what the press deemed “Taubiramania” by LGBTQ advocates and the 
left/center politicians during her proposal to legalize gay marriage.526  Taubira countered this 
erosion of political capital during racially infused incidents. In an interview, she linked her 
individual experiences to France’s political foundation. She stated, “apart from my own personal 
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case, these racist attacks are an attack on the heart of the Republic.”527 Yet, representatives of the 
Republic did not respond to the series of racist incidents as an attack.  Instead, black journalists 
like Roselmack used their platform to offer a public defense of her legitimacy as a leader and to 
shine a light on the deep-rooted racism within France. His article called attention to the ways in 
which racial and gendered prejudices erected barriers that Taubira could not destroy alone.528  In 
the end, Harry Roselmack’s staunch support for the Minster of Defense heightened his visibility 
and reception within the Black community. 
The overall success of both Roselmack and Pulvar opened the door for several more 
Black journalists on primetime television including Rokhaya Diallo seen on BET-France.529 
Diallo’s career as a respected journalist positioned her to be an ideal candidate for French 
President Emmanuel Macron’s National Digital Council (CNNum) in 2017. This committee of 
experts would help the new president develop a more informed digital policy.530 However, her 
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abject_3506228_3260.html; Jon Frosch and Sarah Leduc, "Black Public Figures Sound Alarm on 'racist France'." 
France 24. November 14, 2013. http://www.france24.com/en/20131106-france-racism-christiane-taubira-harry-
roselmack-marine-le-pen-nicolassarkozy; Nabila Ramdani, "Racism in France Is a 'latent Problem'." BBC News. 
November 08, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-24864086/nabila-ramdani-racism-in-france-is-a-latent-
problem; Fabrice Rousselot and Sonya Faure, "Christiane Taubira: «Des inhibitions Disparaissent, Des Digues 
Tombent»." Libération. November 06, 2013. http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2013/11/05/des-inhibitions-
disparaissent-des-digues-tombent_944910. 
529 Several other Afro-French journalists have since acquired positions on French national television including: 
Cameroonian Elizabeth Tchoungui (France 24 and TV5), Burundian Karine Le Marchand (France 3 and TV5), Marie-
Aline Méliyi (Télé-Loisirs and LCI) and Christine Kelly (France 3, LCI, Demain.TV) 
530 Though the digital committee was not the brain-child of Macron, the French national government decided to 
form the thirty-person forum to advise the new president. See Claire Legros and Sandrine Cassini, "Le Conseil 
National Du Numérique Lance Un Débat Public Sur La Régulation Des Plates-formes." Le Monde. October 11, 2017. 
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role as a Black activist received considerable criticism. Open reproach by political leaders for her 
public stance against racism greatly differed from receptions to Harry Roselmack’s editorial 
denouncing racism.  As soon the national committee announced Diallo’s appointment, the 
mainstream right-wing party Les Républicains published an “open letter” to the government 
protesting her selection. Citing her advocacy against racism, use of the terminology 
“institutionalized racism” and support for feminist organizations, Les Républicains denounced 
her candidacy.531 This pushback occurred despite her selection being approved by the Prime 
Minister and Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, Mounir Mahjoubi.532 Diallo was swiftly 
dismissed from the voluntary position by the government to ensure “greater peace of mind” 
                                                          
https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/10/11/le-conseil-national-du-numerique-lance-un-debat-public-
sur-la-regulation-des-plates-formes_5199405_3234.html and "Nos Travaux." CNNum. 
https://cnnumerique.fr/en/nos-travaux#societe-numerique.  
531 For the entire transcript of the open letter see, Zafimehy, Marie. "Pourquoi Rokhaya Diallo A-t-elle été écartée 
Du Conseil National Du Numérique?" RTL. December 16, 2017. http://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/pourquoi-rokhaya-
diallo-a-t-elle-ete-ecartee-du-conseil-national-du-numerique-7791447394.  The letter mentions her being 
“outspoken on institutional racism” in France. As well as her lending support to “feminist movements” such as 
Collectif Mwasi (an Afro-Feminist organization). Mwasi garnered national attention when they proposed to offer a 
conference with select sessions only available to Black women. This display of racial “separatism” caused the 
mayor of Paris to call for a ban on the programming.  Anti-racist groups such as SOS Racisme and LICRA expressed 
their disapproval of the conference as well.  See, "Paris Mayor Calls for Ban of Black Feminist Festival 'prohibited to 
White People'." RT International. May 29, 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/390030-paris-feminist-festival-black/ 
and Pierre Sorgue, "« Ne Nous Libérez Pas, on S'en Charge » : Le Cri Des Afroféministes." Le Monde. July 28, 2017. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/m-actu/article/2017/06/16/ne-nous-liberez-pas-on-s-en-charge-le-cri-des-
afrofeministes_5145330_4497186.html.  
532 Secretary of State for Digital Affairs Mounir Mahjoubi’s approval and appointment to the French cabinet 
position is critical given that he is one of the few non-white politicians represented within national office. Born in 
Paris to Moroccan immigrants, he was a former member of the National Assembly for Paris (June 21, 2017-July 21, 
2017), President of the French Digital Council (February 2, 2016-January 19, 2017) and began a role as Secretary of 
State for the Digitals Affairs (May 17, 2017). Despite being in agreement with Diallo’s original appointment, 
Mahjoubi would later backpedal in his support releasing an office statement that said, “[the office of Mounir 
Mahjoubi] confirms that Rokhaya Diallo is at the heart of the problem: ‘Following the appointment of the Council, 
members of the government and Matignon received a lot of messages and comments reported on the case of Ms. 
Diallo.’" From “Le Gouvernement Ne Veut Pas De La Militante Antiraciste Rokhaya Diallo Au Conseil National Du 




within CNNum.  In response to this reactionary decision by French policymakers, head of the 
Digital Advisory board Marie Ekeland resigned her position as well. In an official statement, she 
said “in France, we don’t want to hear dissonant voices. It shows that we don’t know how to 
calmly debate different points of view.” Following her lead, 27 other members of the 30-person 
committee resigned in solidarity.533  
The collapse of CNNum’s first National Digital Council sparked international attention 
and garnered overwhelming negative press for new president Emmanuel Macron and the French 
government. This negative press revealed both staunch resistance to differing opinions under the 
guise of universalism but also the fallacy of French colorblindness.  Rokhaya Diallo offered the 
following commentary about her position at the center of this political debacle.  
I think [this controversy] shows there’s a great tension…What you can see today is there 
are topics which are very hard to discuss in France, namely race issues. There has been a 
wave of support for me by people…There are generations now who understand that 
France today is also made up of people like me, that I’m part of France today, and 
whether you want to listen to me or not, you have to take that into account. It’s painful 
for some people but crucial for the future.534 
                                                          
533 Ekeland was quoted in the following interview, Angelique Chrisafis, "French Race Row Erupts as Feminist Forced 
off Advisory Body." The Guardian. December 20, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/20/french-
race-row-erupts-as-feminist-forced-off-advisory-body. In a joint statement released by all resigning members of 
the digital committee, they state, “Noting the impossibility of implementing his project, considering that the work 
of the Council can no longer be done in effective ways, we decided to collectively present our resignation.” For 
more public reception to this controversy see Sandrine Cassini, "Le Conseil National Du Numérique Perd Sa 
Présidente Et La Quasi-totalité De Ses Membres." Le Monde. December 20, 2017. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2017/12/19/marie-ekeland-demissionne-du-conseil-national-du-
numerique_5231925_4408996.html and for the entire transcript of the group resignation, "Demain Est Un Autre 
Jour - Message Collectif." CNNum. December 19, 2017. https://cnnumerique.fr/demain_autrejour_message-
collectif.  Echoing disdain for Diallo’s dismissal, The French Human Rights League released a statement, saying: “In 
a democracy, the state must respect the pluralism of opinions to inform public action and enrich it.” 
534 Chrisafis, "French Race Row Erupts," The Guardian. December 20, 2017.  
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After two weeks of relentless media attention both nationally and internationally, the Digital 
Council moved forward with a new composition of committee members deemed “less divisive.” 
The “Diallo scandal” carried both political and personal weight for all those involved. 
Individuals supportive of Diallo signed petitions rallying support. Politicians from the left, right 
and center who clamored for her dismissal were publically ridiculed on an international stage by 
activists, journalists and celebrities. Moreover, Diallo’s dismissal revealed a certain angst with 
discussing the “taboo” topic of race as well as the insidious nature of colorblind rhetoric within 
France. 535 In her work as both an activist and a journalist, Diallo urged both the French state and 
its citizenry to address the gravity of racial difference in a nation that denies its existence. To 
make her point devastatingly clear, she stitched a thread between France and the United States 
using the trifecta of race, police brutality and the media.  
One of the editorials that right-wing critics of Diallo’s appointment looked to was her 
2014 piece entitled, “We have Fergusons in France – but the French media looks away,” Diallo 
reminded French citizens, the government and the media that they have a responsibility to tell the 
truth.536  She highlighted widespread French coverage of American race-fueled police brutality 
in sharp contrast with the media’s deafening silence on similar occurrences happening within the 
hexagon.537 French media hid behind the veil of colorblindness in its coverage of racially 
                                                          
535 Maboula Soumahoro, "In France, a Woman Has Been Dismissed for Her Anti-racism. Where Is Our égalité? | 
Maboula Soumahoro." The Guardian. December 27, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/27/france-anti-racism-dismissed-feminist-rokhaya-diallo. 
536 Rokhaya Diallo and Sihame Assbague, "We Have Fergusons in France-but the French Media Looks Away." The 
Root. September 15, 2014. https://www.theroot.com/we-have-fergusons-in-france-but-the-french-media-looks-
1790877054. 
537 "Ferguson, Sombre Miroir Des Fractures Américaines." Le Monde. August 20, 2014. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/08/19/ferguson-sombre-miroir-des-fractures-
americaines_4473377_3232.html?xtmc=ferguson&xtcr=1; Laure Mandeville, "L'Amérique En Proie Aux Tensions 
Raciales." Le Figaro. August 16, 2014. http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/08/15/01003-
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motivated incidents with the police. Diallo noted that two days before Michael Brown was 
murdered, a 42-year-old John Doe was found dead in a local French police precinct. Later that 
year, two other men were found dead in police custody. All of these men were of African 
descent.  
In France, the deaths of non-white men in police custody seem to follow a nearly 
identical pattern. These instances often begin with police stopping men “young and of color” in 
the form of an identity check. In the process of this check, the man or boy is killed. The accused 
officers plead self-defense or that the person in custody died of “unexplained causes.” Media 
outlets only release the “official” version of events offered by the precinct. In retaliation against 
the wrongful death, there is an uprising in the suburban community where the incident occurred. 
More police are summoned to squelch the uprising. The family of the victim file a civil suit 
against the officers. Most of the time, the officers involved do not pay damages.  
This cycle of police brutality and urban uprisings began in the 1980s and continues to the 
present. Diallo invoked the deaths of Traoré and Benna that preceded the 2005 uprisings as a 
parallel to the untimely murder of Michael Brown. Careful not to argue that the precise 
circumstances of police brutality are identical in the United States and France, Diallo roots the 
use of force by officers to a deep-seeded racism that finds its genesis in slavery within the United 
States and in colonialism within France. French society ignores this history of state-sponsored 
violence upon Black communities under the guise of universalism and its colorblind rhetoric. 
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While applauding French coverage of racially motivated police brutality in America, Diallo 
implored media companies and journalists to turn the mirror from the United States back to 
France and expose how the identity of non-white citizens visibly make them a target for both 
racial profiling and excessive force by police officers. Diallo admonished that until France 
confronts its systemic racism, tensions between Black communities and the police will remain. 
Unaddressed, the cycle of police brutality and urban uprisings will continue and “as in 
Ferguson…tensions will remain in France.”538 Her call to media outlets for increased focus on 
racially motivated crimes concretely links the issues of visibility and invisibility. Police officers’ 
visible recognition of race catalyzes their often violent interactions with Black populations. In 
contrast to white French populations, who are seemingly unaffected by identity checks, Black 
French populations contend with these moments as emblematic of their visibility and signifying 
their difference. However, the media renders these incidents invisible by never acknowledging 
the role of race. This refusal by the media to contend with race not only perpetuates experiences 
of inequality but contradicts the egalitarian basis of French society. The longer history of racial 
discrimination and prejudice impacts Black media personalities but also everyday life.    
 Rokhaya Diallo’s warning that racial tensions will continue unless things change in 
France provides a point of contrast between herself and fellow journalist Harry Roselmack in 
regards to spheres of change. Despite his skepticism about the nature and pace of social change, 
Roselmack is encouraged by the developments in French media. When discussing the progress 
made over the ten years since the urban uprisings of 2005, he stated, “These changes are slow, 
                                                          
538 Rokhaya Diallo and Sihame Assbague, "We Have Fergusons in France-but the French Media Looks Away." The 




too slow, no doubt. They take time, but they take place regularly and continuously.”539 Citing the 
recent César awards, he relished in the fact that the Best Short Film Award was given to “two 
young French directors of African descent [Alice Diop and Maïmouna Doucouré].” He noted 
that the film industry is ‘even more closed’ than television. Diop and Maïmouna Doucouré’s 
César award means that “the lines are moving. Diversity [has begun] to manifest itself.”540  
At the helm of this manifestation of diversity are Black women.541 Alice Diop and 
Maïmouna Doucouré winning the Best Short Film Award was significant. Even more important 
is the nature of their work. Diop’s film entitled Vers la tendresse, examined the role of love 
within the daily lives of young African men in the suburbs. Doucouré’s film entitled Maman(s), 
chronicled the life of a young Senegalese girl reeling from impact of polygamous family 
                                                          
539  Alexandre Le Drollec, "Harry Roselmack: "Il Ne Fallait Pas S'imaginer Que Mettre Un Noir Au 20 Heures Allait 
Tout Changer"." TéléObs. March 18, 2017. https://teleobs.nouvelobs.com/actualites/20170314.OBS6559/harry-
roselmack-il-ne-fallait-pas-s-imaginer-que-mettre-un-noir-au-20-heures-allait-tout-changer.html. 
540 Drollec, "Harry Roselmack” TéléObs.  
541 The following year at the Cannes Film festival, a collective of sixteen Black actresses launched a movement 
named “Noire n’est pas métier.” (Black is not my profession) Penning a book under the same name, these actresses 
protest the racist jokes, clichés and stereotypes, they’ve had to endure while working in the film industry. Citing 
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person]." Actress Nadège Beausson-Diagne laments the common refrain, “not African enough for an African.”  
Another actress Aïssa Maïga argues that “the imagination of French productions is still imbued with clichés 
inherited from another time…Things are changing but so slowly…[Since the calls] I expect for a fairer 
representation does not take place, I need to express myself…Our presence in French films is all too often due to 
the unavoidable or anecdotal need to have a black character.” In their demands for more equal representation 
beyond stereotypical roles and access within the film industry, the women have embarked on a public campaign to 
raise more awareness about the challenges they face, see, « Noire N'est Pas Mon Métier »: Des Actrices 
Dénoncent Un Racisme Latent Du Cinéma Français." Le Monde. May 05, 2018. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/cinema/article/2018/05/04/noire-n-est-pas-mon-metier-des-actrices-denoncent-un-
racisme-latent-du-cinema-francais_5294572_3476.html and Jean Talabot, "Noire N'est Pas Mon Métier: Naissance 





upbringing.  The films explore notions of race and elements of African culture and its position 
within French society.  
Maïmouna Doucouré’s film Maman(s) is told from the perspective of eight-year old 
Aida. Living in a Parisian banlieue, her life is idyllic until her father’s return from a trip to 
Senegal. In addition to his luggage, Aida’s father arrives with another woman and an infant. Her 
world crumbles as she watches her mother mourn the loss of her singular position within her 
husband’s life and grappling with the reality that she must make room for his second wife. Intent 
on restoring order, Aida commits to getting rid of both the second wife and the baby. Though 
ultimately unsuccessful, Aida learns to make room for both her second mother and her new 
sibling. Loosely based on Doucouré upbringing in the nineteenth arrondissement of Paris, she 
willingly confronts the taboo topic of polygamy in France. Various African countries practice 
polygamy. However in France, this practice is illegal. Doucouré’s film explores the reality of 
polygamous families living in France.  
Growing up in Paris, Maïmouna Doucouré was the fifth out of ten children. At a young 
age, she realized that her father had two families. Mother(s) is a fictional take on her 
understanding of how love and a child’s interpretation of love is filtered through the lens of 
polygamy. Her commitment to publicizing the often-private anguish and scarring of this practice 
is encapsulated in her remark, “I really wanted to show the suffering of women and particularly 
of children because, for me, we often forget to think about them and speak to them.”542 In her 
honest display of this suffering by woman and children, she also triumphed in the film industry.  
                                                          
542 Sharon Waxman, "The Inspiring Story of Maimouna Doucoure – TheWrap's ShortList 2016 Jury Winner." 
TheWrap. August 29, 2016. https://www.thewrap.com/the-inspiring-story-of-maimouna-doucoure-our-shortlist-
2016-jury-winner/. Echoing the need to move beyond stereotypes and create programming that is reflective of 
everyday life and the varied experiences of people within the African Diaspora is also a commitment also honored 
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In her acceptance speech, Maïmouna Doucouré recounted to audience members her 
dream of becoming a film director and the reality that most African women filmmakers 
encounter barriers within the industry based on race and gender. She said, 
The day I told my mother that I wanted to do cinema, she said to me, ‘It's not for us. Do 
you see people who look like you?’ Today, Mom, I hope that I have succeeded in proving 
you wrong. Because we also need to tell each other, [that we] exist on the [television] 
screens and [in] cinema…There are people behind [the scenes] who are fighting to bring 
down the walls, so that [the reality of life in] France is told in its diversity.543 
This endeavor to bring diversity to the film industry and portray the reality of life for Black 
people in France is also reflected in the work of co-Best Short Film César Award winner Alice 
Diop.  
Alice Diop’s film, Vers la tendresse or Towards Tenderness, is a return to her childhood 
suburb La Courneuve. She interviewed four young Black and Arab men about their conceptions 
                                                          
by Alice Diop. Their collective work fits within a growing body of work that can be deemed an “Afro Feminine 
Renaissance” of Filmmaking. This includes the work of Isabelle Boni-Claverie, Too Black to Be French (2015). See 
Nicolas Michel, "Documentaire: « Trop Noire Pour être Française? »” Jeune Afrique.  July 01, 2015. 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/242511/societe/trop-noire-pour-etre-francaise; Amandine Gay’s Ouvrir la Voix 
(2016) see Séverine Kodjo-Grandvaux, "Amandine Gay, Porte-voix Afro-féministe." Le Monde. December 08, 2016. 
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De La Diaspora Africaine (Fifda)." RFI Afrique. September 11, 2017. http://www.rfi.fr/culture/20170908-mariannes-
noires-festival-films-diaspora-africaine-fifda-mame-fatou-niang.   
543 Marie Kirschen, "Le Discours De Cette Réalisatrice Aux César a ému Tout Le Monde." BuzzFeed. February 24, 
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of love. Presented in a documentary format, their voices narrate personal adventures with love. 
Despite many of their initial comments being rooted in misogyny and displays of machismo, 
Diop successfully unearths layers of fragile masculinity and their desire to be loved 
unconditionally. The creation of the film began after observing several young men in La 
Courneuve and the Parisian suburb, Montreuil,  After watching them loafing around her 
apartment, Diop confronted them. She let them see and hear her initial work and hoped that they 
would also participate in the project.  
After organizing a workshop for them, she recounted, “[after] seeing what I had filmed, 
they pretended not to recognize it; but spoke to me differently when we saw each other face to 
face.”544 Collectively, the young men refused to recognize themselves. However, their isolated 
voices revealed desires for intimacy, feelings of loneliness and innocence. These sentiments are 
glaringly absent in mainstream media portrayals of Black male youth.  In the film, Diop moves 
beyond a monolithic heterosexual view of love and relationships to examine homosexuality. This 
sexual identity remains at the fringe of societal acceptance.  Through the voice of a young 
African gay man named Patrick, Diop grappled with the complexity of race, gender and sexuality 
as well as communal acceptance. Unable to come out to his parents, he and his lover spend 
weekends in a hotel room located in Aulnay-sous-Bois where they will not be recognized. Their 
need to hide also coincides with the other heterosexual young men interviewed that feel the need 
to hide the desire for love and tenderness. Although Diop initially intended to create a fictional 
                                                          
544 François Ekchajzer, ""Vers La Tendresse", Magnifique Film Sur L'amour Dans Les "quartiers"." Télérama. January 
4, 2017. http://www.telerama.fr/television/a-voir-sur-telerama-fr-vers-la-tendresse-magnifique-film-sur-l-amour-
dans-les-quartiers,152277.php. Describing the dissonance between using imagery of the boys in Montreuil and the 
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film about love in the suburbs, what she unearthed is much more powerful. The struggle and 
journey of ordinary young men finding love in France is encapsulated in the words of a young 
interviewee, “Love is not for Africans.”545 This painful reflection shines a light on the invisibility 
of accurate portrayals of Black men in the media in addition to society’s method of silencing 
displays of masculine emotion. Through the film, Diop successfully confronts stereotypes about 
young Black men in France and effectively destroys these caricatures by allowing Black men to 
speak for themselves. The documentary exposed French’s society rejection of young Black men 
especially with respect to sentiments of love. Often mainstream media projects images that 
dismiss Black men as objects of affection. However through Diop’s cinematography and their 
own words, young African men describe an innate desire to be loved and the quest to make that 
deep-seeded yearning a reality.   
On the night Alice Diop received a César for her short film, she placed Afro-French male 
youths at the forefront of her success. After thanking the four protagonists, she said, “I would 
like to dedicate this César to other young boys whose voices bear little [significance], not enough 
and for some even any at all. I wanted to dedicate this César to Theo Luhaka, to Adama Traoré, 
to Bouna and Zyed, to Lamine Dieng, to Amine Bentounsi and to Wissam. I'm sorry if I 
butchered their names but it was important for me to name them tonight.”546 Dedicating her 
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transit to the precinct. An initial autopsy concluded that he died as a result of cardiac arrest related to a cocaine 
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César to the victims of police brutality, Diop sent a powerful message to the millions of people 
that tuned in to watch the awards show. Responding to the question posed by Rokhaya Diallo, 





                                                          
overdose. A second autopsy revealed that he died to asphyxiation (akin to the circumstances of Adama Traoré). 
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Défense Non Retenue." Libération. March 09, 2017. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/03/09/affaire-
bentounsi-le-policier-condamne-en-appel-la-legitime-defense-non-retenue_1554640. Wissam (El-Yamni) was 
arrested on New Year’s Eve in 2011. While in police custody, he enters a state of coma. Nine days later, it is 
announced he died. Conflicting autopsies reveal his death was a culmination of a “toxic cocktail” of cocaine and 
alcohol as well as the use of the "folding" technique, which consists of keeping the head resting on the knees, 
while being transported to the police station. A preliminary autopsy, revealed a "compression of the internal 
carotid arteries" during transport in police car. The two officers responsible were indicted in 2014 and later 
acquitted. For a more detailed review of the events surrounding his death see, "Mort De Wissam El-Yamni: Vers Un 
Non-lieu." Le Figaro. January 06, 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/01/06/97001-
20170106FILWWW00386-mort-de-wissam-el-yamni-vers-un-non-lieu.php and "Mort De Wissam El-Yamni, Un 
Nouveau Rapport Contredit La Version Policière." Libération. December 26, 2016. 
http://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/mort-de-wissam-el-yamni-un-nouveau-rapport-contredit-la-version-
policiere_54614/. These deaths of young Black and Arab men prompted Rokhaya Diallo to write the following 
article, "Do Black Lives Matter in France?" Al Jazeera. August 06, 2017. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/police-violence-france-justice-adama-
170804091317713.html.  
Figure 18. Alice Diop pictured during the 2017 
César Awards.  
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This moment epitomizes both the struggles and triumphs of Afropean activists in France.  
The reality remains that the experience of African people living in Paris is not a narrative of 
progression or regression devoid of each other. Even as progress is made in the media world 
such as increasing the number of Black journalists at national television stations, Black women 
cinematographers creating content that displays the lived realities of African migrant 
communities to a Black woman wielding political power in the Élysées Palace, inequality 
continues. Moreover, this success comes at a tremendous cost. Harry Roselmack would not have 
reached nightly news without the deaths of Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna, which forced 
President Chirac to demand more diversity in the media. Audrey Pulvar left the journalism world 
to pursue a more political career demanding representation for women on a larger stage.547 
Christiane Taubira resigned her post as Minister of Defense in protest of President Hollande’s 
proposal to remove French nationality from dual-citizens convicted of terrorism.548 Even as 
                                                          
547 In an op-ed, Pulvar demands, “When will a Black Woman be on the Cover of Elle [magazine], see Sonia Rolland, 
and Audrey Pulvar, "A Quand Une Femme Noire En Couverture De "Elle" ?" Le Monde. January 31, 2012. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/01/31/a-quand-une-femme-noire-en-couverture-de-
elle_1636689_3232.html.  
548 Christiane Taubira resigned from office January 27, 2016. She protested President François Hollande’s proposal 
to remove dual-citizenship from those convicted of terrorism. This legal measure was offered as a response to the 
terrorist attacks that took place on November 15, 2015. See, "French Justice Minister Christiane Taubira Resigns 
after Terror Law Row." France 24. January 27, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160127-french-justice-
minister-christiane-taubira-resigns-hollande.  Presenting her arguments and disagreement with the President in 
the book entitled, Murmures à la jeunesse, Taubira took a public stand against the harness of the law and its racist 
overtone. See Thomas Wieder, "Le Réquisitoire De Christiane Taubira Contre La Déchéance De Nationalité." Le 
Monde. February 01, 2016. https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/01/31/le-requisitoire-de-christiane-
taubira-contre-la-decheance-de-nationalite_4856833_823448.html. In statements discussing her resignation, she 
wrote, “I choose to be true to myself, to my convictions and values, to my battles and my relationship to others. I 
am true to us, to us as I understand it…We know how to fight it [terrorism], but must not concede it any victory, 
whether it is military, political or symbolic, because this country [France] has strength and imagination, its destiny 
relies on solid foundations.” Quoting Aimé Césaire, she concluded, “We will not give the world to these dawn 
assassins." See Cécile Bourgneuf, "Aimé Césaire, La Référence De Christiane Taubira." Libération. January 27, 2016.  
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/27/aime-cesaire-la-reference-de-christiane-taubira_1429338 and Tim 
Hume, "French Justice Minister Christiane Taubira Resigns." CNN. January 27, 2016. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/27/europe/france-justice-minister-christiane-taubira-resignation/index.html.  
Following her resignation, she made only one statement via Twitter, "Sometimes to resist means staying, 
sometimes resisting means going.” She also faced profound racism during her tenure as Minister of Defense. The 
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Alice Diop’s invocation of the victims of police brutality was an especially poignant example of 
how media representations highlight the political and day-to-day struggles of Black French 
youth.  Her cry that their names be remembered, and that justice has not been served for their 
senseless murders reverberates in activist writings, social media posts by young Black and Arab 
youth and community protests that occur all too frequently in the city of Paris and its outer 
suburbs. As they gain more momentum and international visibility, Black French people 
continue to use their platforms to secure the promises of “Liberté, égalité, et fraternité” 
guaranteed by French citizenship. Yet, inequality persists. In a 2015 interview, Cameroonian 
author Léonora Miano expressed her frustrations with the disparity between the national motto 
and the lived experiences of Black French people. Reflecting on the ten years since the deaths of 
Benna and Traoré in 2005, Miano addresses the gap between the French use of republican 
ideology and the persistent inequality that shapes Black experiences. She stated, “I am fed up 
with fraternity without equality. What’s the point of fraternity if it doesn’t work with 
equality...Fraternity doesn’t work if we’re not equal.”549 The quest for equality in a society that 
fundamentally denies the existence of racial inequality are the root of Black French activist 
pursuits.  
                                                          
National Front posted her photograph alongside a picture of a chimpanzee on a Facebook page. One of her 
achievements as Minister of Defense was the passing of gay-marriage law in France. In protest of this law, crowds 
chanted “Taubira, t’es foutue, les Français sont dans la rue.” (“Taubira, you’re fucked, the French are in the 
street!”). At a different rally, a child symbolically handed Taubira a banana in reference to previous comments and 
iconography mocking her African heritage. See Alexander Stille, “The Justice Minister and the Banana: How Racist 
Is France?” The New Yorker. June 19, 2017 https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-justice-
minister-and-the-banana-how-racist-is-france and footnote 68 within this chapter.  




Black Lives Matter France 
Rokhaya Diallo’s evocation of the American movement, Black Lives Matter (BLM), 
calls attention to the nature of police violence that occurs in France and is not acknowledged. In 
the same way, that Black American activists used the BLM Movement to underscore that 
American media outlets also did not provide adequate coverage of police violence against Black 
people. Many of these incidents between police forces and Black males that ended in death were 
not covered by the press. Instead social media made these violent interactions a centerpiece of 
digital discussion and forced mainstream media to contend with this issue. The growth of the 
Black Lives Movement from 2012 to 2014 in response to incidents in Sanford and Ferguson 
propelled Black French activists and particularly Diallo to use #BlackLivesMatter as an example 
of a movement that was tremendously successful in focusing racially conscious attention on 
issues of police brutality in a society that traditionally ignored them. However, the key difference 
between this call to use Black American social justice efforts and Black French activism is the 
language and the framework to describe racial inequality. Diallo’s article argues that in order for 
Black French activists to gain the same type of momentum of BLM, they need to change the 
narrative. This tactical move by Black French activists and Black Lives Mater France signals a 
transition from online and media activism back into the streets of Paris.  
In the American context, the BLM movement emerged out the acquittal of George 
Zimmerman, who shot seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida on February 26, 
2012.550 In the two weeks before national press began to air the story, social media implicitly 
                                                          
550 "Justifiable Use of Force." State of Florida, Statutes & Constitution: 2012. 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0700-0799/0776/0776.html; 
"Events Leading to the Shooting of Trayvon Martin." The New York Times. April 01, 2012. 
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addressed the reality that Black lives did not matter to a segment of American society.551 The 
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter not only addressed the nature of violent interpersonal interactions 
between white and Black people in the United States, but also the media portrayal of 
Zimmerman’s racial identity in juxtaposition to that of Trayvon Martin. BLM explicitly 
addressed the nature of violence committed in addition to the erasure of Martin’s personal 
significance in subsequent investigations by police, court proceedings and media representations.   
#BlackLivesMatter became more than a Twitter hashtag when three women activists 
called attention to the lack of female and non-heterosexual media representation in the wake of 
Trayvon’s death.552 Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi used their platform to raise 
awareness about the deaths of unarmed Black men and women across the nation. They organized 
peaceful protests, rallies and raised money to expose the alarming number of Black men, women 
and children killed by the police and civilian vigilantes.553 As the hashtag metamorphosed into a 
                                                          
http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/02/us/the-events-leading-to-the-shooting-of-
trayvon-martin.html.  
551 Daniel Trotta, "Trayvon Martin: Before the World Heard the Cries." Reuters. April 03, 2012. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-florida-shooting-trayvon/trayvon-martin-before-the-world-heard-the-
cries-idUSBRE8320UK20120403.  
552 Cited from the Black Lives Matter Website, BLM members “see and understand significant gaps in movement 
spaces and leadership. Black liberation movements in this country have created room, space, and leadership 
mostly for Black heterosexual, cisgender men—leaving women, queer and transgender people, and others either 
out of the movement or in the background to move the work forward with little or no recognition. As a network, 
we have always recognized the need to center the leadership of women and queer and trans-people.”  For more 
on Black Lives Matter, see Patrisse Khan-Cullors and Asha Bandele, When They Call You A Terrorist: A Black Lives 
Matter Memoir (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2019). 
553 Jonathan Capehart, "From Trayvon Martin to 'Black Lives Matter'." The Washington Post. February 27, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/02/27/from-trayvon-martin-to-black-lives-
matter/?utm_term=.acc731cee9c5; Darran Simon, "Five Years after Trayvon Martin's Death, a Movement Lives 




movement, various cities and towns established Black Lives Matter local chapters, which led to 
the Black Lives Matter Global Network. This network of national and international chapters uses 
grassroots leadership and a flexible programmatic agenda to support organizers in transnational 
contexts.554   
In 2016, Black Lives Matter launched its French chapter in response to the death of 
Adama Traoré. This history of violence by officers during a contrôle d’identité is rooted in 
racism. Police overwhelmingly target males of North and Sub-Saharan African descent. A 
national study found that Black and Arab male youths were “20 times more likely than others to 
be stopped.”555 Protected under French law, police can stop anyone deemed in “breach of public 
order.”556 A grossly abused tool, officers primarily stop “suspicious-looking” individuals. 
Identification checks are source of anxiety and danger within the Black community largely due 
to the fact that majority of youth interrogated by police are innocent of any and all crimes. What 
are theoretically supposed to be brief interactions for proof of identity, habitually result in verbal 
and physical assault. Black youths and adults describe police actions often going well-beyond 
                                                          
554 Barbara Ransby’s article argues that Black Lives Matter is distinctive in its approach due to its shift from 
hierarchical leadership platforms that dominate national activist organizations to emphasis on grassroots 
organization. For more information, see Barbara Ransby, "Black Lives Matter Is Democracy in Action." The New 
York Times. October 21, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/opinion/sunday/black-lives-matter-
leadership.html. Ransby further details her argument in the book, Making All Black Lives Matter: Reimagining 
Freedom in the Twenty-first Century (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018). 
555 "Discrimination, Contrôle Au Faciès... Quelles Sont Les Règles Du Contrôle D'identité?" France 3. October 22, 
2018. https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/paris-ile-de-france/seine-saint-denis/discrimination-controle-au-
facies-quelles-sont-regles-du-controle-identite-1562604.html.  
556 Plausible reasons for an identity check include:  committed or attempted to commit an offense, preparing to 
commit a crime or offense, or can provide information about a crime or offense, is the subject of research ordered 
by a judicial authority, or has violated the obligations or prohibitions to which it is subject in the context of a 
judicial review, a house arrest with electronic surveillance, a sentence or a measure followed by the judge of the 




proof of identification ranging from orders to empty their pockets and bags to full body 
searches.557  As a result, in African migrant communities, it is customary to “disperse” in order 
to avoid these humiliating and violent interactions with the police.558 
Later that year over 1,000 individuals marched in protest of Adama Traoré’s death after a 
routine identity check. The rallying cry, “no justice, no peace,” echoed throughout France as 
protesters took to the streets to demonstrate against the questionable circumstances under which 
Traoré died. On the evening of July 19, 2016, police confronted Adama and his brother, Bagui 
Traoré. Adama fled the scene in an attempt to avoid an identity check because he forgot his 
ID.559 In the process of his arrest, police officers pursued Adama. Three officers forced him to 
the ground over his cries that he could not breathe. After being handcuffed and transported to the 
precinct, he lost consciousness and later died in police custody. 
After his family was made aware of the suspicious circumstances of his death, the Traoré 
family became targets for retribution after raising their concerns and organizing protests. 
Adama’s family and local supporters arrived at a local council meeting to request more 
information about his death. Police barred their entrance and used teargas to disperse the crowd. 
                                                          
557 “The Root of Humiliation" | Abusive Identity Checks in France.” Human Rights Watch. July 07, 2015. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/26/root-humiliation/abusive-identity-checks-france#.  
558 See “Quelles Sont Les Règles En Matière De Contrôle Et De Vérification D’identité?" Service-public. Direction de 
l'information Légale Et Administrative (Premier Ministre) verified on July 29, 2015, http://vosdroits.service-
public.fr/F1036.xhtml; "Police et minorités visibles: les contrôles d’identité à Paris," Open Society Justice Initiative, 
2009, http://www.cnrs.fr/inshs/recherche/docs-actualites/rapport-facies.pdf 
559From this point, there are multiple and conflicting accounts of what occurred after this arrest. For a more 
detailed account of the events leading to Adama Traore’s death, see, Boutry, Timothée. "Les Dernières Minutes 
D'Adama Traoré." Le Parisien. August 02, 2016. http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/les-dernieres-minutes-d-
adama-traore-02-08-2016-6010063.php; Sarah Paillou, "En Images. Mort D'Adama Traoré: La Marche Bloquée Par 




On the day of the second council meeting, police arrested Adama’s brothers Bagui and Youssouf 
before they left the house. Charged with verbal and physical abuse towards the police, the 
brothers were denied bail. Despite offering evidence of contradictory testimonies by local 
authorities, both brothers were sentenced to several months in jail and were fined 7,000 euros in 
damages. In addition to these punishments, the judge banned Bagui Traoré from living in 
Beaumont-sur-Oise for two years.560  
The court cited a “need for serenity” as justification for the residency ban.  Alluding to 
his role in public protests, the judge framed Traoré’s presence in the city as threat to public 
order. Protected under national law, residence bans are typical in domestic violence and drug 
trafficking cases.561 Its goal is to protect civilian victims from further harassment or contact with 
an assailant. This unusual application of the law to a resident protesting police violence and 
interactions with officers raises questions about judicial intentionality. Increasingly, political 
activists are subject to residence bans.562  A tool of repression, the law bars individuals from 
communities where they carry political influence and from their family. Public officials claim 
                                                          
560 Julia Pascual, "Bagui Traoré Condamné à Huit Mois Ferme Pour Violences." Le Monde. December 15, 2016. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/12/15/un-des-freres-d-adama-traore-condamne-a-huit-mois-
ferme-pour-violences_5049076_1653578.html.  
561 The text of the law reads, “The prohibition of residence prohibits the defendant from appearing in certain 
places determined by the jurisdiction. It also includes surveillance and assistance measures. The list of prohibited 
places and the measures of supervision and assistance may be modified by the judge of the enforcement of 
sentences, under the conditions set by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prohibition of residence may not 
exceed ten years in the case of a conviction for a crime and five years in the case of conviction for an offense.” See 




562 Florent, an anti-nuclear activist was also banned in 2016. See "Meuse: Un Militant Anti-nucléaire Brave Son 




there are no exact statistics for the use of this sentence.  However, Adama’s sister Assa Traoré 
framed the punishment as a weapon of family destruction. One of her brothers died at the hands 
of police officers and her other two brothers were imprisoned and banned from the city where the 
family lived due to their participation in an assortment of protests. In an appeal, the judge 
sentenced Bagui Traoré to six months in prison but lifted the residency ban amidst massive 
public outcry. 563 
Adama Traoré’s death and its impact on his family became a national issue.  Emerging as 
the family’s spokesperson, Assa Traoré maintained the ability to speak out and not face the same 
type of criminal sanctions as her brothers. Her capacity to enter into politically charged spaces 
and critically engage individuals that wield political, cultural and social power is a tactic 
replicated by Black women in a variety of other national contexts. She called upon local 
organizers, politicians and cultural icons to help deliver the message: “Justice and truth for 
Adama.”564   
 
                                                          
563 For more detail on the residence ban and press coverage of Bagui Traoré’s arrest see Claire Hache, "Affaire 
Traoré: Comment Expliquer L'interdiction De Séjour à Beaumont-sur-Oise?" L’Express. December 15, 2016. 
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/affaire-traore-comment-expliquer-l-interdiction-de-sejour-a-
beaumont-sur-oise_1860749.html; "Affaire Adama Traoré: Le Point Sur La Situation." Clique.tv. July 19, 2018. 
http://www.clique.tv/affaire-adama-traore-depots-de-plainte-et-financement-de-frais-de-justice-pour-la-maire-
de-beaumont-sur-oise/; Julia Pascual, "Bagui Traoré Condamné à Huit Mois Ferme Pour Violences." Le Monde. 
December 15, 2016. https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/12/15/un-des-freres-d-adama-traore-
condamne-a-huit-mois-ferme-pour-violences_5049076_1653578.html; Romain Chiron, "Beaumont-sur-Oise: Les 
Frères D'Adama Traoré Condamnés, Le plus Jeune Remis En Liberté." Le Parisien. December 14, 2016. 
http://www.leparisien.fr/beaumont-sur-oise-95260/beaumont-sur-oise-prison-ferme-requise-contre-les-freres-
traore-14-12-2016-6456504.php; Antoine Hasday, "La Mort D'Adama Traoré, Une Affaire D'État." Slate. July 26, 
2017. http://www.slate.fr/story/149028/mort-adama-traore.  










Her message galvanized a host Black French individuals who spoke out about the failures of the 
French state to reckon with its intensive inequalities. Answering Assa’s call, a collective of high-
profile artists, athletes, actors, writers and academics drafted an open letter to local and national 
authorities outlining the inconsistences of the official police report and violations in police 
conduct. The group wrote 
“The Adama Traoré affair is everybody's business: to affirm and defend equal 
rights…we, artists, athletes, actors, [and] writers...relay…[that] the inhabitants of 
working-class neighborhoods are hit daily by economic and racial violence … We refuse 
to accept that a growing part of the French population is abandoned by the Republic, and 
we demand the strictest impartiality of the state when forces of order go beyond the 
law…That is why we…support the demand of truth and justice for Adama…[and] all the 
victims of violence by forces of law and order. It is our common cause: together against 
police violence and their impunity.”565 
 
Mobilizing their efforts to increase the visibility of the cause, several of the signatories 
volunteered to perform at La Cigale in Paris on February 2nd. Performing under the banner 
“Vérité pour Adama” (Truth for Adama), some of French rap’s biggest stars including Kery 
                                                          
565 Signatories included: the French rapper Fik’s Niavo, Casey, Alice Diop, Rokhaya Diallo, Omar Sy, Joan W. Scott 
(historian and Professor Emerita at Princeton University) and Sylvie Tissot (French sociologist, activist and 
documentary filmmaker).  For the full manifesto see "Mort D'Adama Traoré: «Si on Se Tait, C'est Toute Notre 
Société Qui Se salit»." Libération. February 14, 2017. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/02/14/mort-d-adama-
traore-si-on-se-tait-c-est-toute-notre-societe-qui-se-salit_1548531.  
Figure 19. Assa Traoré pictured during a 
“Justice for Adama” march on July 22, 2017. 
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James, Mac Tyer, Medina, Sofiane, Ärsenik, and Youssoupha organized a concert to raise funds 
for the family’s legal fees. Speaking on behalf of the group, Youssoupha explained the purpose 
of the show, “It’s a concert to show support for the family and (local) mobilization. What the 
family is asking for is simple: it is justice and truth. But the cause of Adama also bears a political 
and social aspect with the broader issue of police violence.”566 This use of Hip Hop performers 
deploying their social and cultural capital towards political movements fits within a longer 
history of the musical genre.  Black French rappers like Kery James, Casey, Bams and MC 
Solaar use their lyrics to challenge French society’s silence on inequality. Themes of uplift, 
political criticism and community engagement pervade their musical content. Thus, this post-
2005 manifestation of conscious Hip Hop to propel political change maintains historical roots. 
Over the past two decades, artists contended with these issues in their music. Unifying earlier 
generations of rappers with millennial artists, their efforts to raise awareness about a long history 
of police brutality demonstrates that Black musical artists are political figures and their work is 
representative of protest art.  Even so, the same day that some of France’s biggest Hip-Hop 
artists performed in protest of police violence, another incident between a Black youth and 
several French officers reignited the Parisian suburbs. 
 On February 2, 2017, a young Afro-French man was walking home in the neighborhood 
of Aulnay-sous-Bois when he was stopped by the police.567 Four officers responding to reports 
                                                          
566 The details of the sold-out concert were explained at the press conference hosted by several of the artists and 
Assa Traoré. See "Affaire Traoré: « C'est Un Concert De Soutien à La Famille Et De Mobilisation »." Le Parisien. 
January 30, 2017. http://www.leparisien.fr/beaumont-sur-oise-95260/affaire-traore-c-est-un-concert-de-soutien-
a-la-famille-et-de-mobilisation-30-01-2017-6640023.php.   
567 There are various and conflicting accounts on the actual events of the police encounter. For more narration on 
the incident occurring on February 2, 2017, see Joel Dreyfuss, "The tragedy of Theo L. reveals France's failures on 
race." The Washington Post. February 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2017/02/16/the-tragedy-of-theo-l-reveals-frances-failures-on-race/?utm_term=.ac42d1dde408; 
Claire Digiacomi, "Arrestation à Aulnay-sous-Bois: l'IGPN contredit la version de Théo et écarte la thèse du viol." 
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of drug-dealing began stopping young men in the area. Performing the routine contrôle 
d’identité, the officers profiled young Black men whom they thought fit the suspect’s 
description. Among the youth stopped by the police was twenty-two year old Theo Luhaka.    
The officers demanded identification from Luhaka and others walking with him. Forcing 
the boys to line up against a street wall, their faces were pressed against the building. When one 
of the young men questioned the actions of the officers. He was met with threat of physical 
assault and fines. Theo Luhaka raised his voice in defense. Yanked from the wall, police dragged 
him further from the street cameras. As they scuffled, one officer struck his skull and back. 
Another officer unleashed tear gas clouding Theo’s vision. A third officer allegedly sodomized 
him using an expandable baton.568 Handcuffed and bleeding profusely, police officers brought 
him to the local precinct.  
That night, word spread of Theo’s brutal attack through Snapchat, Twitter and Facebook 
postings. As he was rushed to the hospital for treatment of anal canal wounds, an explosion of 
                                                          
Huffington Post. February 09, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2017/02/09/arrestation-a-aulnay-sous-bois-
ligpn-contredit-la-version-de-theo_a_21710305/; Jeanne Cavelier, "Affaire Théo: manifestations contre les 
violences policières." Le Monde. February 13, 2017. http://www.lemonde.fr/police-
justice/article/2017/02/09/affaire-theo-manifestations-contre-les-violences-policieres_5076878_1653578.html; 
Peter Holley, "A black man accused French police of raping him. Police claim it was an accident." The Washington 
Post. February 11, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/11/a-black-man-
accused-french-police-of-raping-him-police-claim-it-was-an-accident/?utm_term=.4ffaae1f6169; Blandine Le Cain, 
"Affaire Théo: la police des polices privilégie la thèse de l'accident plutôt que celle du viol." Le Figaro. February 10, 
2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/02/09/01016-20170209ARTFIG00128-affaire-theo-la-police-
des-polices-privilegie-la-these-de-l-accident-plutot-que-le-viol.php.  





fury detonated.569 In neighborhoods around Paris, youth hurled rocks and handmade petrol 
bombs at the police. Returning the volley of arms, police unleashed tear gas into the night air. 
While this violent exchange escalated, uprisings erupted in other Parisian banlieues including 
Bobigny, Argenteuil, Clichy-sous-Bois, Les Ulis and provincial cities in Nantes, Marseille and 
Rouen. For several days, protestors set fire to cars and destroyed local bus shelters. These events 
resulted in 245 arrests.570 
 On Monday, February 6th, Black Lives Matter France organized a march. Hundreds 
marched along the streets of Aulnay-sous-Bois wearing t-shirts and carrying banners that read 
“Justice for Theo.”571 Soon the protest moved from the periphery to the metropole, when 
thousands gathered around Place de la Republique with raised signs declaring, “Racist Cop go to 
Jail.”572 Three days later, riot police were deployed to sixteen high schools within Paris where 
students blocked the school entrances with fiery trashcans in protest.573 In an effort to quell the 
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rising tide of protests, uprisings and marches, French President François Hollande visited Theo at 
a local hospital.  
Despite this display of empathy by the President, the protests persisted. Immigrant 
communities clamored for charges of rape and the firing of the accused police officers. When the 
police report was released to the public, communal indignation grew as the official statement 
asserted the sodomy charge was an “accident.” Their angry cries reverberated through time 
echoing similar demands for justice and the end of police brutality that reached a crisis point in 
2005. These sentiments were embodied in a banner with the following phrase, “Theo and Adama 
remind us why Zyed & Bouna ran.”574 This phrase captures the visceral nature of why young 
Black men flee identity checks. The violent nature of these interactions with police are fraught 
with flagrant abuses of their power which engender sentiments of fear and danger. When Zyed 
and Bouna ran to avoid an identity check, they died. After being confronted by police forces, 
Adama died in their custody. Theo escaped with his life but bore the scars of a vicious attack.    
These events occurred two and a half months before the 2017 French Presidential 
election. Presidential candidates used the “Theo Affair” to situate their political positions and the 
sentiments of many white French citizens on police engagement with Black communities.  Each 
candidate weighed in on the events and the aftermath of the incident on various media platforms. 
François Fillon, the right-center candidate, insisted “that all the truth must come out” but 
condemned the violence. Emmanuel Macron, the independent party candidate, used the hashtag 
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#JusticeforTheo to express his “full confidence in the justice system” and his belief that Theo 
and his family would get answers for the actions of the police officers.575  Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 
the Left-wing candidate, suggested that the violence was being encouraged, without specifying 
by whom.576  Marine Le Pen, the far-right candidate and daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
voiced support for the police forces and their “right to defend themselves.” 577 These four 
responses ultimately reveal the range of French state attitudes and their method for addressing 
these issues. Categorizing their statements both in support and condemnation of the police as 
well as the restrained backing of Theo expose France’s persistent denial of racially charged 
incidents between police forces and Black French residents. This continued rebuff of Black 
communities and their publicized experiences with inequality map with over forty years of 
political marginalization. Drawing parallels to 2005, the press and academics condemned white 
French political foot-dragging.578 They argued that if politicians continued to render these 
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incidents and the variety of tactics used (protesting, court cases, legislative lobbying, music, film, 
press) invisible, the nation reeled toward insurrection unparalleled since 2005.  Despite initial 
overtures and the use of social media to discuss the “Theo Affair,” political commitment to 
rectifying these abuses of power quickly and quietly dissolved.  After his election, President 
Emmanuel Macron refrained from using his political platform to address the growing tensions 
between police and non-white community members or discriminatory patterns in French society.  
For a growing body of Black activists, academics and popular commentators, the 
worsening of Black living conditions in Paris and the surrounding suburbs is directly related to 
the increasing militarization of the police force.  French researcher Hacène Belmessous rooted 
the initial escalation in police surveillance to the aftermath of 2005. He argued that “the mission 
of the police is no longer to ensure its role as a guardian of order in the public sphere…it has 
merged in[to] this new apparatus that is the counter-guerrilla urban.”579 Officers occupy Black 
communities as “enemy territory.” The police engagement with the community and recognition 
of their humanity no longer exists. Your “friendly crime fighting neighborhood officer,” has 
evolved into units of officers dressed in military gear accompanied by a hovering helicopter. Big 
Brother-like technology allows police to capture images from cameras placed throughout areas 
of the neighborhood. Thus, officers can monitor the activity of the neighborhood from the 
precinct. This uptick in surveillance and the militarization of local police allows Belmessous to 
conclude that a “‘police democracy’ has been established” especially in Black and immigrant 
                                                          




communities.  The police’s “repressive role is a function of state-led monitoring agendas instead 
of the overall good of the community.”580  
Contrary to Belmessous’ claim that a drastic shift in police training and occupation of 
Black and immigrant neighborhoods began after 2005, these changes actually started before the 
uprisings.581 In 2003, acting Minister of Interior Nicholas Sarkozy dismantled the “community 
policing” infrastructure. Still in its infancy, community policing had demonstrated some initial 
success.582 However, Sarkozy bemoaned the officers’ activities and engagement with residents.  
He remarked, “[the] police are not here to organize local rugby games, but to arrest 
delinquents.”583 Former Minister of Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement criticized Sarkozy’s 
actions by applauding the officers’ progress. Citing the achievements of community policing in 
Québec and the Netherlands, Chevènement implemented this form of policing in France from 
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1998-2001. In its initial stages of testing and customization for the French context, he recognized 
that the program needed more time that Sarkozy refused to permit. In an interview with Politis 
magazine, Chevènement lamented that community policing was “surreptitiously –and really 
quickly cancelled and emptied of its budget and of its basic substance by (new Minister) 
Nicholas Sarkozy.”584 Chevènement continued to criticize the defunding of community policing, 
paramilitary tactics and offered an alternative solution. He stated, “[it’s] time to give back to the 
Community Police their funding and…their effective tools, especially in the “no go” areas and in 
the giant ghettoes surrounding our cities. But this presupposes a concept of democratic 
humanism on the part of the police themselves.” 585 Unlike his predecessor, Sarkozy did not 
presume that police should be “democratically human.”  
The militarization of the police propelled to new heights as the government expanded its 
powers in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks. Sitting President François Hollande 
announced a state of war and increased police and army occupation of France to unseen levels.586 
The argument of many Black people is that the police are instead being trained to fight not 
terrorists but others. This comes at a tremendous cost for Black and North African individuals. 
Organized over the slogan, “Urgent: Our Police Murder with Impunity,” the families of victims 
amassed a list of over 131 individuals murdered or mutilated during interactions with the 
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police.587 These families demand justice and the creation of legislation targeted toward holding 
police officers accountable for flagrant violence. Anti-racist organizations such as SOS Racism, 
CRAN and LICRA lend support to these individual and community efforts.588 To date, 
parliament has not successfully passed any legislation regarding police behavior and the list of 
non-white individuals impacted by police violence continues to grow.  
The interconnected relationship between race, history and French national identity is an 
evolving category that has shifted and transformed over the past forty years.  Nevertheless, Black 
demands for greater visibility and their wrestling with society’s institutional inequality remain a 
permanent feature of their experiences in France.  Three generations of Black migrants have 
added complexity and nuance to previously unilateral positions on these connections. African 
immigrants and citizens continue to challenge the current politicization of a homogenous Black 
caricature prevalent in French culture. This attempt to “essentialize” the African community is at 
the forefront of activist engagements in Parisian society. Their emphasis on media depictions and 
its impact on daily life links representation to a fundamental recognition of humanity. By shifting 
the focus to “everyday” interactions, activists explore how these violent behaviors are 
normalized and desensitized over time especially through negative portrayals of Black people.  
Colonial conceptions of race resulted in “othering” Black migrants living in the post-colonial 
metropole. Long after the violent catalyst of decolonization fizzled, police brutality and the 
frustration of Black communities embodied in the suburban uprisings from the 1980’s to the new 
                                                          
587 "Qui Sera Le Prochain?" Urgence-notre-police-assassine En Toute Impunité. January 25, 2018. 
http://www.urgence-notre-police-assassine.fr/123663553.  
588 See "SOS Racisme Lance Un Appel à Témoin! #Police." SOS Racisme. February 2, 2017. https://sos-
racisme.org/police/; "Contrôles Au Faciès : Le Cran Met à Disposition Un "auto-récépissé" à Télécharger Pour 




millennium persists. French insistence on “racelessness” in the face of overwhelming evidence 
that police view Black people as criminals in an attempt to drown the deafening cries of Black 




















Epilogue: Africa, France and the Future: “Liberty, equality, Mbappé & the 2018 World Cup 
 
  Kylian Mbappé was five months old when France won its first FIFA World Cup 
championship in 1998. Born to a Congolese father and Algerian mother, Mbappé was raised in 
the northern Parisian banlieue of Bondy.589 Twenty years later, he was selected for the 2018 
French national team. As France prepared for the FIFA tournament, the national team moved 
swiftly through the preliminary games. Sports commentators and local news channels predicted 
that the 2018 French national team had the talent to win it all. At the center of these hopeful 
forecasts was Mbappé. Expectations that he would serve as the team’s talisman dominated the 
soccer world. Many believed Mbappé was destined to make World Cup history and join the 
Brazilian soccer legend Pelé as the youngest player to score a goal in a World Cup Finals match.   
 Over the course of the 2018 FIFA tournament, the French national team controlled each 
game. On July 15, 2018, Paris buzzed with excitement, Les Bleus were headed to the World Cup 
final in a match against Croatia. Hundreds of thousands of fans swarmed the city. Parisians 
packed local bars. Beyoncé and Jay-Z postponed their sold-out On the Run Tour II concert to 
accommodate over 50,000 loyal soccer fans in attendance.590  AfroPunk created fan zone areas 
for music festival patrons to watch the match. At 5:00pm, the city of Paris and soccer fans 
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around the world waited with bated breath for the World Cup final kick-off. The summer air was 
electric with energy as many fans camped outside for over ten hours in preparation for the match.  
 After a tense first half, Paul Pogba, the son of Guinean immigrants, kicked a 59 foot goal 
to seal France’s 3-1 lead over Croatia. Ecstatic fans chanted, “Whoever does not jump is not 
French!” Their movements caused “mini-earthquakes.”591 The ground literally shook with 
excitement. Shortly after, Kylian Mbappé scored a goal of his own and ensured France’s victory 
over Croatia. Twenty years after France secured their World Cup win in 1998, the national team 
brought the title back to the hexagon. Led by scorers Kylian Mbappé, Paul Pogba and Antoine 





 Almost one million people stormed the Champs-Élysées waving French flags and 
embracing each other. They chanted, “Liberté, Égalité, Mbappé."592 Over 100,000 people sang 
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Figure 20. Paul Pogba (pictured left) and 
Kylian Mbappé (pictured right) after 
their 2018 World Cup Final win.  
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the lyrics to “N**gaz in Paris” along with Jay-Z and Beyoncé as they wore Paris Saint-Germain 
jerseys (the top team in France’s domestic league). Thousands of cars beeped their horns and 
draped the tri-colored flags outside their windows.  French president, Emmanuel Macron 
delivered an emotional speech. He exclaimed, “I told you and the coach to bring back the second 
star. You did it! You made us dream, you played wonderful football, you made 60 million 
French people and kids everywhere dream and you'll see tomorrow when you go back home…a 
big thank you to you, to the whole team."593 The next day, a parade for the national team filed 
the players along the Champs-Élysées again gathering hundreds of thousands of fans. After the 
parade, the players were officially received by the President. In photos, Macron dabbed with 
Paul Pogba and he led the team in several chants in front of the Élysée Palace.594  
In the days following France’s second World Cup win, the world reacted to this 
achievement. Much of the attention focused on the team’s racial and socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Of the 23 players who formed the French World Cup team, 14 are of (Black) 
African descent, 2 of North African descent and 5 were raised in the suburbs.595 Reflecting on 
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France’s dominating win over Croatia, South African comedian Trevor Noah joked, “Africa 
Won the Word Cup!”596 His comment caused a tidal wave of reactions on both sides of the 
Atlantic as people of African descent, the French government and the players themselves 
weighed in. Debates erupted on social media, leading activists and scholars wrote opinion pieces 
navigating the complicated story of race, identity and nationality in contemporary France.  
In the wake of these events, the French ambassador to the United States, Gérard Araud 
penned a letter to Trevor Noah reprimanding him for his statements. He wrote,  
France does not refer to its citizens based on their race, religion or origin. To us, there is 
no hyphenated identity, roots are an individual reality. By calling them an African team, 
it seems you are denying their Frenchness. This even in jest, legitimizes the ideology 
which claims whiteness as the only definition of being French.597   
 
The letter was reposted to Twitter and a second series of debates erupted. This public debacle 
escalated when Noah responded to Araud’s letter in a subsequent show. Reading the letter to 
audience members, Trevor Noah clarified his previous comments by stating that he did not mean 
to deny any of the players their sense of “Frenchness.” Instead in his impassioned monologue, he 
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questioned both the parameters of French assimilation policies and their impact on an 
individual’s sense of identity. Trevor asked why players cannot be both French and African.  He 
noted that within the definition of nationalism offered by the ambassador, Araud underscores the 
notion that in order to be French, the players must “erase their African-ness.”  Noah countered 
this position with the statement, “I don’t take their Frenchness away, but I also don’t think you 
need to their African-ness away.”598  His comments highlighted the constant resurfacing of 
duality among multi-ethnic French populations. Since the 1980s, these questions of identity 
pervade politics and public debate. In response to comments made by both Noah and Araud, 
Rokhaya Diallo penned an article entitled, “On football, identity and 'Frenchness'.” 
She wrote,  
A common French identity cannot and should not be created by whitewashing history. 
These athletes should not be forced to forget their heritage - and their ancestors' stories - 
in order to legitimize their Frenchness… Despite what Araud says, France is not a nation 
that defends the French identity of its black athletes - and black citizens in general - at all 
times. The non-white citizens of France are only celebrated and embraced as fully French 
when they perform extraordinary feats - when they win the World Cup or save the life of 
a child by climbing the façade of a building with bare hands. This demonstrates the 
fragility of non-white Frenchness: raised to the clouds when they act exceptionally and 
reduced to their origins at the slightest mistake. French footballers of African descent are 
not any less French than their white counterparts, and they should not need to disown 
their African heritage to prove that.599 
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Her comments synthesized years of conversations and scholarship on the connections between 
racial and national identity. The linkage between “African-ness” and “Frenchness” remains at the 
core of French national controversy and decades of sociopolitical and cultural negotiation by 
Black populations living in France. Their lived experiences underscore the reality that dual 
identities exist and are already embraced by Black French people. Penned just before the final 
World Cup match, Professor Maboula Soumahoro applauded this duality. She wrote, “Blackness 
is French. Blackness is an experience… Go, Les Noirs! Because you can be Black and 
French.”600  
Despite this open celebration of Blackness and Frenchness in 2018, issues of racial 
inequality remained particularly salient just before the World Cup. In 2017, Black Lives Matter 
France had publicized a series of violent attacks upon Black suburban youth. A national study 
conducted that year on police brutality detailed that “40 percent of young people between the 
ages of 18 to 24 reported having been stopped by police, 80 percent of men in that age range 
‘perceived as black [or] Arab/from the Maghreb,’ reported being stopped by the police.”601 The 
2017 French Presidential election had exposed a spike in racist and anti-immigrant positions 
among voters. Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen campaigned on curtailing immigration, despite 
a significant dip in these migration processes and played on xenophobic and racial fears to garner 
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34% of the national vote.602 This election represented the FN’s best national performance in its 
45 year history. 
The use of sports and soccer in particular to reunite a divided nation and address issues of 
discrimination, racism, and national identity summoned recollections of the short-lived 
experiment with diversity under the banner “Black, Blanc, Beur” in 1998. Twenty years later, 
many of the same issues plaguing Black French residents endure. National youth unemployment 
rates linger at 21% and in various banlieue areas this percentage spikes at 40%.603 Tensions 
between police forces and suburban youth continue. These tensions resurfaced in the immediate 
wake of the 2018 win.  As Paris reveled in its second World Cup victory, violent exchanges 
between youth and police erupted which led to the suspension of public transit to several 
suburban neighborhoods.604 Furthermore, public campaigns around racial identity and 
Frenchness received increased exposure under the banner “Je suis noire, pas Black.” This 
movement codified in film, paraphernalia, marches and music empowers Afro-French 
populations to reclaim the word “Noire” to describe their racial identity instead of the English 
                                                          
602 Alissa J. Rubin, "Macron Decisively Defeats Le Pen in French Presidential Race." The New York Times. May 07, 
2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-france-election-marine-le-
pen.html. 
603 Amrani, Iman. "France Squandered the Unity of Its Last World Cup Win. This Time Must Be Different | Iman 
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https://www.theguardian.com/football/video/2018/jul/16/police-and-football-fans-in-paris-clash-after-frances-





term “Black.”605 The French state’s resistance to contending with race, national identity and 
belonging in the new millennium underscores the reality that sports cannot and will never be able 
to upend the deep-seeded roots of racial inequality in French society.   
Moreover, these moments of euphoria continue to paper over decades of systemic 
discrimination. Brewing underneath the national celebration of the 2018 World Cup victory 
remains a simmering discontent within marginalized communities. If the 1998 title taught Black 
communities anything it was that this era of good feelings “last[s] about as long as the 
fireworks.”606 The question that activists face once again is what will happen now that the 
fireworks have faded? The use of racelessness to cloak the problematic disparities within society 
is an enduring tactic. As long as these inequalities remain unresolved and once the “World Cup 
effect” wanes, history foretells that the system is bound to give way to something harsher and 
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interviews with Black French women. See, "Ouvrir La Voix." Ouvrir La Voix. Accessed February 10, 2019. 
https://ouvrirlavoixlefilm.fr/.  






ADEF – Association for the Development of Foyers  
ADICOM – Africa Digital Communication  
AFIP – Association pour Favoriser l’Integration Professionnelle  
AFRAP – Association for the Parisian Region Foyers  
AFTAM – Association for the Reception and Training of Migrant Workers  
AN – Archives Nationales in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine 
AOM-AEF- Archives d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence 
ASSOTRAF – Association for Assistance to African Workers  
BLM – Black Lives Matter  
CAPDV – Cercle d’Action pour la Promotion de la Diversité  
CNNum – National Digital Council 
CRAN – Representative Council of Black Associations 
CSA – Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel  
FANE – Fédération d'action nationaliste et européenne 
FAS – Fonds d’Action sociale  
FEANF – Fédération des Étudiants D'Afrique Noire en France  
FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association  
FN – National Front  
GDF – Gaz de France  
HLM – Habitations à loyer modéré  
LDH – League for Human Rights  
LICRA – International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism  
MOACOSI –Miss Oumy À Coeur Solidarité Internationale  
MRAP – Movement Against Racism and for the Friendship of Peoples   
OAPEC – Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries  
OAS – Organisation armée secrète 
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ONI – Office National D’Immigration  
RPR – Rally for the Republic  
SNCF – Société nationale des chemins de fer français  
SONACONTRA – National Society for the Construction of Housing for Worker Housings 
SONACOTRAL – National Society for the Construction of Housing for Algerian Worker 
Housing  
SOUNDIATA – Association for Solidarity, Dignity and Unity in Welcoming African Workers  
SSRC – Social Science Research Council  
UDF – Union for the French Democracy  
UGTSF – Union Générale des Travailleurs Sénégalais en France  
ZFU – Zones franches urbaines  
ZRU – Zones de redynamisation urbaine  





















Afrique sur Seine – A 1955 film directed by Paulin Soumanou Vieyra and Mamadou Sarr. The 
film’s title “Africa on the Seine” became synonymous with capturing experiences of Sub-
Saharan populations in Paris. 
Aide au retour – This term meaning “aide to return” was a government sponsored financial 
incentive for recent migrants to return to their home country in 1977. The government offered 
unemployed immigrants who worked in France for more than five years the equivalent of 1,524 
euros to leave. 
Arrondissements –This term refers to local districts within Paris. 
Baccalauréat – This term is used to describe the equivalent of an American high school diploma. 
Banlieue – This term is used to describe a suburban location within Paris.  
Banlieusards – A slang French term for someone from the suburbs often connoting their lower 
socioeconomic status.  
Bensikin – This term refers to a traditional Cameroonian song during which people swing from 
one foot to the other, then, in turn, enter the circle and improvise a stanza.  
Beur – A French term with origins in the verlan inversion of the word “arabe” inverted first as 
“rebeu” and secondly as “beur” used to describe people of North African descent. 
Bidonvilles – Roughly translated as shantytowns, the term describes the construction of this 
lodging along the periphery of many French cities during the mid-20th century.  
Black – An English term used to describe African diasporic populations in France as well as 
distance French language speakers from a maternal language reference to race. 
Black-Blanc-Beur – The phrase translated as “Black, White, Arab” was supposed to champion 
racial diversity in France during the 1998 World Cup tournament.  
Bouillabaisse – A French word used to describe a traditional fish stew originating from 
Marseille. This stew is used as a model to describe the acculturation process and diversity model 
of France by Sociologist Loretta Bass.   
Circulaires – A term used to describe French administrative and ministry action particularly in 
reference to immigration.  
Cités de transit – A term used to describe the American equivalent to urban housing projects. 
Cité Universaitare – A term used to describe the main Parisian housing center for foreign 
students in Paris. The campus is located in the 14th arrondissement. 
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Contrôle d’identité – A term used to describe an identity check, which is a police procedure 
protected under French law. The police can stop anyone and ask for their identification in order 
to prove their citizenship. 
Décalage – A term popularized by the scholar Brent Hayes Edwards. He defines décalage as a 
“gap” in space and time and uses the word to represent the un-evenness of the African Diaspora 
as a model for individual experiences that resist and or escape linguistic translation 
Dénatalité française – A term that connotes low population growth. 
Entreprises CAC 40 – A term that describes the equivalent to the American Fortune 500 
companies. 
Eurafrica – A term used in postcolonial France to describe the continued connections between 
Europe and Africa.  
Foyers – A term used to describe single-sex dormitories originally created for African migrant 
workers in early 1960’s and 1970’s.  
Françafrique – A term coined by French economist François-Xavier Verschave to describe 
economic policies between France and African in the postcolonial period. 
Goutte d'Or – A term used to describe a neighborhood in the 18th arrondissement of Paris, more 
recently referred to as “Little Africa. 
Habitations à loyer modéré – A term used to describe government low cost housing.  
Harkis –A term used to describe Algerian Muslims who supported France’s presence in Algeria. 
Jus soli – A term used within French nationality law, which is derived from the Latin phrase 
meaning “right of soil.”  
Laïcité – A term used to endorse the practice of secularism. Within France, outward displays of 
religious patronage are discouraged within the public sphere. 
La Marseilliase – A term used to describe the French national anthem.  
Les Trente Glorieuses – A term used to describe thirty glorious years of economic growth from 
1945 to 1975. 
Liberté égalité et fraternité – A phrase used to outline the national motto “Liberty, Equality and 
Brotherhood.” 
Nègre” – A term used to describe people of African descent in France, meaning negro and also 
pejoratively as nigger.  
Noire – A term used to describe people of African descent in France.  
Pieds-noirs – A term used to describe Algerian people of Jewish descent.  
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Problème des banlieues – A term used to situate social, political and economic problems within 
suburban neighborhoods.  
Sans-papiers – A term used to describe undocumented individuals. 
Sappeur – A word used to describe a social and cultural phenomenon begun in Kinshasa and 
Brazzaville during the colonial period. Congolese men repurposed the hand-me-downs of 
colonial administrators to make them their own. Altering and layering French designer brands 
with bright colors, patterns and fabrics, the men celebrate political freedom and individuality 
through their clothing.  
Seuil de Tolerance – A phrase used by French President François Mitterrand to describe a 
“threshold of tolerance” in regard to immigration.  
Tiralleurs – A term that is an abbreviation of the words Tirailleurs Sénégalais, which refers to 
colonial troops recruited from West, Central and East Africa known collectively as Sub-Saharan 
or Black Africa. 
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School of Arts & Sciences, African American Studies, B.A.  
Whitman School of Management, Strategic Management, Minor  
Phi Beta Kappa  
 
Awards, Prizes and Fellowships 
Nelson Blake Research Prize               2017-2018  
Roscoe Martin Research Grant               2017-2018  
Ronald E. McNair Scholar Research Fellowship           2016-2017  
French Ministry of Education Teaching Assistant Program     2016-2017  
New York Council for Humanities Graduate Public Humanities Fellowship    2016-2017  
The Moynihan Center for European Studies Graduate Research Grant                  2016-2017  
  
Articles  
"Le Pouvoir Noir: The Politics of Identity, Pan-Africanism, and Social Justice"    
(Under Review)  
  
“Navigating the Quandary of African American Study Abroad Statistics: Representation, Gender 
and Geopolitics in Paris, France.”  




Barbara, S. Davis, Black America Series: Syracuse African Americans. Syracuse Manuscript. 
Vol 1. N.2   
(Spring 2013) 
 
Selected Presentations  
 “Doing Our Work’: Critical Community Engagement within Academic Institutions,” National 
Association of African American Studies, Dallas, Texas, February 2019.   
  
 "Le Pouvoir Noir: The Politics of Identity, Pan-Africanism, and Social Justice," Africans, 
African Americans, Academia, and Activism Conference, Bowie State University, April 2018.  
  
“The Road to Independence: Somali Bantu Refugee Immigration to Syracuse,” Humanities New 
York and Central New York Corridor, Manhattan, New York, April 2017.  
  
“The Politics of a Post-Colonial Diaspora: Contemporary African Immigration to the French 
Metropole.” Syracuse University Future Professoriate Program Conference, Syracuse, New 
York, April 2015.  
  
“The Declension Narrative: Les banlieues défavorisée and the 2005 Parisian Riots.” National 
Council for Black Studies Annual Conference, University of Miami, March 2014.  
 
Teaching Experience  
Humanities New York, Reading & Discussion Program Facilitator      July 2017-Present  
The New York Council for the Humanities Reading & Discussion Program focuses on bringing together community 
members for a series of thematically-linked, text-based conversations. This position requires facilitating reading 
discussions for non-academic audiences.   
 
 - Partnering with Syracuse University's African American Studies Department and the Martin 
Luther King Jr. Memorial Library, this program explores the work of Audre Lorde and James 
Baldwin bringing together the Syracuse University community and local Syracuse residents.  
 - Partnering with Refugee and Immigrant Self- Empowerment (RISE) Community Center in 
Syracuse, New York, this program entitled “Serving” brought together refugees, immigrants and 
various other community members to explore how to better support civic engagement within the 
city.  
  
Syracuse University Study Abroad, Teaching Associate                                June 2015-August 2017   
Paris Noir: Literature, Art and Contemporary Life in Diaspora is an internationally recognized five-week summer 
study abroad course hosted by Syracuse University.  
  
-Mentoring and assessing the seminar coursework, research proposals and presentations of 13-17 
undergraduate and graduate students. 
 -Managing the budget for all program/operational activities and reporting business transactions 
to the University Study Abroad Office, African American Studies Department and College of 
Arts & Science.  
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-Producing digital content for the University highlighting components of the program and its 
impact on the students including: a weekly blog and social media posts on Facebook, Instagram 
and Twitter. 
  
Syracuse University, History Department Graduate Instructor              August 2014-Present  
100 Level Courses: Early Modern European History, American History before 1865, American History after 1865, 
and Global History before 1750.  
  
-Producing a range of teaching materials that meet the learning objectives of the above courses at 
the undergraduate level.  
-Assessing the coursework of 40-60 students using a variety of methods and techniques to 
provide effective feedback that supports their learning. -Providing select lectures on course 
material.  
-Engaging in professional development to update subject-related knowledge bases.  
  
Executive Education Graduate Assistant                                   December 2017-February 2018  
Course: PAI 763: NGO Management in Developing Countries  
 
 - Assessing the coursework of 38 graduate students using a variety of methods and techniques to 
provide effective feedback that supports their learning. -Relevant Professional Coursework 
including: Log frames Analysis, Letter of Inquiries, Case Study memos and NGO Grant Project 
Proposals 
 
Professional Experience  
  
Program Coordinator, Transnational NGO Initiative, Maxwell School    March 2017-Present   
The Transnational NGO Initiative focuses on the governance, leadership, and effectiveness of transnationally 
operated NGOs and advances our understanding of TNGOs as significant players in global affairs through research, 
education, and practitioner engagement.   
  
-Supervise three undergraduate research teams examining leadership development, diversity & 
inclusion strategies and transnational NGO case studies.   
-Manage correspondence and curriculum development for the Senior Leadership Development 
Program in collaboration with Amnesty International, Greenpeace, CIVICUS, ActionAid and 
Oxfam International.   
-Facilitate public talks from NGO leaders and researchers within the Moynihan Institute.  
- Monitor research development for the annual TNGO Fellow and coordinate the fellow’s public 
presentations.   
  
WellsLink Intern, Syracuse University Office of Multicultural Affairs        August 2011-May 2013   
The WellsLink Leadership Program is an academic excellence  and  leadership  program  for  first-year 
undergraduate students giving them the tools necessary  to  achieve  their  academic  goals, develop  
professionalism, and expand their awareness of valuable resources and opportunities.   
  
-Operated as an administrative assistant to the Office of Multicultural Affairs and WellsLink 
Leadership program.  
-Greeted and assisted all office visitors via walk-ins, phone and email.  
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-Functioned as a Student Liaison for program participants.  
-Organized communication between program staff and students.  
-Assisted with event planning and execution of all WellsLink programming. 
-Coordinated filing, data management, drafted and edited short memos.  
  
 
Campus and Community Service 
 
Play for Peace: Communications Contributor     October 2016-Present 
 - Contributors conceptualize, write, edit and promote the content of the organization and its 
global activity.  
-Contributors interview local trainers and NGO leaders stationed throughout the world to provide 
updates for the PlayforPeace blog and Annual Report.  
  
RISE (Refugee Immigrant Self-Empowerment): Consultant    May 2016-Present  
-Customize curriculum for the Young Women's Empowerment Program -Mentor school-aged 
immigrant and refugee girls (ages 12-17) on a weekly basis.  
-Develop proposals and grants with accompanying program budgets 
-Organize annual youth conference panels on college preparedness and essential study skills  
  
The Conflict Management Center: Associate     September 2017-Present  
-Co-lead training workshops on Conflict management and resolution as well as outreach events 
which are open to both the University and the greater Syracuse community.  






Languages: Professional Working Proficiency in French, Conversational Haitian Kreyol and 
Spanish   
  
Technical: Microsoft Office, Research Databases, Social Media Platforms, Adobe Photoshop, 





 Institutional Review Board Certification in Human Subject Education Research  
  
Future Professoriate Program Certificate in University Teaching 
 
 
